發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-03-09 01:15

  本文選題：政府監(jiān)管　切入點(diǎn)：礦山治污　出處：《南華大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：政府監(jiān)管與礦山治污之間的博弈是博弈論在采礦行業(yè)中的一種具體應(yīng)用,本文對(duì)此進(jìn)行了研究。文中,把政府的罰款方式分為累積罰款和單次罰款,同時(shí)把礦山的污染類型分為累積污染和單次污染。結(jié)果表明:在沒有外力監(jiān)督的前提下,所有礦山都治污并不是一個(gè)穩(wěn)定的均衡,而所有礦山都不治污則能達(dá)成穩(wěn)定的均衡;無論在什么情況下,政府采用累積罰款的方案均不可取;在政府或多或少會(huì)監(jiān)管的前提下,礦山會(huì)治理好累積污染;當(dāng)政府采用單次罰款的方案,同時(shí)礦山產(chǎn)生的污染屬于單次污染時(shí),情況變得比較復(fù)雜。根據(jù)建立的博弈模型可以看出,政府監(jiān)管概率和礦山治污概率會(huì)達(dá)成均衡。但是,在現(xiàn)實(shí)中會(huì)產(chǎn)生以下幾個(gè)問題:第一,政府有追求自身利益最大化的策略。即穩(wěn)定地以略小于納什均衡的概率進(jìn)行監(jiān)管,每次都能得到罰金;第二,政府傾向于管大放小。由于政府的監(jiān)管資源是有限的,同樣的監(jiān)管資源投入到大礦山的收益比小礦山的收益高的多;第三,礦山可以通過尋租來削減成本。事實(shí)上,政府以略小于納什均衡概率進(jìn)行監(jiān)管和礦山選擇不治污不是雙方最佳的博弈均衡,因?yàn)榈V山可以通過尋租活動(dòng)從而讓政府停止監(jiān)管。以上三個(gè)問題的解決方案如下:第一,解決政府追求自身利益最大化的問題,關(guān)鍵在于把治污礦山的數(shù)量多少作為考核其政績(jī)的一個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。若治污礦山的數(shù)量少于合格標(biāo)準(zhǔn),則扣罰相關(guān)政府人員的工資甚至將其撤職。若治污礦山的數(shù)量高于優(yōu)秀標(biāo)準(zhǔn),則獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)相關(guān)政府人員甚至讓其升遷。另外,政府得來的罰金只能用于監(jiān)管花費(fèi),不能挪用。如此雙管齊下,政府將不會(huì)以追求罰金為目的去選擇監(jiān)管策略,取而代之的是盡量督促礦山治污。第二,政府之所以管大放小,根本原因是監(jiān)管資源的稀缺。而降低監(jiān)管成本,如采用先進(jìn)的檢測(cè)技術(shù)等,可以豐富監(jiān)管資源,讓政府去監(jiān)管小礦山有了現(xiàn)實(shí)的可能性。另外,將小礦山合并或者集中管理既能減少排污,又能方便政府監(jiān)管。第三,礦山尋租行為有其內(nèi)在的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益驅(qū)動(dòng),所以全社會(huì)要對(duì)相關(guān)監(jiān)管部門進(jìn)行監(jiān)督。礦山有沒有治污,當(dāng)?shù)厝罕娛亲钋宄�。如果礦山通過尋租免去了治污的責(zé)任,群眾可以揭發(fā),而到時(shí)國(guó)家要追究礦山和相關(guān)監(jiān)管部門的責(zé)任。最后,對(duì)于全社會(huì)來說,保持輿論監(jiān)督的壓力,形成自發(fā)保護(hù)環(huán)境的風(fēng)氣,加上政府極少量的監(jiān)管能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)社會(huì)總體福利最大化。
[Abstract]:The game between government supervision and mine pollution control is a concrete application of game theory in mining industry. At the same time, the types of mine pollution are divided into accumulative pollution and single pollution. The results show that, without external force supervision, all mines are not a stable equilibrium, and all mines can achieve a stable balance without pollution control; No matter what the circumstances, the Government's adoption of a cumulative penalty scheme is not desirable; if the Government is more or less able to monitor the situation, the mine will control the accumulated pollution. When the Government adopts a single fine scheme, At the same time, the situation becomes more complicated when the pollution produced by mines is single pollution. According to the established game model, we can see that the probability of government supervision and mine pollution control will be balanced. However, In reality, the following problems arise: first, the government has a strategy to maximize its own interests, that is, to regulate steadily with a probability slightly less than Nash's equilibrium and to be fined every time; second, Because the government's regulatory resources are limited, the same regulatory resources invest much more revenue in large mines than in small ones; third, mines can cut costs by rent-seeking. It is not the best game equilibrium for the government to supervise and the mine choose not to deal with pollution at a probability slightly less than Nash equilibrium, because mines can stop government supervision through rent-seeking activities. The solutions to the above three problems are as follows: first, The key to solving the problem that the government pursues the maximization of its own interests lies in how many mines are treated as a criterion for assessing its performance. If the number of mines for pollution control is less than the qualified standard, If the number of pollution mines is higher than the standard of excellence, then the relevant government personnel are rewarded or even promoted. In addition, the fines received by the government can only be used for regulatory expenses. It cannot be misappropriated. With this two-pronged approach, the government will not choose a regulatory strategy for the purpose of pursuing fines. Instead, it will try to urge the mines to deal with pollution. The root cause is the scarcity of regulatory resources. Reducing regulatory costs, such as the adoption of advanced detection techniques, can enrich regulatory resources and make it possible for the government to regulate small mines. In addition, Merging or centralized management of small mines can not only reduce sewage discharge, but also facilitate government supervision. Third, the rent-seeking behavior of mines has its inherent economic benefits, so the whole society should supervise the relevant regulatory authorities. Does the mine have pollution control or not? The local people are the most clear. If the mine is exempted from pollution control responsibility through rent-seeking, the masses can expose it, and the state will then have to investigate the responsibility of the mines and the relevant regulatory authorities. Finally, for the whole society, it is necessary to maintain the pressure of public opinion supervision. A climate of spontaneous environmental protection, coupled with minimal government regulation, maximizes the overall welfare of society.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南華大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：D630;F426.1

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相關(guān)期刊論文 前2條

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本文編號(hào)：1586360