本文選題：公司捐贈(zèng) + 公司社會(huì)責(zé)任　； 參考：《湖南師范大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：公司高管薪酬是當(dāng)前國(guó)內(nèi)外公司治理的熱點(diǎn)和難點(diǎn)問(wèn)題。有關(guān)“天價(jià)薪酬”報(bào)道常見(jiàn)諸報(bào)端,惹起了公眾的不滿。尤其是國(guó)有企業(yè)高管薪酬以及由此產(chǎn)生的社會(huì)問(wèn)題引起了社會(huì)的高度關(guān)注。金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)后,歐美各國(guó)政府懫取了一系列限薪措施。我國(guó)也于2014年11月公布了《中央管理企業(yè)負(fù)責(zé)人薪酬制度改革方案》并從2015年開(kāi)始實(shí)施。當(dāng)然,為了加強(qiáng)“高管薪酬”的合理性,獲得公眾的認(rèn)可,高管會(huì)主動(dòng)承擔(dān)相應(yīng)的社會(huì)責(zé)任——公司捐贈(zèng)。當(dāng)今社會(huì),無(wú)論是在經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)行的宏觀層面還是公司活動(dòng)的微觀層面,社會(huì)規(guī)范都產(chǎn)生了不可忽視的影響。正處于經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型中的中國(guó),盡管公眾對(duì)公司的社會(huì)責(zé)任內(nèi)涵還沒(méi)一個(gè)清晰、準(zhǔn)確的認(rèn)知,但對(duì)于“公司應(yīng)當(dāng)承擔(dān)社會(huì)責(zé)任”的觀念已深入人心。本文正是從這一視角出發(fā),實(shí)證考察了高管薪酬安排對(duì)公司捐贈(zèng)行為、捐贈(zèng)水平的影響。本文認(rèn)為,由于上市公司高管拿著遠(yuǎn)高于社會(huì)平均水平的薪酬,其面臨來(lái)自社會(huì)輿論的壓力。上市公司的管理們?yōu)榱司徑膺@些輿論沖擊,他們并不會(huì)心甘情愿地降低其薪酬水平,而是通過(guò)任職公司采取積極的捐贈(zèng)行為以顯示出公司的“社會(huì)公民”身份、積極地承擔(dān)了社會(huì)責(zé)任,這為其拿著高薪社會(huì)合理性提供有力依據(jù)。公司對(duì)外實(shí)施越多的捐贈(zèng),表明其承擔(dān)了更多的社會(huì)責(zé)任,從而獲得了一定的社會(huì)支持,越有利于高管謀取更高的薪酬。因此,上市公司高管薪酬水平與公司捐贈(zèng)行為、水平之間存在著正相關(guān)的關(guān)系。不僅如此,長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)國(guó)企高管的貨幣薪酬一直有所限制,這使得在職消費(fèi)這種隱形激勵(lì)成為高管一種重要的激勵(lì)方式,其影響不可小覷。本文以2006年至2013年間我國(guó)A股上市公司為樣本進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究,研究發(fā)現(xiàn)公司高管的貨幣薪酬水平確實(shí)與公司捐贈(zèng)行為、水平呈現(xiàn)正相關(guān)關(guān)系。而在拓展性分析中,本文深入探討了高管薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)與公司捐贈(zèng)行為、水平之間的關(guān)系。最后本文分析了公司的所有權(quán)性質(zhì)對(duì)上述經(jīng)驗(yàn)結(jié)果的影響。結(jié)果表明當(dāng)公司的實(shí)際控制人為各級(jí)政府時(shí),高管薪酬水平與捐贈(zèng)水平之間關(guān)系的敏感度更強(qiáng)。另外,本文的研究結(jié)論為相應(yīng)的政策建議也提供了新的視角。面對(duì)飛速發(fā)展、日新月異的中國(guó)新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體,經(jīng)濟(jì)生活與社會(huì)生活已密不可分,社會(huì)責(zé)任已成為經(jīng)濟(jì)長(zhǎng)期穩(wěn)定發(fā)展必不可少的影響因素。沿著這樣的思路,政府、公司等各經(jīng)濟(jì)體進(jìn)行經(jīng)濟(jì)決策時(shí)要充分考慮這一影響。
[Abstract]:Executive compensation is a hot and difficult problem in corporate governance at home and abroad. The common reports on the "pay for the price of the sky" have aroused public dissatisfaction. Especially, the salary of the executives of state-owned enterprises and the resulting social problems have aroused great concern. After the outbreak of the financial crisis, the governments of the European and American countries have taken a series of issues. In November 2014, China also announced the reform plan for the compensation system for the head of the central management enterprise and implemented it in 2015. Of course, in order to strengthen the rationality of "executive compensation" and obtain public recognition, the executive will take the initiative to bear the corresponding social responsibility - the public donation. Today, the economy is running. The macro level is still the micro level of the company's activities, and the social norms have had the influence that can not be ignored. China is in economic transformation. Although the public has not a clear and accurate understanding of the corporate social responsibility, the concept of "the company should bear social responsibility" has been deeply rooted in the people's mind. This article is from this view. From the point of view, the impact of executive pay arrangements on the company's donation behavior and the level of donation is examined. This article believes that executives of listed companies are facing pressure from public opinion because they are far higher than the social average. The salary level, but through the active donation behavior of the company to show the "social citizen" identity of the company, actively undertakes social responsibility, which provides a strong basis for its high paid social rationality. The more donations the company carries out, it shows that it has taken on more social responsibility, thus obtaining a certain society. As a result, there is a positive correlation between the level of executive compensation and the level of corporate donation. Not only that, the long-term monetary compensation of state-owned enterprises has been limited, which makes the stealth incentive of on-the-job consumption an important incentive for executives, This paper makes an empirical study on the sample of A shares listed in China from 2006 to 2013. It is found that the monetary salary level of the company executives is positively related to the corporate donation behavior. In the expansibility analysis, the level of executive compensation structure and corporate donation behavior is discussed in depth. In the end, this paper analyzes the influence of the ownership nature of the company on the above empirical results. The results show that the relationship between executive compensation level and the level of donation is more sensitive when the actual control of the company is the government at all levels. In addition, the conclusion of this paper also provides a new perspective for the corresponding policy recommendations. The economic life and social life are inseparable, and social responsibility has become an indispensable factor in the long-term and stable development of the economy. Along this way, the government, the company and other economies should take full consideration of this effect.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：D632.9;F272.92

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