本文關(guān)鍵詞： 股東類型 大小非減持 動因 最優(yōu)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)　出處：《重慶大學》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：從股權(quán)分置改革中引起的資本市場重構(gòu)開始深刻影響著市場微觀個體行為發(fā)生變化，微觀個體通過減（增）持股份追求自身利益最大化。在大小非減持的過程中，不同類型的股東在減持力度、時點選擇等考慮的因素均不同，其對證券市場的影響也迥異。由于最優(yōu)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的形成是一個動態(tài)過程，在此過程中不同股東增持或減持股份；而在股權(quán)高度集中的市場中，股東增持或減持行為直接影響了股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)，所以大小非減持實質(zhì)上是一個最優(yōu)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的動態(tài)選擇問題。 本文從最優(yōu)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和微觀個體效用理論的視角，采用規(guī)范分析與實證研究相結(jié)合的方法，區(qū)分股東類型來研究大小非減持動因。首先，總結(jié)了國內(nèi)外關(guān)于最優(yōu)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的主流理論同大小非減持相關(guān)的主要研究成果，并對股票市場的供求關(guān)系、控股股東與私有收益和非控股股東與行為金融學等相關(guān)理論做了分析和回顧。其次，基于Parigi和黃志忠等模型和研究方法的基礎上，結(jié)合中國股市實際情況而修正，構(gòu)建理論模型，推導得出不同類型股東減持動因的假設。再次，通過2006年至2011年間深證數(shù)據(jù)的實證分析和上證市場宏達股份與匯通能源的案例分析，共同驗證模型假設的適用性和合理性。最后，，本文針對不同類型股東的行為特點和大小非減持動因，從優(yōu)化上市公司法人治理結(jié)構(gòu)，創(chuàng)新監(jiān)管方式及強化信息披露，建立健全的投資者法律保護體系三個方面提出了相應的政策建議。 研究得到了三種類型股東不同的減持動因：控股股東的減持來自于低業(yè)績、高價位、強風險和降低掏空成本的影響；股權(quán)制衡條件下的非控股大股東減持在考慮低業(yè)績和高價位因素之外還會受到弱制衡因素的影響；而中小股東減持動因主要來自于低業(yè)績和高估值。
[Abstract]:The capital market restructuring caused by the reform of split share structure has a profound impact on the market micro-individual behavior changes. In the process of non-reduction, different types of shareholders consider different factors, such as the intensity of reduction, the choice of time and so on. Because the formation of the optimal ownership structure is a dynamic process, different shareholders increase or reduce their shares in the process; In the highly concentrated equity market, shareholders' behavior of increasing or reducing their holdings has a direct impact on the ownership structure, so the non-reduction is essentially a dynamic choice of the optimal ownership structure. From the perspective of optimal equity structure and micro-individual utility theory, this paper uses the method of combining normative analysis and empirical research to distinguish the types of shareholders to study the non-reduction motivation. This paper summarizes the main research results of the main theories about the optimal equity structure and the non-reduction, and the relationship between supply and demand in the stock market. The related theories of controlling shareholder and private income and non-controlling shareholder and behavioral finance are analyzed and reviewed. Secondly, based on Parigi and Huang Zhizhong and other models and research methods. According to the actual situation of China's stock market, this paper constructs a theoretical model and deduces the hypothesis of different types of shareholders' reduction motivation. Through the empirical analysis of Shenzhen Stock Exchange data from 2006 to 2011 and the case study of HTC shares and Huitong Energy in Shanghai Stock Exchange, the applicability and rationality of the model hypothesis are verified. According to the behavior characteristics and non-reduction motivation of different types of shareholders, this paper focuses on optimizing the corporate governance structure of listed companies, innovating supervision methods and strengthening information disclosure. To establish a sound legal protection system for investors in three aspects of the corresponding policy recommendations. The results show that three types of shareholders have different reasons to reduce their holdings: the controlling shareholder's reduction comes from low performance, high price, strong risk and the effect of reducing tunneling cost; Under the condition of equity balance, the reduction of non-controlling majority shareholders will be affected by weak checks and balances in addition to the consideration of low performance and high price factors. And medium and small shareholder reduce the motive mainly comes from low achievement and high valuation.
【學位授予單位】：重慶大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.51;F224

【參考文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 劉林;國有大股東控制權(quán)的狀態(tài)依賴模型[J];財經(jīng)科學;2005年02期

2 李寧;劉玉紅;;大小非減持過程中的盈余管理行為及監(jiān)管策略[J];財經(jīng)問題研究;2009年11期

3 申尊煥;大股東補償、激勵與中小股東利益保護[J];財貿(mào)研究;2003年05期

4 孫永祥;上市公司的所有權(quán)與融資結(jié)構(gòu)[J];當代經(jīng)濟科學;2001年06期

5 王會芳;中國上市公司第一大股東變更的實證研究[J];當代經(jīng)濟科學;2004年02期

6 楊棟;張建龍;張小濤;;“大小非”解禁沖擊了中國證券市場嗎[J];當代經(jīng)濟科學;2009年02期

7 蔣海勇;建立對大股東權(quán)力濫用的有效制約機制——《公司法》修改的若干建議[J];廣西財政高等�？茖W校學報;2004年03期

8 吳育輝;吳世農(nóng);;股票減持過程中的大股東掏空行為研究[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟;2010年05期

9 朱紅軍,汪輝;“股權(quán)制衡”可以改善公司治理嗎?——宏智科技股份有限公司控制權(quán)之爭的案例研究[J];管理世界;2004年10期

10 徐莉萍;陳工孟;辛宇;;控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移、產(chǎn)權(quán)改革及公司經(jīng)營績效之改進[J];管理世界;2005年03期

相關(guān)博士學位論文 前1條

1 唐運舒;全流通進程中大股東侵害及中小投資者權(quán)益保護研究[D];合肥工業(yè)大學;2009年

本文編號：1488185