【摘要】：政治與經(jīng)濟的關(guān)系一直是學(xué)術(shù)研究的焦點之一(Durnev,2011),宏觀經(jīng)濟政策的執(zhí)行與波動,是微觀企業(yè)行為的基礎(chǔ)和重要影響因素之一,政治對微觀企業(yè)財務(wù)行為的影響日益受到學(xué)界的重視(徐業(yè)坤等,2013)。企業(yè)的行為內(nèi)生于其所處的制度環(huán)境之中,而政治環(huán)境的影響尤為明顯。我國地方政府在地區(qū)的經(jīng)濟增長中發(fā)揮著重要作用,地方政府掌握著信貸、政府補貼等資源分配以及行政審批的權(quán)力,且在執(zhí)行過程中有著較大的自由裁量權(quán),地方政府間的競爭體制和財政分權(quán)體制往往被人們認(rèn)為是解釋和理解"中國經(jīng)濟奇跡"的重要制度安排,上級政府會根據(jù)地方的各項經(jīng)濟指標(biāo)對地方官員進(jìn)行考核,據(jù)以決定官員的晉升與否(周黎安,2007),地方政府因此有很強的激勵去發(fā)展地方經(jīng)濟。官員變更往往會導(dǎo)致政策的不連續(xù)性,從而帶來政策不確定性,新任官員在考核機制下,很可能對企業(yè)進(jìn)行干預(yù)以實現(xiàn)個人晉升的目標(biāo),稅收既是地方財政收入的重要來源,同時也是官員政績考核的重要指標(biāo),由于在稅收征管過程中,地方政府擁有較大的自由裁量權(quán)(劉慧龍和吳聯(lián)生,2014),因此官員變更勢必會對企業(yè)的稅收規(guī)避行為產(chǎn)生影響。本文收集了 2009——2013年中國各城市的市委書記變更數(shù)據(jù)和A股非金融類上市公司數(shù)據(jù),考察了地方官員變更對企業(yè)稅收規(guī)避行為的影響。本文發(fā)現(xiàn),總體而言,地方官員變更會顯著抑制當(dāng)?shù)仄髽I(yè)的稅收規(guī)避行為;進(jìn)一步的研究表明,在金融發(fā)展水平高的地區(qū),官員變更對稅收規(guī)避的抑制程度更顯著。官員變更對企業(yè)稅收規(guī)避的抑制作用僅顯著存在于國有企業(yè)中,且對地方國有企業(yè)中的影響尤甚,而在民營企業(yè)中并不顯著。同時,官員變更對稅收規(guī)避的抑制作用還會受到官員異質(zhì)性的影響,如果新任地方官員屬于外地調(diào)任或者非正常換屆時,抑制作用會更為明顯。本文的進(jìn)一步檢驗還發(fā)現(xiàn)在晉升壓力較大以及財政壓力較大的地區(qū),官員變更對企業(yè)稅收規(guī)避的抑制程度更為顯著;在官員變更當(dāng)年地方國有企業(yè)的稅收規(guī)避程度減少越多,則在下一年得到的政府補貼越多。本文的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)從企業(yè)稅收規(guī)避層面為官員變更如何影響微觀企業(yè)行為提供了新的經(jīng)驗證據(jù),結(jié)合地區(qū)金融發(fā)展水平、產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)、國有企業(yè)層級等外部制度環(huán)境的研究,有助于加深了解政府如何干預(yù)企業(yè);其次,本文的研究豐富了企業(yè)稅收規(guī)避的文獻(xiàn),是對制度環(huán)境因素如何影響企業(yè)稅收規(guī)避的有益補充;最后,結(jié)合研究結(jié)論,本文同時對監(jiān)管機構(gòu)和企業(yè)提出相應(yīng)建議。
[Abstract]:The relationship between politics and economy has always been one of the focuses of academic research (Durnev,2011). The implementation and fluctuation of macroeconomic policy is one of the basic and important influencing factors of micro-enterprise behavior. The influence of politics on micro-enterprise financial behavior has been paid more and more attention by academic circles (Xu Yechun and others). The behavior of the enterprise is born in its institutional environment, and the influence of the political environment is especially obvious. Local governments in China play an important role in regional economic growth. Local governments hold the power of resource allocation, such as credit, government subsidies, and administrative examination and approval, and have greater discretion in the process of implementation. The competition system among local governments and the fiscal decentralization system are often considered to be important institutional arrangements for interpreting and understanding the "Chinese economic miracle." Local officials will be assessed by higher levels of government according to various local economic indicators. Local governments have a strong incentive to develop the local economy by deciding whether or not to promote officials (Zhou 2007). The change of officials often leads to the discontinuity of policies, which leads to policy uncertainty. Under the appraisal mechanism, new officials are likely to intervene in enterprises to achieve the goal of personal promotion. Tax is an important source of local revenue. At the same time, it is also an important indicator of official performance assessment. Because local governments have greater discretion in the process of tax collection and management (Liu Hui-long and Wu Lian-sheng 2014), the change of officials is bound to have an impact on the tax evasion behavior of enterprises. In this paper, we collect the data of the changes of party secretaries of cities in China from 2009 to 2013 and the data of A-share non-financial listed companies, and investigate the influence of the change of local officials on the tax evasion behavior of enterprises. This paper finds that, in general, the change of local officials will significantly inhibit the tax evasion behavior of local enterprises; further research shows that in areas with a high level of financial development, the degree of restraint of official change on tax evasion is more significant. The inhibitory effect of official change on tax evasion exists only in state-owned enterprises, especially in local state-owned enterprises, but not in private enterprises. At the same time, the restraining effect of official change on tax evasion will also be affected by the heterogeneity of officials. If the new local officials are transferred to other places or abnormal transfer, the inhibitory effect will be more obvious. The further test of this paper also found that in the areas where the pressure of promotion and financial pressure is greater, the degree of tax evasion of enterprises is more significantly inhibited by the change of officials, and the more the degree of tax evasion of local state-owned enterprises decreases in the year of the change of officials, The more government subsidies they receive next year. In this paper, we find that tax evasion provides new empirical evidence on how the change of officials affects micro-enterprise behavior, combining with the study of the external institutional environment, such as the level of regional financial development, the nature of property rights, the level of state-owned enterprises, and so on. It is helpful to understand how the government interferes with enterprises. Secondly, the research of this paper enriches the literature of corporate tax evasion and is a useful supplement to how institutional environmental factors affect corporate tax evasion. Finally, combined with the conclusions of the study, At the same time, this paper puts forward the corresponding suggestions to the regulators and enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：D630;F275.4;F832.51
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本文編號：2226158