本文選題：數(shù)字內(nèi)容產(chǎn)業(yè)　切入點：平臺　出處：《東南大學(xué)》2016年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：互聯(lián)網(wǎng)的發(fā)展,特別是數(shù)字化技術(shù)的應(yīng)用推動了數(shù)字內(nèi)容產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展,是內(nèi)容產(chǎn)業(yè)的一次革命。內(nèi)容產(chǎn)業(yè)的數(shù)字化不僅僅是產(chǎn)品的轉(zhuǎn)型升級,更是企業(yè)商業(yè)模式以及消費者理念的革新。數(shù)字化時代,內(nèi)容產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展多以平臺模式為主,企業(yè)通常采用樣本品免費,增值品、衍生品收費以及征收廣告費用等方式來盈利,內(nèi)容為王時代來臨。互聯(lián)網(wǎng)時代媒介的多樣化為內(nèi)容產(chǎn)品的傳播提供了便利,這也是內(nèi)容逐漸成為核心競爭力的關(guān)鍵。論文首先以綜述和全景性展示的方式描述了這一變化的發(fā)生及其意義。科技是一把雙刃劍,互聯(lián)網(wǎng)巨量的信息內(nèi)容對傳統(tǒng)的以政府為主體的單邊規(guī)制模式提出了挑戰(zhàn),在內(nèi)容產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)生革命性的變革時代,政府的獨家規(guī)制顯然已經(jīng)不適應(yīng)平臺型發(fā)展模式的數(shù)字內(nèi)容產(chǎn)業(yè)。以平臺企業(yè)規(guī)制為核心的自我規(guī)制的有效性、自由性、激勵性、低成本等特性較好地彌補了市場失靈以及政府失靈,自我規(guī)制的“軟”性特征也符合國家治理的理念,是政府權(quán)力到市場的回歸,并且自我規(guī)制有利于提高社會的福利水平,所以以平臺企業(yè)為核心的自我規(guī)制體系應(yīng)運而生并推廣開來。在以平臺企業(yè)為核心的自我規(guī)制體系重構(gòu)方面,本文首先闡述了企業(yè)成長為平臺型企業(yè),進而演化出平臺生態(tài)系統(tǒng)的機理及路徑。企業(yè)成長為平臺型企業(yè)主要依靠企業(yè)的核心產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)的不斷創(chuàng)新,而平臺型企業(yè)演化為平臺生態(tài)系統(tǒng)的關(guān)鍵則是網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性。企業(yè)到平臺型企業(yè)、再到平臺生態(tài)系統(tǒng)的成長與演化歷程,不僅僅是組織結(jié)構(gòu)復(fù)雜程度的變化,更重要的是實現(xiàn)了從單贏到多贏、再到共贏的經(jīng)營理念的轉(zhuǎn)變,這也是平臺經(jīng)濟時代的主流商業(yè)模式。在上述工作的基礎(chǔ)上,論文討論了平臺生態(tài)系統(tǒng)下的平臺企業(yè)自我規(guī)制體系,利用考慮了法律成本及不確定性等因素的博弈模型分別解釋了政府規(guī)制主導(dǎo)體系和自我規(guī)制主導(dǎo)體系下的社會福利狀況。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),在政府規(guī)制主導(dǎo)的體系下,政府的規(guī)制政策對消費者越有利,政府的收益越大；法律的不確定性越大,社會福利水平越低。在自我規(guī)制主導(dǎo)的體系下,法律的不確定性較大時,政府的收益要高于政府規(guī)制；消費者對政府的影響程度越大,社會福利水平越高。在通常情況下,政府規(guī)制主導(dǎo)與自我規(guī)制主導(dǎo)哪一個更適合作為數(shù)字內(nèi)容產(chǎn)業(yè)的規(guī)制體系將取決于規(guī)制方式和手段的調(diào)整成本。顯然,自我規(guī)制主導(dǎo)體系所具有的靈活性等優(yōu)點使其調(diào)整成本要低于政府規(guī)制體系。也就是說,對于數(shù)字內(nèi)容產(chǎn)業(yè)的規(guī)制而言,采用自我規(guī)制主導(dǎo)的體系可能優(yōu)于政府的單邊規(guī)制模式。為了闡明自我規(guī)制主導(dǎo)體系的運作激勵,論文進一步將政府、數(shù)字內(nèi)容運營商、提供商以及消費者等4類利益主體納入到自我規(guī)制為主的體系框架中,以探究利益主體的激勵行為及均衡狀態(tài)。研究結(jié)果顯示,在數(shù)字內(nèi)容運營商作為自我規(guī)制者的體系下,如果運營商曝光內(nèi)容提供商不良行為的概率增加,則內(nèi)容提供商需要輸送更多的利益給內(nèi)容運營商,從而導(dǎo)致內(nèi)容提供商和運營商合謀的意愿降低。如果消費者的投訴成本減少,運營商和提供商合謀的概率也會相應(yīng)降低。在串謀均衡狀態(tài)下,作為自我規(guī)制者的內(nèi)容運營商的監(jiān)督水平將高于曝光均衡；但是,如果運營商的邊際監(jiān)督激勵處于低水平狀態(tài),那么內(nèi)容提供商高水平欺詐行為的發(fā)生不僅僅取決于運營商的低監(jiān)督水平,還取決于內(nèi)容提供商的行賄成本。最后,論文利用類Hotelling模型分析了完全壟斷及寡頭壟斷兩種市場結(jié)構(gòu)下,消費者偏好、內(nèi)容運營商競爭以及內(nèi)容運營商是否承擔(dān)社會規(guī)制責(zé)任對于運營商數(shù)字內(nèi)容產(chǎn)品價格的影響。研究結(jié)果顯示,內(nèi)容運營商之問的競爭可以降低數(shù)字內(nèi)容產(chǎn)品的價格并有利于提高運營商的專業(yè)化程度；消費者偏好的多樣性對于運營商的運營策略有重要影響,運營商的內(nèi)容產(chǎn)品相對于消費者偏好的偏離程度受消費者偏好的區(qū)間跨度控制；數(shù)字內(nèi)容運營商作為自我規(guī)制者承擔(dān)社會規(guī)制責(zé)任時,運營商的內(nèi)容產(chǎn)品相對于消費者偏好的偏離大于不承擔(dān)社會規(guī)制責(zé)任時的偏離,同時數(shù)字內(nèi)容產(chǎn)品的價格也要高于無自我規(guī)制責(zé)任時的價格。
[Abstract]:The development of the Internet, especially the application of digital technology to promote the development of the digital content industry, is a revolution in the content industry. Digital content industry is not only the transformation and upgrading of products, is the enterprise business model and consumer. The innovation of the concept of the digital era, the development of content industry in platform mode, enterprises generally adopt the sample is free, value-added products, derivatives fees and advertising costs levied way to profit, the content is king era. The diverse Internet era media facilitate the dissemination of the contents of the product, which is content has gradually become the core competitiveness of the key. Firstly, to review and panoramic display mode describes the occurrence and significance of this a change. Science and technology is a double-edged sword, the Internet information content of the traditional government unilateral regulation mode as the main body. A challenge, a revolutionary change in the content industry era, exclusive government regulation is obviously not adapt to the platform development model of the digital content industry. The effectiveness, to the platform of enterprise regulation as the core of the self regulation of freedom, incentive, low cost and other characteristics is to make up for market failure and government failure. The self regulation of "soft" characteristics are in line with national governance concept, is the return of government power to the market, and self regulation is conducive to improve the level of social welfare, self regulation system so as to enterprises as the core of the platform came into being and spread. In the reconstruction of self regulation system on the platform of enterprise as the core, this paper first elaborated the enterprise growth platform for the enterprise, and the evolution mechanism of ecological system and platform of enterprise growth path. As a platform for enterprises mainly rely on the enterprise's core products Continuous innovation and service platform, and enterprise evolution as a key platform of ecological system is the network externality. The enterprise to the enterprise platform, and then to the growth and evolution of the platform ecosystem, is not only the change of organizational structure complexity, more important is to achieve a single win from to win, to change win-win business philosophy, which is the mainstream business model platform economy era. Based on the above work, this paper discussed the platform ecosystem under the platform of enterprise self regulation system, with the consideration of the game model of legal costs and uncertain factors are explained in social welfare system of government regulation and self regulation of dominant dominant under the system of government regulation. The study found that in the leading system, government regulation policies more favorable to consumers, government income is bigger; the greater the legal uncertainty, The level of social welfare is lower. In the leading self regulation system, legal uncertainty is large, government revenue is higher than that of government regulation; consumers more influence on the degree of government, the level of social welfare is higher. Under normal circumstances, government regulation and self regulation of dominant dominant which one is more suitable for digital content industry regulation system will adjust the cost depends on the regulation of ways and means. Obviously, the advantages of flexibility of self regulation leading system to adjust its cost is lower than the government regulation system. That is to say, for the regulation of the digital content industry, the self regulation of the dominant system may be superior to the government in order to unilateral regulation mode. Operation of self regulation system of the dominant incentive to clarify, the government will further, digital content providers and operators, consumers and other 4 categories of stakeholders into the self The regulation framework, to encourage the behavior of stakeholders and the equilibrium state. The results of the study show that in the digital content operators as a self regulation system, if the operator exposure increases the probability of bad behavior, content providers, content providers need to deliver more benefits to content operators, which leads to the content providers and operators collusion will reduce consumer complaints. If the cost is reduced, the probability of collusion of operators and providers will be reduced accordingly. In collusion equilibrium, the level of supervision content operators as self regulation within the exposure will be higher than the equilibrium; however, if the marginal supervision Operators Incentive in the low level then, the content provider of high level fraud not only depends on the operator's low level of supervision, the cost of bribery also depends on the content provider. Finally, the paper use Hotelling model to analyze the monopoly and oligopoly under two different market structures, consumer preferences, content operators competition and content operators should bear the social responsibility regulation for operators of digital content product price. The results showed that the contents of the operation business competition can reduce the digital content products the price and increase the degree of specialization of operators; diversity of consumer preference has great influence on the operation strategy of operators, operators of content products relative to the interval span control deviation degree of consumer preference by consumer preferences; digital content operators as a self regulation to undertake the social responsibility regulation, operator content the product is offset with respect to consumer preferences than do not bear the social responsibility from regulation, at the same time, the digital content products price The grid is also higher than the price of no self regulated liability.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：東南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F49
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本文編號：1587957