本文選題：財政支出　切入點：策略互動行為　出處：《首都經濟貿易大學學報》2017年03期

【摘要】：通過構建地方政府財政支出的完全信息靜態(tài)無序離散型博弈模型,并對此博弈模型進行非參數估計,實證分析地方政府財政支出的策略互動行為及此策略互動行為對區(qū)域經濟協調發(fā)展的影響。結果表明:地方政府財政支出在公共服務和正外溢效應比較大的領域,如教育、科學技術、文化體育與傳媒、節(jié)能環(huán)保和金融監(jiān)管的策略互動行為是策略替代的,在搭便車心理的影響下,這些領域地方政府財政支出的增加不利于區(qū)域經濟的協調發(fā)展;而地方政府財政支出在公共安全和外溢效應比較小的領域,如醫(yī)療衛(wèi)生、城鄉(xiāng)社區(qū)事務、農林水事務和交通運輸的策略互動行為是策略互補的;在協同發(fā)展的情況下,這些領域地方政府財政支出的增加會促進區(qū)域經濟的協調發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:By constructing the static disorderly discrete game model of complete information of local government fiscal expenditure, the non-parametric estimation of the game model is carried out. This paper empirically analyzes the strategic interaction behavior of local government fiscal expenditure and its influence on the coordinated development of regional economy. The results show that the local government fiscal expenditure is in the areas where the public service and positive spillover effects are relatively large, such as education. The interactive behavior of science and technology, culture and sports and media, energy saving and environmental protection and financial supervision is replaced by strategy. Under the influence of hitchhiking psychology, the increase of local government financial expenditure in these fields is not conducive to the coordinated development of regional economy; However, the strategic interaction of local government expenditure in areas with less public safety and spillover effects, such as health care, urban and rural community affairs, agricultural and forestry water affairs and transportation, is strategic complementary; in the case of coordinated development, The increase of local government expenditure in these fields will promote the coordinated development of regional economy.
【作者單位】： 首都經濟貿易大學經濟學院;
【分類號】：F812.45

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本文編號：1680952