本文選題：環(huán)保稅 + 稅權配置��； 參考：《首都經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：面對嚴峻突出的霧霾、污水等環(huán)境污染問題,人們對“APEC藍”、“閱兵藍”常態(tài)化滿懷期待。同反腐、社會公平、社會保障、收入分配等話題一道,環(huán)境治理也是老百姓最關心的問題。為了改善環(huán)境狀況、加快轉變經(jīng)濟發(fā)展方式,我國近年來出臺了一系列環(huán)保政策,環(huán)保稅是社會關注度較高的環(huán)境經(jīng)濟政策。環(huán)保稅具有杠桿調(diào)節(jié)功能,建立健全環(huán)保稅,不僅有利于明確個人、企業(yè)及政府的環(huán)境保護責任,還可以通過開征環(huán)保稅以最大限度地減少人環(huán)境破壞、推動產(chǎn)業(yè)結構轉型升級型并實現(xiàn)生態(tài)環(huán)境的改善。因此,環(huán)境稅的研究工作既具有理論意義又具有現(xiàn)實意義,理應得到環(huán)保、稅收等各界的重視。我國環(huán)保稅法已于2016年通過立法,而環(huán)保稅法未對環(huán)保稅歸屬問題及稅收收入使用問題進行明確規(guī)定,目前,也沒有其他法律法規(guī)予以規(guī)定。因此,中央與地方在爭取口后環(huán)保稅稅權尤其是征管權和收益分配權的配置中存在著利益博弈。本文在現(xiàn)實政策和科學數(shù)據(jù)的基礎上,對中央與地方環(huán)保稅稅權配置問題進行分析,以博弈模型為分析工具,從理論上論證了環(huán)保稅的歸屬問題,得出相關結論:認為在不違背上位法的條件下,中央應下放地方部分環(huán)保稅立法權;環(huán)保稅更適合作為地方稅,由地方進行征收管理,將環(huán)保稅征管權全權交由地方:延續(xù)排污費制度,環(huán)保稅收入應專款專用,由地方執(zhí)行環(huán)保稅的稅收收益分配權。本文認為這樣有利于協(xié)調(diào)中央與地方的利益關系,避免惡性競爭,實現(xiàn)共贏的局面。本文將文獻分析法、假設與推理相結合的方法運用到分析中央與地方在環(huán)保稅稅權配置中的博弈關系,希望有益于加快完善我國環(huán)保稅制度及征管準備工作,為日后環(huán)保稅擴圍、改革提供有益的幫助。
[Abstract]:In the face of severe environmental pollution problems such as haze and sewage, people are looking forward to the normality of "APEC blue" and "parade blue". With anti-corruption, social equity, social security, income distribution and other topics, environmental governance is also the most concerned issues. In order to improve the environmental situation and accelerate the transformation of the mode of economic development, China has issued a series of environmental protection policies in recent years. Environmental protection tax has the function of leverage regulation. Establishing and perfecting environmental protection tax is not only helpful to clarify the responsibility of environmental protection of individuals, enterprises and governments, but also can minimize the damage to human environment by levying environmental tax. Promote the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure and achieve the improvement of ecological environment. Therefore, the research of environmental tax is of both theoretical and practical significance, and should be paid attention to by all walks of life, such as environmental protection and taxation. China's environmental tax law has passed legislation in 2016, and the environmental protection tax law has not clearly stipulated the issue of the attribution of environmental tax and the use of tax revenue. At present, there are no other laws and regulations to provide for it. Therefore, there is an interest game between the central government and the local government in the allocation of the right to tax, especially the right to collect and manage, and the right to distribute income. On the basis of realistic policy and scientific data, this paper analyzes the allocation of tax power between central and local environmental protection tax, and with the game model as an analysis tool, theoretically demonstrates the ownership of environmental protection tax. The conclusion is as follows: under the condition of not violating the upper law, the central government should devolve the legislative power of part of the local environmental protection tax, and the environmental tax is more suitable for the local tax, which should be collected and managed by the local government. The collection and management of environmental protection tax will be handed over to the local authorities: the system of sewage charges shall be extended, the revenue of environmental tax shall be earmarked for special use, and the distribution of tax revenue of environmental protection tax shall be carried out by the local authorities. This paper argues that this is conducive to coordinating the interests of central and local governments, avoiding vicious competition and realizing win-win situation. This paper applies the method of literature analysis, hypothesis and reasoning to analyze the game relationship between central and local governments in the allocation of environmental protection tax power, hoping that it will be helpful to accelerate the improvement of environmental tax system and the preparation for collection and management in China. For the future environmental tax expansion, reform to provide useful help.
【學位授予單位】：首都經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F812.42

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