本文選題：地區(qū)人才吸引力 + 教育投資回報(bào)　； 參考：《湘潭大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文檢驗(yàn)了一種導(dǎo)致我國(guó)高校本地生源占比地區(qū)間差異的機(jī)制,并且以此為例,說(shuō)明地方分權(quán)(分級(jí)辦學(xué))對(duì)公共品分配的影響。高考招生是否公平是重大的社會(huì)議題,是影響人力資本積累、地區(qū)收入差距和社會(huì)和諧的重要因素。各省平均高校本地生源占比差距較大,一些觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為某些地區(qū)的高校優(yōu)先招收本地學(xué)生,造成了各地高等教育機(jī)會(huì)不均等,對(duì)外地考生不公平。另一些觀點(diǎn)則認(rèn)為,經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展水平較高的地區(qū),基礎(chǔ)教育發(fā)展較好,師資力量雄厚,生源質(zhì)量較好,因此高校愿意投放更多的招生指標(biāo)。本文利用2012—2015年中國(guó)1204所普通高校(本科)招生計(jì)劃面板數(shù)據(jù),研究地區(qū)人才吸引力和教育財(cái)政支出對(duì)高校本地生源占比的影響,進(jìn)而驗(yàn)證地方政府利益對(duì)公共品分配的影響。我們將高校在各省投放的生源比例作為被解釋變量,將虛擬變量“是否本地生源”作為解釋變量,地方吸引力與是否本地生源的交互項(xiàng)和教育支出與本地生源交互項(xiàng)作為主要檢驗(yàn)變量。為了排除生源質(zhì)量、高校知名度,高校屬地的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展水平等因素,我們構(gòu)建了普通最小二乘(OLS)模型、固定效應(yīng)模型(FE)控制生源地因素、高校因素、高校屬地因素,盡量解決內(nèi)生性問(wèn)題,得出穩(wěn)健結(jié)論。我們認(rèn)為地方政府利益影響教育公共品分配:地方政府為了發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì),獲得政績(jī),回收教育投資收益,采取偏向本地考生的招生策略。對(duì)于地區(qū)人才吸引力較低,留不住人才的地區(qū),地方政府更愿意招收本地學(xué)生發(fā)展當(dāng)?shù)亟?jīng)濟(jì);對(duì)于教育支出占一般公共支出比例較高的地方政府,教育投資的機(jī)會(huì)成本更大,地方政府更迫切地回收教育投資收益,更傾向于本地考生。實(shí)證結(jié)果顯示,在控制了生源質(zhì)量、高校質(zhì)量后,高校的本地生源占比仍然顯著高于外地生源平均占比。地區(qū)人才吸引力高的地區(qū),傾向本地考生的程度更弱,教育財(cái)政支出占比較高地區(qū)的高校,傾向本地考生的程度更強(qiáng)。本文通過(guò)高校招生的例子,說(shuō)明地方分權(quán)不僅會(huì)影響公共品供給的數(shù)量、類(lèi)別,還會(huì)影響公共品的分配。最后,本文依據(jù)研究結(jié)論提出政策建議,中央財(cái)政資金應(yīng)該在平衡公共服務(wù)供給、分配問(wèn)題中發(fā)揮更大作用。
[Abstract]:This paper examines a mechanism that leads to regional differences in the proportion of local students in colleges and universities in China, and takes this as an example to illustrate the influence of decentralization on the distribution of public goods. The fairness of college entrance examination is a major social issue and an important factor affecting the accumulation of human capital, regional income gap and social harmony. There is a big difference in the proportion of local students in each province. Some views suggest that the preferential admission of local students in some regions has resulted in unequal opportunities in higher education and unfair to non-local candidates. Others think that in areas with higher economic development level, basic education develops better, teachers are strong, and the quality of students is better, so colleges and universities are willing to put in more enrollment targets. Based on the panel data of enrollment plans of 1204 universities (undergraduate) in China from 2012 to 2015, this paper studies the influence of local talent attraction and educational expenditure on the proportion of local students in colleges and universities. Then verify the impact of local government interests on the distribution of public goods. We take the proportion of students that colleges and universities put in each province as the explained variable, and the fictitious variable "whether the local student source" as the explanatory variable. The interaction between local attractiveness and local students and the interaction between education expenditure and local students are the main test variables. In order to exclude the factors such as the quality of students, the popularity of colleges and universities, the level of economic development of the dependent territories of colleges and universities, we have constructed the ordinary least squares OLS model, the fixed effect model (FEE) to control the factors of students' origin, and the factors of the dependent territories of colleges and universities. Try to solve the endogenetic problem and draw a steady conclusion. We believe that the interests of local governments affect the distribution of educational public goods: in order to develop the economy, obtain achievements, and recover the income from investment in education, local governments adopt the strategy of recruiting students in favor of local candidates. Local governments are more willing to recruit local students to develop the local economy in areas where local talents are less attractive and cannot be retained. For local governments, where education expenditure accounts for a higher proportion of general public expenditure, the opportunity cost of education investment is higher. Local governments are more eager to recover income from investment in education and are more inclined to local candidates. The empirical results show that after controlling the quality of students, the proportion of local students in colleges and universities is still significantly higher than that in other places. In the regions with high attractiveness of talents, the degree of preference to local candidates is weaker, and higher education expenditure accounts for higher education expenditure, and the degree of preference for local candidates is stronger. This paper shows that decentralization not only affects the quantity and category of public goods, but also affects the distribution of public goods. Finally, according to the conclusions of the study, the paper puts forward some policy suggestions that the central financial funds should play a greater role in balancing the supply and distribution of public services.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：C964.2;F812.45

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