本文選題：澳大利亞 + 礦產(chǎn)業(yè)�。� 參考：《華東師范大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：澳大利亞礦產(chǎn)資源豐富,是世界上最重要的礦產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)國(guó)和出口國(guó)之一。礦業(yè)在澳經(jīng)濟(jì)體系中占有重要地位。近年來(lái),隨著國(guó)際市場(chǎng)對(duì)礦產(chǎn)品的需求持續(xù)增長(zhǎng),礦產(chǎn)品價(jià)格大幅提升,澳大利亞礦業(yè)企業(yè)獲取了巨額利潤(rùn)。在澳大利亞,礦產(chǎn)資源被視為全體澳大利亞人民的共同財(cái)富,政府有權(quán)對(duì)私人企業(yè)自開(kāi)采這些公共資源所獲得的利潤(rùn)征稅。而在澳政府看來(lái),現(xiàn)行的稅費(fèi)政策不能適應(yīng)市場(chǎng)變化以確保礦業(yè)利潤(rùn)得到合理分配�；诖�,澳大利亞政府調(diào)整稅收政策,推出了一系列礦產(chǎn)稅改革政策。 2010年5月,工黨政府啟動(dòng)礦產(chǎn)稅改革,首先推出資源超額利潤(rùn)稅(RSPT),該方案擬對(duì)礦業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)過(guò)程中產(chǎn)生的超額利潤(rùn)征收40%的稅款。澳大利亞礦業(yè)對(duì)此方案表示強(qiáng)烈反對(duì),并發(fā)動(dòng)媒體戰(zhàn)以對(duì)抗新方案實(shí)施。在隨后的博弈過(guò)程中,澳政府落敗,資源超額利潤(rùn)稅未能實(shí)施,此敗績(jī)成為時(shí)任澳大利亞總理陸克文下臺(tái)重要原因之一。隨后,繼任總理吉拉德與礦業(yè)企業(yè)協(xié)商后推出妥協(xié)方案：礦產(chǎn)資源租賃稅(MRRT),該方案于2012年7月實(shí)行。2013年9月,反對(duì)黨聯(lián)盟領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人阿博特上臺(tái),上任伊始便兌現(xiàn)礦業(yè)稅收改革承諾,推出法案廢除礦產(chǎn)資源租賃稅。 本文著眼于自2010年起澳大利亞政府開(kāi)始推行的礦產(chǎn)稅改革,對(duì)比澳大利亞此前的礦業(yè)稅收體系,結(jié)合澳大利亞自身經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢(shì)以及礦業(yè)發(fā)展?fàn)顩r,對(duì)其改革背景、改革動(dòng)因、政策特點(diǎn)及其制定過(guò)程進(jìn)行深入探討。重點(diǎn)關(guān)注在改革之初澳大利亞政府推出資源超額利潤(rùn)稅的失敗經(jīng)歷,以及時(shí)任總理下臺(tái)事件。 研究過(guò)程基于政府報(bào)告、行業(yè)協(xié)會(huì)報(bào)告、媒體報(bào)道、政策演講以及民意調(diào)查等資料,剖析改革過(guò)程中政府與礦業(yè)企業(yè)之間的利益博弈。本文運(yùn)用利益相關(guān)者理論及企業(yè)權(quán)力理論解釋澳大利亞政府推行改革受阻的原因。結(jié)果表明,在政策制定過(guò)程中,澳大利亞政府未就政策細(xì)節(jié)與主要利益相關(guān)者(即澳大利亞礦業(yè)企業(yè))進(jìn)行咨詢協(xié)商,是改革失敗的重要原因之一。澳大利亞聯(lián)邦大選的迫近、礦業(yè)在澳大利亞的特殊地位等原因使得礦業(yè)企業(yè)權(quán)力得到有效發(fā)揮,同時(shí)將工黨政府置于改革不利地位。本文的最后部分將就未來(lái)的改革政策實(shí)施提出合理化建議。
[Abstract]:Australia is rich in mineral resources and is one of the most important mineral producers and exporters in the world. The mining industry occupies an important position in the Australian economic system. Australian mining companies have made huge profits in recent years as international demand for minerals has continued to grow and mineral prices have risen sharply. In Australia, mineral resources are regarded as the common wealth of all Australians, and the government has the right to tax the profits of private companies from exploiting these public resources. In the Australian government's view, the current tax policy can not adapt to market changes to ensure a reasonable distribution of mining profits. Based on this, the Australian government adjusted its tax policy and introduced a series of mineral tax reform policies. In May 2010, the Labour government launched a tax reform on minerals, first introducing a tax on excess profits on resources, which would impose a 40 percent tax on excess profits generated in the course of mining operations. Australian mining strongly opposed the plan and launched a media war against the new plan. In the ensuing game, the Australian government failed to implement a tax on excess profits on resources, which was one of the important reasons why Kevin Rudd, then prime minister, stepped down. Subsequently, the successor Prime Minister Gillard, in consultation with mining companies, launched a compromise: a mineral resources lease tax, MRRTT, which was introduced in July 2012. In September 2013, opposition coalition leader Abbott came to power. As soon as he took office, he made good on his promise of tax reform and introduced a bill to abolish the mineral resource lease tax. This paper focuses on the mineral tax reform that has been implemented by the Australian government since 2010, compares Australia's previous mining tax system, combines Australia's own economic situation and mining development situation, and gives the background of the reform and the reasons for the reform. The characteristics of the policy and its formulation process are discussed in depth. The focus was on the failure of the Australian government to introduce a tax on excess profits on resources at the start of the reforms and the ouster of the then prime minister. The research process is based on government reports, industry association reports, media reports, policy speeches and public opinion surveys to analyze the interests of the government and mining enterprises in the reform process. This paper uses stakeholder theory and corporate power theory to explain why the Australian government has been blocked from carrying out the reform. The results show that the failure of the Australian government to consult the major stakeholders (i.e. Australian mining enterprises) on the details of the policy is one of the important reasons for the failure of the reform. The approaching federal election and the special status of the mining industry in Australia make the mining industry power exert effectively and put the Labor government at a disadvantage of reform. The last part of this article will put forward the rationalization suggestion of the reform policy implementation in the future.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F816.11

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 徐靜冉;;澳大利亞礦產(chǎn)資源租賃稅改革及其啟示[J];商業(yè)研究;2013年05期

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本文編號(hào)：1985918