本文選題：演化博弈論 + 微信運營商��； 參考：《蘭州理工大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著互聯(lián)網(wǎng)技術(shù)應用和社交化平臺被廣為接受,具有社交性質(zhì)的微信平臺在國內(nèi)高速發(fā)展,尤其是微信支付功能在極大方便了用戶線上線下結(jié)算服務的同時獲得了用戶高度認同。微信平臺的成長和壯大,對銀行帶來了深遠影響。從營銷角度看,微信運營商企業(yè)服務業(yè)務拓展了銀行營銷渠道,豐富了銀行促銷方式,節(jié)約了銀行營銷成本;同時銀行可以從微信支付中獲得存款和結(jié)算手續(xù)費,并為微信運營商營銷過程提供資金和信用保障。雙方通過協(xié)同營銷能夠整合資源、降低彼此營銷成本,提高營銷效率,在營銷關(guān)系上達成了合作共贏。但由于微信運營商與銀行用戶存在重疊,高效便捷、功能強大、用戶規(guī)模龐大的微信運營商理財、貸款和支付等業(yè)務對銀行業(yè)務造成了巨大沖擊,銀行為應對沖擊推出了同質(zhì)金融平臺和產(chǎn)品、發(fā)布了政策和措施,限制了微信運營商轉(zhuǎn)賬次數(shù)和額度。由此,雙方在協(xié)同營銷中又產(chǎn)生了競爭。面對這一復雜局面,微信運營商與銀行協(xié)同營銷關(guān)系是否應該終止,已經(jīng)成為雙方營銷關(guān)系中遇到的最大問題。通過對背景分析和以往文獻梳理,本文首先回顧了演化博弈論與協(xié)同營銷的基本理論,然后分析了微信運營商與銀行協(xié)同營銷現(xiàn)狀,闡述了微信運營商與銀行協(xié)同營銷產(chǎn)生的積極影響和出現(xiàn)的問題。在此基礎上通過對微信運營商與銀行協(xié)同營銷現(xiàn)狀存在的問題分析,結(jié)合演化博弈理論建立了微信運營商與銀行營銷關(guān)系支付矩陣,利用支付函數(shù)構(gòu)建與復制動態(tài)方程求解得出了微信運營商與銀行營銷關(guān)系最終演化結(jié)果,展示了不同決策參數(shù)對雙方協(xié)同營銷狀態(tài)影響。結(jié)果表明,微信運營商與銀行營銷關(guān)系演化結(jié)果趨向于兩種模式,但只有(協(xié)同,協(xié)同)營銷策略才能使雙方利益達到最大化,并得出決策參數(shù)增量收益、分配系數(shù)對雙方協(xié)同營銷關(guān)系存在正向影響;協(xié)同營銷成本、資源投入對雙方協(xié)同營銷關(guān)系存在負向影響。最后根據(jù)分析結(jié)果,在解決現(xiàn)有問題的基礎上,分別從增量收益、協(xié)同營銷成本、雙方投入資源、分配系數(shù)等方面提出促進微信運營商與銀行協(xié)同營銷的對策建議:合理劃分目標市場、提高協(xié)同營銷增量收益、降低協(xié)同營銷成本、控制資源恰當投入、保障合理收益分配系數(shù)、利用政府獎懲作用提高協(xié)同營銷積極性。
[Abstract]:With the wide acceptance of the application of Internet technology and social platform, the social nature of the WeChat platform in China has developed rapidly.In particular, WeChat Pay function greatly facilitates the online and offline settlement services, while obtaining high user recognition.The growth and growth of WeChat platform, has brought the profound influence to the bank.From the marketing point of view, the enterprise service business of WeChat operators expands bank marketing channels, enriches bank promotion methods and saves bank marketing costs. At the same time, banks can obtain deposits and settlement fees from WeChat Pay.And for the WeChat operator marketing process to provide funds and credit protection.Through cooperative marketing, the two sides can integrate resources, reduce each other's marketing costs, improve marketing efficiency, and achieve win-win cooperation in marketing relations.However, because of the overlap between WeChat operators and bank users, the high efficiency, convenience, powerful function and the huge scale of users, WeChat operators have a huge impact on the banking business, such as financing, loan and payment, and so on.Banks launched homogeneous financial platforms and products to deal with the impact, issued policies and measures that limited the number and quota of WeChat operators' transfers.As a result, the two sides in the collaborative marketing has produced competition.In the face of this complex situation, whether the cooperative marketing relationship between WeChat operators and banks should be terminated has become the biggest problem in the marketing relationship between the two sides.Based on the background analysis and literature review, this paper reviews the basic theories of evolutionary game theory and cooperative marketing, and then analyzes the current situation of cooperative marketing between WeChat operators and banks.This paper expounds the positive influence and problems arising from the cooperative marketing between WeChat operators and banks.On this basis, by analyzing the problems existing in the current situation of the cooperative marketing between WeChat operators and banks, and combining with the evolutionary game theory, the paper establishes the payment matrix of the relationship between WeChat operators and banks.Using payment function to construct and copy the dynamic equation, the final evolution result of marketing relationship between WeChat operator and bank is obtained, and the influence of different decision parameters on cooperative marketing state of both parties is shown.The results show that the evolution results of the relationship between WeChat operators and banks tend to two models, but only the (collaborative, cooperative) marketing strategy can maximize the interests of both parties, and obtain the incremental benefits of decision parameters.The distribution coefficient has a positive effect on the cooperative marketing relationship between both sides, and the cost and resource input of the cooperative marketing have a negative influence on the cooperative marketing relationship between the two sides.Finally, according to the analysis results, on the basis of solving the existing problems, from the incremental income, cooperative marketing costs, both sides invested resources,Some suggestions are put forward to promote cooperative marketing between WeChat operators and banks, such as dividing target market reasonably, increasing incremental profit of cooperative marketing, reducing the cost of cooperative marketing, and controlling the appropriate input of resources.To ensure reasonable income distribution coefficient and improve the enthusiasm of cooperative marketing by using the role of government rewards and punishments.
【學位授予單位】：蘭州理工大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F49;F832;F224.32

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