發(fā)布時間：2018-05-23 10:49

  本文選題：地方政府債券 + 信用風(fēng)險��； 參考：《華東師范大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：2015年1月1日實施的新《預(yù)算法》允許我國所有省份和個別計劃單列市自發(fā)自還地方政府債券,這有力地刺激了地方政府債券的發(fā)行。2014年地方政府債券的發(fā)行額為4000億元,而2016年其發(fā)行規(guī)�？傆嬕堰_60458億元,在短短兩年內(nèi)地方政府債券的發(fā)行規(guī)模急速擴大,其面臨的信用風(fēng)險不容小覷。本文首先對國內(nèi)外地方政府債券的相關(guān)文獻進行梳理,并從公共財政理論、財政聯(lián)邦理論和金融生態(tài)理論闡述了我國地方政府債券的發(fā)行依據(jù)、發(fā)行偏好及相關(guān)影響。開篇的文獻梳理及理論研究為地方債券信用風(fēng)險來源的分析奠定了堅實基礎(chǔ)。緊接著,本文將地方政府債券與"城投債"進行比較分析,進而明確了本文研究的地方政府債券的含義。之后又對我國地方政府債券的發(fā)展歷史進行了歸納,并從發(fā)行規(guī)模、發(fā)行機制、監(jiān)管機制這三個角度對地方政府債券的現(xiàn)狀進行分析。在上述文獻理論歸納和歷史現(xiàn)狀分析的基礎(chǔ)上,本文研究發(fā)現(xiàn)我國地方政府債券的信用風(fēng)險主要來源于宏觀政治體制環(huán)境、地方政府債券的發(fā)行結(jié)構(gòu)及信息披露等,并選定KMV模型作為地方政府債券信用風(fēng)險研究的實證分析模型。在實證分析部分,本文利用全國30省(市)政府財政收入數(shù)據(jù)、財政支出數(shù)據(jù)、地方政府債券實際發(fā)行額,通過KMV模型對地方政府債券的信用風(fēng)險進行了研究。結(jié)果顯示30省(市)中有9個省份在可接受的0.4%的違約概率下存在信用風(fēng)險,其中2個屬于東北省份、5個屬于西部省份、其余分別自東部和中部省份。地方政府債券信用風(fēng)險伴隨著債券發(fā)行規(guī)模的擴大而提高,且信用風(fēng)險省份主要集中在經(jīng)濟發(fā)展水平落后的西部地區(qū)和近年來經(jīng)濟增長水平迅速下滑的東北地區(qū)。不同省份在確定地區(qū)政府債券發(fā)行規(guī)模時不但要參考財政收入的絕對規(guī)模,還需要參考本地區(qū)財政收入的增長、波動情況。結(jié)合實證分析結(jié)果,本文提出了加強規(guī)�？刂�、健全地方債券信息披露制度、提高債券信用評級質(zhì)量、建立地方政府債券保險制度四條建議。
[Abstract]:The new Budget Law, which came into effect on January 1, 2015, allows all provinces and municipalities in China to voluntarily repay their own local government bonds, which has given a powerful boost to the issuance of local government bonds. The amount of local government bonds issued in 2014 was 400 billion yuan. In 2016, the total size of its issuance has reached 6.0458 trillion yuan, in just two years, the size of local government bond issuance has expanded rapidly, its credit risk is not to be underestimated. This paper firstly combs the relevant literature of local government bonds at home and abroad, and expounds the basis, preference and influence of local government bonds issuance in China from the public finance theory, fiscal federal theory and financial ecology theory. The literature combing and theoretical research at the beginning lay a solid foundation for the analysis of the sources of local bond credit risk. Then, this paper makes a comparative analysis of the local government bonds and the city investment bonds, and then clarifies the meaning of the local government bonds studied in this paper. Then the development history of local government bonds in China is summarized, and the present situation of local government bonds is analyzed from the perspectives of issuing scale, issuing mechanism and supervision mechanism. On the basis of the above literature theory and the analysis of the historical situation, this paper finds that the credit risk of the local government bonds mainly comes from the macro political system environment, the issuing structure of the local government bonds and the information disclosure, etc. KMV model is chosen as the empirical analysis model of local government bond credit risk research. In the part of empirical analysis, this paper studies the credit risk of local government bonds by using the data of government revenue, fiscal expenditure and the actual issuance amount of local government bonds in 30 provinces (cities). The results show that 9 provinces in 30 provinces (cities) have credit risk under acceptable default probability of 0.4%, 2 of them belong to northeast province, 5 belong to western province, and the rest are from eastern and central provinces, respectively. The credit risk of local government bond increases with the expansion of bond issuance scale, and the credit risk provinces mainly focus on the western region with backward economic development level and the northeast region where the economic growth level is declining rapidly in recent years. Different provinces should not only refer to the absolute scale of fiscal revenue, but also refer to the growth and fluctuation of local fiscal revenue when determining the issuing scale of regional government bonds. Based on the results of empirical analysis, this paper puts forward four suggestions on strengthening scale control, perfecting local bond information disclosure system, improving the quality of bond credit rating, and establishing local government bond insurance system.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F812.5

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本文編號：1924418