發(fā)布時間：2018-03-04 18:47

  本文選題：股權激勵　切入點：案例分析　出處：《吉林財經(jīng)大學》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：20世紀50年代股權激勵理論在美國誕生并發(fā)展,這一理論的發(fā)展極大地解決了企業(yè)的所有者與經(jīng)營者產(chǎn)生的委托代理問題,降低了企業(yè)的代理成本,從而使股東和管理者的目標相一致。股權激勵作為一種長期激勵模式,在我國興起于20世紀90年代,國內(nèi)很多上市公司開始嘗試實施股權激勵方案。但由于國內(nèi)股權激勵相關法律法規(guī)還不完善,股權激勵相關要素的規(guī)定還不明確,很多實施股權激勵的公司以失敗告終。由于實施的股權激勵方案相似性較高,未結合企業(yè)自身實際,所以并非所有企業(yè)都取得了預期效果。在國家出臺了《上市公司股權激勵管理辦法(試行)》、《股權激勵有關備忘錄》1、2、3號文件等相關法規(guī)后,使得實施股權激勵的公司數(shù)量急速增長。2011年發(fā)布的《創(chuàng)業(yè)板信息披露業(yè)務備忘錄》更是為創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司實施股權激勵方案提供了實施依據(jù)。本文根據(jù)樂視網(wǎng)自身發(fā)展情況分析2011年、2013年和2015年的股權激勵方案的科學合理性,供同行業(yè)其他企業(yè)借鑒。本文以在創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市的樂視網(wǎng)為研究對象,通過對國內(nèi)外文獻的閱讀和理解,以委托代理、人力資本等理論為基礎,對樂視網(wǎng)先后實施的三期股權激勵方案。結合公司生命周期和SWOT分析,從外部環(huán)境和內(nèi)部環(huán)境兩方面對樂視網(wǎng)實施股權激勵進行可行性分析。以2010-2016年年報數(shù)據(jù)為基礎,分析樂視網(wǎng)實施股權激勵前后公司業(yè)績的變化。以營業(yè)收入、凈利潤、加權凈資產(chǎn)收益率等財務指標為基礎,并結合離職率等非財務指標分析其實施股權激勵的效果。結合前三期實施的股權激勵方案,對樂視網(wǎng)股權激勵方案中的激勵對象與激勵額度、行權條件與行權安排以及考核指標等要素進行了對比分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)樂視網(wǎng)股權激勵方案值得學習之處與需要改進的地方。從而建立更加符合樂視網(wǎng)的股權激勵方案,為創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司實施股權激勵方案提供更多的依據(jù),為同行業(yè)的發(fā)展提供借鑒作用。
[Abstract]:In 1950s, the equity incentive theory was born and developed in the United States. The development of this theory has solved the principal-agent problem of the owner and operator of the enterprise greatly, and reduced the agency cost of the enterprise. As a long-term incentive model, equity incentive emerged in 1990s in China. Many listed companies in China have begun to try to implement equity incentive schemes. However, because the relevant laws and regulations of domestic equity incentive are not perfect, the relevant elements of equity incentive are not clear. Many companies that implement equity incentives end up failing. Because of the high similarity of equity incentive schemes implemented, they do not combine with the actual situation of the enterprises themselves. Therefore, not all enterprises have achieved the expected results. After the State promulgated the "measures for the Management of Equity incentives of listed companies (for trial implementation)", the "Memorandum on Equity incentive" and other relevant laws and regulations, such as documents 1 / 2, 3, etc., Make the number of companies implementing equity incentive grow rapidly. 2011 "gem information disclosure business memorandum" is for gem listed companies to implement the equity incentive scheme implementation basis. This article according to Letv net from. On 2011, 2013 and 2015, the author analyzes the scientific rationality of the equity incentive scheme. This article takes Letv net, which is listed on the gem, as the research object, through reading and understanding the domestic and foreign literature, based on the theory of principal-agent, human capital and so on. Based on the analysis of the company's life cycle and SWOT, the paper analyzes the feasibility of the three phases of equity incentive implemented by Letv net from two aspects of external and internal environment. It is based on the data of 2010-2016 annual report. This paper analyzes the changes of the company's performance before and after the implementation of equity incentive by Letv. It is based on the financial indicators such as operating income, net profit, weighted return on net assets, etc. Combined with the non-financial indicators such as turnover rate to analyze the effect of equity incentive, combined with the first three periods of the implementation of equity incentive plan, Letv net equity incentive plan in the incentive object and incentive quota, Through the comparative analysis of the conditions of exercise, the arrangement of exercise rights and the assessment index, the author finds out that the equity incentive scheme of Letv net is worth learning and needs to be improved, so as to establish the equity incentive scheme which is more in line with Letv net. It provides more basis for the implementation of equity incentive scheme for gem listed companies and provides reference for the development of the same industry.
【學位授予單位】：吉林財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F49;F272.92

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