發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-03-04 18:47

  本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì)　切入點(diǎn)：案例分析　出處：《吉林財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：20世紀(jì)50年代股權(quán)激勵(lì)理論在美國(guó)誕生并發(fā)展,這一理論的發(fā)展極大地解決了企業(yè)的所有者與經(jīng)營(yíng)者產(chǎn)生的委托代理問(wèn)題,降低了企業(yè)的代理成本,從而使股東和管理者的目標(biāo)相一致。股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為一種長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)模式,在我國(guó)興起于20世紀(jì)90年代,國(guó)內(nèi)很多上市公司開(kāi)始嘗試實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案。但由于國(guó)內(nèi)股權(quán)激勵(lì)相關(guān)法律法規(guī)還不完善,股權(quán)激勵(lì)相關(guān)要素的規(guī)定還不明確,很多實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的公司以失敗告終。由于實(shí)施的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案相似性較高,未結(jié)合企業(yè)自身實(shí)際,所以并非所有企業(yè)都取得了預(yù)期效果。在國(guó)家出臺(tái)了《上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)管理辦法(試行)》、《股權(quán)激勵(lì)有關(guān)備忘錄》1、2、3號(hào)文件等相關(guān)法規(guī)后,使得實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的公司數(shù)量急速增長(zhǎng)。2011年發(fā)布的《創(chuàng)業(yè)板信息披露業(yè)務(wù)備忘錄》更是為創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案提供了實(shí)施依據(jù)。本文根據(jù)樂(lè)視網(wǎng)自身發(fā)展情況分析2011年、2013年和2015年的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案的科學(xué)合理性,供同行業(yè)其他企業(yè)借鑒。本文以在創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市的樂(lè)視網(wǎng)為研究對(duì)象,通過(guò)對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn)的閱讀和理解,以委托代理、人力資本等理論為基礎(chǔ),對(duì)樂(lè)視網(wǎng)先后實(shí)施的三期股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案。結(jié)合公司生命周期和SWOT分析,從外部環(huán)境和內(nèi)部環(huán)境兩方面對(duì)樂(lè)視網(wǎng)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)進(jìn)行可行性分析。以2010-2016年年報(bào)數(shù)據(jù)為基礎(chǔ),分析樂(lè)視網(wǎng)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)前后公司業(yè)績(jī)的變化。以營(yíng)業(yè)收入、凈利潤(rùn)、加權(quán)凈資產(chǎn)收益率等財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)為基礎(chǔ),并結(jié)合離職率等非財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)分析其實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的效果。結(jié)合前三期實(shí)施的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案,對(duì)樂(lè)視網(wǎng)股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案中的激勵(lì)對(duì)象與激勵(lì)額度、行權(quán)條件與行權(quán)安排以及考核指標(biāo)等要素進(jìn)行了對(duì)比分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)樂(lè)視網(wǎng)股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案值得學(xué)習(xí)之處與需要改進(jìn)的地方。從而建立更加符合樂(lè)視網(wǎng)的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案,為創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案提供更多的依據(jù),為同行業(yè)的發(fā)展提供借鑒作用。
[Abstract]:In 1950s, the equity incentive theory was born and developed in the United States. The development of this theory has solved the principal-agent problem of the owner and operator of the enterprise greatly, and reduced the agency cost of the enterprise. As a long-term incentive model, equity incentive emerged in 1990s in China. Many listed companies in China have begun to try to implement equity incentive schemes. However, because the relevant laws and regulations of domestic equity incentive are not perfect, the relevant elements of equity incentive are not clear. Many companies that implement equity incentives end up failing. Because of the high similarity of equity incentive schemes implemented, they do not combine with the actual situation of the enterprises themselves. Therefore, not all enterprises have achieved the expected results. After the State promulgated the "measures for the Management of Equity incentives of listed companies (for trial implementation)", the "Memorandum on Equity incentive" and other relevant laws and regulations, such as documents 1 / 2, 3, etc., Make the number of companies implementing equity incentive grow rapidly. 2011 "gem information disclosure business memorandum" is for gem listed companies to implement the equity incentive scheme implementation basis. This article according to Letv net from. On 2011, 2013 and 2015, the author analyzes the scientific rationality of the equity incentive scheme. This article takes Letv net, which is listed on the gem, as the research object, through reading and understanding the domestic and foreign literature, based on the theory of principal-agent, human capital and so on. Based on the analysis of the company's life cycle and SWOT, the paper analyzes the feasibility of the three phases of equity incentive implemented by Letv net from two aspects of external and internal environment. It is based on the data of 2010-2016 annual report. This paper analyzes the changes of the company's performance before and after the implementation of equity incentive by Letv. It is based on the financial indicators such as operating income, net profit, weighted return on net assets, etc. Combined with the non-financial indicators such as turnover rate to analyze the effect of equity incentive, combined with the first three periods of the implementation of equity incentive plan, Letv net equity incentive plan in the incentive object and incentive quota, Through the comparative analysis of the conditions of exercise, the arrangement of exercise rights and the assessment index, the author finds out that the equity incentive scheme of Letv net is worth learning and needs to be improved, so as to establish the equity incentive scheme which is more in line with Letv net. It provides more basis for the implementation of equity incentive scheme for gem listed companies and provides reference for the development of the same industry.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F49;F272.92

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