理性邊界的形成與突破:以圣彼得堡悖論演進(jìn)為視角
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2019-01-05 06:56
【摘要】:根據(jù)期望值理論,理性的決策者應(yīng)當(dāng)以財(cái)富的多少衡量收益,以概率衡量結(jié)果出現(xiàn)的可能性,采用期望值最大化原則作為決策依據(jù)。然而,圣彼得堡悖論的出現(xiàn)卻突破了期望值理論確立的理性邊界,根本原因在于,期望值理論將影響決策的主、客觀因素完全割裂,忽視了決策行動的主體性特質(zhì)。財(cái)富、概率等客觀因素并不能直接作用于決策行動,而必須依靠一種主體性轉(zhuǎn)化,即轉(zhuǎn)化為決策者對這些因素的認(rèn)知結(jié)果。因此,要消解圣彼得堡悖論,進(jìn)而確立合理的理性邊界,就必須準(zhǔn)確把握和刻畫這種轉(zhuǎn)化的機(jī)理。期望效用理論主張用"效用"來衡量收益,在客觀財(cái)富與主觀認(rèn)知之間架起一座橋梁,在理性邊界的認(rèn)識上實(shí)現(xiàn)重大飛躍。前景理論繼承了期望效用理論的研究路徑,采用價(jià)值函數(shù)與決策權(quán)重,為主體性轉(zhuǎn)化提供了豐富和細(xì)致的內(nèi)容,在更深層次上推進(jìn)了決策理論對理性邊界的探索。
[Abstract]:According to the theory of expected value, rational decision makers should take the amount of wealth to measure the return, the probability to measure the possibility of the result, and the principle of maximization of expected value as the basis of decision-making. However, the appearance of St. Petersburg paradox breaks through the rational boundary established by the expected value theory. The fundamental reason is that the expected value theory will affect the subject of decision making, the objective factors are completely separated, and the subjectivity of decision action is ignored. The objective factors such as wealth, probability and so on can not directly affect the decision making action, but must rely on a kind of subjective transformation, that is, the cognitive result of the decision maker to these factors. Therefore, in order to resolve the St. Petersburg paradox and establish reasonable rational boundaries, we must accurately grasp and characterize the mechanism of this transformation. The theory of expected utility advocates to use "utility" to measure income, to build a bridge between objective wealth and subjective cognition, and to realize a great leap in the understanding of rational boundary. Foreground theory inherits the research path of expected utility theory and adopts value function and decision weight to provide rich and meticulous content for the transformation of subjectivity. It promotes the exploration of rational boundary in decision theory on a deeper level.
【作者單位】: 廣東外語外貿(mào)大學(xué)商學(xué)院;西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)人文學(xué)院;
【基金】:國家社科基金項(xiàng)目“關(guān)于主觀資產(chǎn)組合模型的行為金融理論建構(gòu)與方法研究”(11BJY013)
【分類號】:C934
本文編號:2401442
[Abstract]:According to the theory of expected value, rational decision makers should take the amount of wealth to measure the return, the probability to measure the possibility of the result, and the principle of maximization of expected value as the basis of decision-making. However, the appearance of St. Petersburg paradox breaks through the rational boundary established by the expected value theory. The fundamental reason is that the expected value theory will affect the subject of decision making, the objective factors are completely separated, and the subjectivity of decision action is ignored. The objective factors such as wealth, probability and so on can not directly affect the decision making action, but must rely on a kind of subjective transformation, that is, the cognitive result of the decision maker to these factors. Therefore, in order to resolve the St. Petersburg paradox and establish reasonable rational boundaries, we must accurately grasp and characterize the mechanism of this transformation. The theory of expected utility advocates to use "utility" to measure income, to build a bridge between objective wealth and subjective cognition, and to realize a great leap in the understanding of rational boundary. Foreground theory inherits the research path of expected utility theory and adopts value function and decision weight to provide rich and meticulous content for the transformation of subjectivity. It promotes the exploration of rational boundary in decision theory on a deeper level.
【作者單位】: 廣東外語外貿(mào)大學(xué)商學(xué)院;西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)人文學(xué)院;
【基金】:國家社科基金項(xiàng)目“關(guān)于主觀資產(chǎn)組合模型的行為金融理論建構(gòu)與方法研究”(11BJY013)
【分類號】:C934
【相似文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條
1 崔書英,馬謙杰;圣彼得堡悖論的消解與決策學(xué)意義反思[J];西南師范大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(人文社會科學(xué)版);2004年05期
,本文編號:2401442
本文鏈接:http://sikaile.net/guanlilunwen/tongjijuecelunwen/2401442.html
最近更新
教材專著