本文選題：低標價 + 高造價��； 參考：《公路》2005年09期

【摘要】：在工程項目建設(shè)過程中,低標價中標而最終導致高造價的現(xiàn)象有其內(nèi)在的必然性。中標機會大小影響報價變動。低價中標預示業(yè)主取得了“超額利益”,導致建設(shè)期間業(yè)主與承包商存在利益上的先對抗、后妥協(xié)的“對抗—妥協(xié)”關(guān)系。承包商進場后,業(yè)主風險損失系數(shù)變大而趨向于“妥協(xié)”,以利項目按時完工�！皩埂讌f(xié)”關(guān)系存在動態(tài)平衡點,但雙方在爭奪利益的過程中均付出了代價,資源被無形消耗。動態(tài)平衡點的計算也存在陷阱,用錯也使造價大幅提升。本文運用數(shù)學模型分析了其中的機理,并提出了防范和改變這種局面的建議,可應用于大型工程項目管理。
[Abstract]:In the process of project construction, it is inevitable to win the bid with low price and lead to high cost. The chance of winning will affect the change of quotation. Winning a bid at a low price indicates that the owner has obtained "excess interest", which leads to a "confrontation" relationship between the owner and the contractor during the construction period, which is characterized by "confrontation and compromise" in the interests of the owner and the contractor. After the contractor comes into the field, the risk loss coefficient of the company increases and tends to "compromise" so that the project can be completed on time. There is a dynamic equilibrium point in the "confrontation-compromise" relationship, but both sides pay the price in the process of competing for interests, and the resources are intangibly consumed. There are pitfalls in the calculation of the dynamic equilibrium point, and the cost is greatly increased by mistake. This paper analyzes the mechanism by using mathematical model, and puts forward some suggestions to prevent and change this kind of situation, which can be applied to the management of large engineering projects.
【作者單位】： 重慶交通學院 天津市高速公路投資建設(shè)發(fā)展公司
【分類號】：F284;

【參考文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前5條

1 蔡益新;國際招標承包中業(yè)主的防索賠與防不平衡報價[J];國際經(jīng)濟合作;1994年02期

2 陳大仁;施工招投標工作中業(yè)主的選擇和對策[J];基建優(yōu)化;2004年03期

3 侯e，

本文編號：1934101