本文關(guān)鍵詞：基于契約動機視角的盈余管理治理路徑研究　出處：《大連理工大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 契約動機 銀行監(jiān)管 高管薪酬 盈余管理

【摘要】：近年來,隨著中國市場經(jīng)濟的高速發(fā)展和股票市場的不斷發(fā)展,上市公司的盈余管理問題日益凸顯,引起了各利益相關(guān)者的廣泛關(guān)注。現(xiàn)代企業(yè)理論指出,企業(yè)是一系列契約的聯(lián)盟,企業(yè)的會計盈余在這些契約履行的過程中發(fā)揮著重要的作用。研究表明債務(wù)契約動機與薪酬契約動機都是上市公司盈余管理的契約動機,而債權(quán)人與管理當(dāng)局之間的問題也屬于委托代理問題,上市公司高管為了獲得貸款,獲得高水平的薪酬均有可能進行盈余管理�；趥鶆�(wù)契約的盈余管理動機的存在,作為利益相關(guān)者的上市公司債權(quán)人,特別是大債權(quán)人——銀行為了維護其自身的合法利益,將對上市公司的盈余管理行為進行監(jiān)督。同時有研究表明當(dāng)銀行對上市公司的監(jiān)管更加嚴(yán)格時,基于薪酬契約動機的盈余管理則會相應(yīng)的減弱。 本文從盈余管理的契約視角出發(fā),在深入的理論研究基礎(chǔ)上,建立結(jié)構(gòu)方程,選用2007年到2011年滬深兩市共2487個樣本公司的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù),探索基于債務(wù)契約動機的銀行監(jiān)督機制和基于薪酬契約動機的高管薪酬激勵機制對上市公司盈余管理程度的治理效果以及治理機制與路徑。對進一步完善上市公司的薪酬激勵機制、完善貸款制度、規(guī)范上市公司的盈余管理行為、提高上市公司會計信息質(zhì)量具有一定的理論意義和現(xiàn)實意義。 研究結(jié)果顯示,上市公司高管薪酬激勵機制對盈余管理有顯著的激發(fā)作用,銀行監(jiān)督機制對盈余管理有顯著的抑制作用,而且銀行監(jiān)督機制的存在會激勵高管努力工作,進而達(dá)到薪酬水平得以提升的效果,并且能夠削弱高管薪酬激勵機制對盈余管理的激勵作用。基于契約動機的盈余管理行為更偏好采取應(yīng)計盈余管理方式。企業(yè)契約的制定過程中,應(yīng)全面權(quán)衡,綜合考慮,制定完善合理的債務(wù)契約和薪酬契約,充分發(fā)揮薪酬契約機制和銀行監(jiān)督機制對上市公司盈余管理行為的治理作用。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the rapid development of China's market economy and the continuous development of the stock market, the earnings management problem of listed companies has become increasingly prominent, which has aroused the widespread concern of all stakeholders, modern enterprise theory points out. An enterprise is an alliance of contracts. Accounting earnings of enterprises play an important role in the performance of these contracts. The research shows that the motivation of debt contract and salary contract are both contractual motives of earnings management of listed companies. The problem between creditors and management authorities is also a principal-agent problem, listed company executives in order to obtain loans. Earnings management is possible to obtain a high level of remuneration. The existence of earnings management motivation based on debt contract, as a stakeholder creditor of listed companies. Especially, in order to protect their own legal interests, the big creditors will supervise the earnings management behavior of listed companies. At the same time, some studies have shown that when banks supervise the listed companies more strictly. Earnings management based on salary contract motivation will be weakened accordingly. From the perspective of the contract of earnings management and on the basis of in-depth theoretical research, this paper establishes the structural equation and selects 2487 sample data from 2007 to 2011 in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets. This paper explores the governance effect of bank supervision mechanism based on debt contract motivation and executive compensation incentive mechanism based on compensation contract motivation on earnings management degree of listed companies. Division of the compensation incentive mechanism. It is of theoretical and practical significance to perfect the loan system, standardize the earnings management behavior of listed companies and improve the quality of accounting information of listed companies. The results show that the incentive mechanism of executive compensation of listed companies has a significant incentive effect on earnings management, and the bank supervision mechanism has a significant inhibitory effect on earnings management. And the existence of bank supervision mechanism will encourage executives to work hard, and then achieve the effect of salary level can be improved. And it can weaken the incentive effect of executive compensation incentive mechanism on earnings management. Earnings management behavior based on contract motivation prefers to adopt accrual earnings management. Considering comprehensively, we should establish and perfect reasonable debt contract and salary contract, and give full play to the governance effect of salary contract mechanism and bank supervision mechanism on earnings management behavior of listed companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：大連理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275;F832.51;F224

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本文編號：1430505