本文選題：中國(guó)式分權(quán) + 地方政府競(jìng)爭(zhēng)�。� 參考：《云南大學(xué)》2015年博士論文

【摘要】：改革開放以來(lái),中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展取得了顯著成就,但與之相伴的是不斷惡化的環(huán)境污染。傳統(tǒng)文獻(xiàn)主要基于環(huán)境庫(kù)茲涅茨曲線、環(huán)境污染的公共物品性質(zhì)和外部性等對(duì)環(huán)境污染問題進(jìn)行研究。但環(huán)境污染的特殊性決定了政府在環(huán)境污染治理中的重要作用,特別是在中國(guó)這種政府主導(dǎo)型經(jīng)濟(jì)體中,對(duì)環(huán)境污染背后的政府行為進(jìn)行深入分析就顯得十分必要。由此,本文提出了一個(gè)理解我國(guó)地方政府環(huán)境治理的分析框架,從“財(cái)政分權(quán)、政治集權(quán)”的中國(guó)式分權(quán)體制出發(fā),構(gòu)造了一個(gè)中央和地方、地方政府間的博弈競(jìng)爭(zhēng)模型,分析我國(guó)環(huán)境治理困境的內(nèi)在邏輯,從理論上闡述財(cái)政分權(quán)和基于GDP的晉升錦標(biāo)賽對(duì)地方政府環(huán)境治理行為的影響。并采用2003-2012年省級(jí)面板數(shù)據(jù)實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了中國(guó)式分權(quán)與地方政府環(huán)境支出之間的關(guān)系、地方政府環(huán)境支出競(jìng)爭(zhēng)是否存在?以及地方政府環(huán)境支出競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的具體表現(xiàn)形式。理論研究表明,第一,中央政府對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的強(qiáng)調(diào)和地方政府財(cái)政激勵(lì)的增強(qiáng),使得地方政府過分偏向基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投入,而忽視了環(huán)境的保護(hù)和治理；第二,在資本流動(dòng)情況下,稟賦條件好的地區(qū),地方政府這種“重基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施、輕環(huán)境治理”的行為被進(jìn)一步放大。相反,稟賦條件差的地區(qū),地方政府基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投入相對(duì)減少,而環(huán)境公共物品投入將相對(duì)增加；第三,當(dāng)?shù)胤秸g環(huán)境公共物品提供存在策略性互補(bǔ)行為時(shí),溢出效應(yīng)的上升將使兩個(gè)地方政府環(huán)境公共物品供給增加。當(dāng)?shù)胤秸g環(huán)境公共物品提供存在策略性替代行為時(shí),溢出效應(yīng)的上升將使地方政府環(huán)境公共物品供給出現(xiàn)“騎蹺蹺板”特征。同時(shí),利用2003-2012年省級(jí)面板數(shù)據(jù),構(gòu)建空間計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)模型,運(yùn)用系統(tǒng)廣義矩估計(jì)方法就我國(guó)地方政府環(huán)境支出的策略互動(dòng)行為模式、形成機(jī)制等進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：我國(guó)地方政府間環(huán)境支出存在顯著的策略互動(dòng)行為；地方政府環(huán)境支出競(jìng)爭(zhēng)效應(yīng)相當(dāng)顯著,而溢出效應(yīng)并未發(fā)現(xiàn)；本文還發(fā)現(xiàn)我國(guó)的財(cái)政分權(quán)顯著地?cái)D出了地方政府的環(huán)境支出。在理論和實(shí)證分析的基礎(chǔ)上,本文認(rèn)為,必須從政府行為激勵(lì)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)的視角,改變地方政府“重經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)輕環(huán)境治理”的行為,使地方政府從“為增長(zhǎng)而競(jìng)爭(zhēng)”走向“為和諧而競(jìng)爭(zhēng)”。首先,要調(diào)整現(xiàn)行的環(huán)境治理體制,根據(jù)環(huán)境污染問題的實(shí)際采取屬地管理與垂直管理相結(jié)合的混合體制,并強(qiáng)化環(huán)境管理機(jī)構(gòu)的權(quán)威；其次,在保持中央政治集權(quán)前提下,調(diào)整中央政府政績(jī)考核指標(biāo)體系,將“綠色GDP”納入地方政府政績(jī)考核指標(biāo)體系,取代基于GDP的政績(jī)考核機(jī)制,并提高公眾環(huán)境滿意度在政績(jī)考核和干部提拔任用中的力度；第三,完善縱向和橫向財(cái)政轉(zhuǎn)移支付制度,建立公平合理的環(huán)境治理生態(tài)補(bǔ)償機(jī)制。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, China's economic development has made remarkable achievements, but it is accompanied by worsening environmental pollution. The traditional literature is mainly based on the environmental Kuznets curve, the nature of public goods and externalities of environmental pollution. However, the particularity of environmental pollution determines the important role of government in environmental pollution control, especially in the government-led economy such as China, so it is necessary to deeply analyze the government behavior behind environmental pollution. Therefore, this paper puts forward an analytical framework to understand the environmental governance of local governments in China, starting from the Chinese decentralization system of "fiscal decentralization, political centralization", constructs a game competition model between central, local and local governments. This paper analyzes the internal logic of the plight of environmental governance in China, and theoretically expounds the influence of fiscal decentralization and the promotion championship based on GDP on the environmental governance behavior of local governments. Using the provincial panel data from 2003-2012 to test the relationship between Chinese decentralization and local government environmental expenditure, whether local government environmental expenditure competition exists? As well as the local government environment expenditure competition concrete manifestation form. Theoretical studies show that, first, the central government's emphasis on economic growth and the strengthening of local government fiscal incentives make local governments excessively biased towards infrastructure investment, while ignoring environmental protection and governance; second, in the case of capital flows, In areas with good endowments, the local government's "emphasis on infrastructure rather than environmental governance" is further magnified. On the contrary, in regions with poor endowment conditions, the investment in local government infrastructure will decrease relatively, while the investment in environmental public goods will increase relatively. Third, when local governments provide environmental public goods with strategic complementary behavior, The increase of spillover effect will increase the supply of environmental public goods in two local governments. When the local government provides environmental public goods with strategic substitution behavior, the increase of spillover effect will make the local government environmental public goods supply "ride the seesaw" characteristics. At the same time, using the provincial panel data from 2003 to 2012, this paper constructs a spatial econometric model, and makes an empirical study on the interactive behavior model and formation mechanism of local government environmental expenditure in China by using the method of system generalized moment estimation. It is found that there is significant strategic interaction between local governments in environmental expenditure, the competitive effect of local government environmental expenditure is quite significant, but the spillover effect is not found. It is also found that the fiscal decentralization of our country has significantly squeezed out the environmental expenditure of local governments. On the basis of theoretical and empirical analysis, this paper holds that we must change the local governments' behavior of "emphasizing economic growth over environmental governance" from the angle of the design of government behavior incentive mechanism. Make the local government from "competition for growth" to "competition for harmony." First, we should adjust the current environmental governance system, adopt a mixed system of territorial management and vertical management according to the actual situation of environmental pollution, and strengthen the authority of environmental management institutions; secondly, under the premise of maintaining the centralization of central politics, Adjust the central government performance assessment index system, put "green GDP" into the local government performance assessment index system, replace the performance assessment mechanism based on GDP, and improve the public environmental satisfaction in the performance assessment and cadre promotion and appointment; Third, improve the vertical and horizontal fiscal transfer payment system and establish a fair and reasonable ecological compensation mechanism for environmental governance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：云南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：D630

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相關(guān)期刊論文 前2條

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本文編號(hào)：1887843