本文選題：財(cái)政分權(quán)　切入點(diǎn)：政府行為　出處：《財(cái)政部財(cái)政科學(xué)研究所》2014年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：改革開(kāi)放三十多年來(lái),我國(guó)的政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)、社會(huì)諸領(lǐng)域發(fā)生了翻天覆地的變化,并朝著現(xiàn)代化國(guó)家快速邁進(jìn)。在我國(guó)的轉(zhuǎn)型中,財(cái)政領(lǐng)域的改革一直處于中心地位,并對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展和社會(huì)進(jìn)步發(fā)揮著關(guān)鍵作用。在十八屆三中全會(huì)《中共中央關(guān)于全面深化改革若干重大問(wèn)題的決定》中,又以前所未有的歷史高度對(duì)財(cái)政職能進(jìn)行了定位,賦予了財(cái)政以“國(guó)家治理的基礎(chǔ)和重要支柱”的特殊地位,從而進(jìn)一步凸顯出財(cái)政領(lǐng)域改革與研究的重要性和迫切性。 學(xué)界普遍認(rèn)為,中國(guó)近幾十年的財(cái)政改革是以中央向地方的分權(quán)為根本特征的,這種分權(quán)化趨勢(shì)帶來(lái)的影響是復(fù)雜而又深遠(yuǎn)的：一方面,它調(diào)動(dòng)了地方發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)的積極性,促進(jìn)了地方政府之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng),從而奠定了我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)取得巨大成就的制度基礎(chǔ)；另一方面,權(quán)力的分散和下放也產(chǎn)生了一定的負(fù)面效果,最為突出的表現(xiàn)是地方公共物品供給的不足。 為加強(qiáng)國(guó)家治理能力和治理體系現(xiàn)代化建設(shè),必須對(duì)財(cái)政體制進(jìn)行優(yōu)化設(shè)計(jì),這要求我們?cè)诔浞终J(rèn)識(shí)現(xiàn)有財(cái)政體制存在問(wèn)題的基礎(chǔ)上,提出具有針對(duì)性的建議。然而,現(xiàn)有關(guān)于財(cái)政分權(quán)體制的研究成果主要側(cè)重于財(cái)政分權(quán)與醫(yī)療衛(wèi)生、教育和基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)等公共物品供給,財(cái)政分權(quán)與土地出讓,以及財(cái)政分權(quán)同地方政府債務(wù)等方面,相對(duì)忽略了財(cái)政分權(quán)體制帶來(lái)的另一個(gè)重要的負(fù)面影響——環(huán)境污染。 近些年來(lái),隨著環(huán)境污染的不斷加劇和國(guó)家對(duì)于環(huán)境保護(hù)的重視,環(huán)境問(wèn)題逐漸成為公共議論的熱點(diǎn)。黨的十八大明確提出了包括生態(tài)文明建設(shè)在內(nèi)的“五位一體”總體布局,2014年政府工作報(bào)告明確提出“出重拳強(qiáng)化污染防治,堅(jiān)決向污染宣戰(zhàn)”,更是將環(huán)境治理提升到國(guó)家戰(zhàn)略的高度。改善和治理環(huán)境首先必須認(rèn)識(shí)環(huán)境污染的成因,我國(guó)環(huán)境污染的成因復(fù)雜而又多元,其中一個(gè)重要原因是地方政府環(huán)境監(jiān)管上的“缺位”這種“缺位”的背后,是地方政府在現(xiàn)行財(cái)政和人事激勵(lì)機(jī)制下的某種理性選擇。因此,本文將從財(cái)政學(xué)和公共經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的角度分析和解釋地方政府的行為偏好以及這種偏好對(duì)于環(huán)境監(jiān)管和治理行為的影響,不僅為理解我國(guó)環(huán)境污染問(wèn)題提供了新視角,而且豐富了我國(guó)環(huán)境污染治理的思路。通過(guò)闡明財(cái)政制度背后蘊(yùn)含的激勵(lì)機(jī)制,希望對(duì)未來(lái)財(cái)政改革的頂層設(shè)計(jì)方案提供一定的經(jīng)驗(yàn)支撐,對(duì)公共財(cái)政的完善、國(guó)民福利的提高和生態(tài)環(huán)境的保護(hù)有借鑒意義。 從已有的文獻(xiàn)來(lái)看,國(guó)外對(duì)財(cái)政分權(quán)與環(huán)境污染之間的關(guān)系研究顯然更加成熟,經(jīng)驗(yàn)分析的模型更加豐富,而國(guó)內(nèi)對(duì)這方面的研究起步較晚。從國(guó)內(nèi)已有的研究來(lái)看,大部分認(rèn)為財(cái)政分權(quán)會(huì)妨礙環(huán)境質(zhì)量的提高,但是這些研究對(duì)財(cái)政分權(quán)與環(huán)境污染關(guān)系的分析存在兩方面的不足：第一,已有研究在探討財(cái)政分權(quán)與環(huán)境污染之間的關(guān)系時(shí),沒(méi)有形成較為一致的答案。這與已有研究中數(shù)據(jù)的時(shí)限、財(cái)政分權(quán)指標(biāo)的選取、實(shí)證方法的選擇都有關(guān)系。第二,財(cái)政分權(quán)對(duì)于環(huán)境污染影響的傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制闡述尚不清晰。財(cái)政分權(quán)通過(guò)影響制度環(huán)境下的主體行為選擇來(lái)發(fā)揮作用,而目前的研究則將政府內(nèi)部的行為選擇過(guò)程視作一個(gè)“黑箱”,沒(méi)有對(duì)其作用機(jī)制進(jìn)行深入分析。 因此,本文將著重進(jìn)行兩方面的探索：第一,綜合已有研究,通過(guò)選取動(dòng)態(tài)面板數(shù)據(jù)、更全面的財(cái)政分權(quán)指標(biāo)和控制變量與采用更合適的實(shí)證方法,考察財(cái)政分權(quán)、地方政府競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)區(qū)域環(huán)境污染的影響,分析財(cái)政分權(quán)體制對(duì)地方政府的激勵(lì)作用及其對(duì)環(huán)境監(jiān)管行為產(chǎn)生的影響。第二,通過(guò)理論分析與綜述,本文將財(cái)政分權(quán)對(duì)環(huán)境污染的作用機(jī)制歸納為三條路徑：一是通過(guò)改變地方政府的財(cái)政支出結(jié)構(gòu)和模式影響環(huán)境治理的投入,并最終影響環(huán)境污染水平；二是通過(guò)改變中央轉(zhuǎn)移支付的強(qiáng)度和方向影響地方政府在環(huán)境方面的投入；三是通過(guò)影響地方政府的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策和產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu),進(jìn)而對(duì)污染物的排放產(chǎn)生影響。 針對(duì)已有研究的不足,本文提出了相應(yīng)的研究假設(shè),并構(gòu)建了財(cái)政分權(quán)影響環(huán)境污染的研究模型。該模型的重點(diǎn)在于分析財(cái)政分權(quán)對(duì)環(huán)境污染的具體影響,以及財(cái)政分權(quán)如何通過(guò)財(cái)政支出、中央轉(zhuǎn)移支付和產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)這三個(gè)途徑影響環(huán)境污染水平。 基于2003—2010年我國(guó)省級(jí)層面的面板數(shù)據(jù),本文對(duì)財(cái)政分權(quán)、地方政府競(jìng)爭(zhēng)水平、財(cái)政支出、中央轉(zhuǎn)移支付、產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)和環(huán)境污染等方面的變量進(jìn)行了描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析,分析了變量的特征和關(guān)系,并運(yùn)用系統(tǒng)GMM模型對(duì)研究假設(shè)進(jìn)行了驗(yàn)證。通過(guò)實(shí)證分析,本文主要得出以下幾點(diǎn)結(jié)論：(1)財(cái)政分權(quán)程度和工業(yè)“三廢”污染程度之間呈顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系,意味著財(cái)政分權(quán)程度越高,環(huán)境污染越嚴(yán)重；(2)在財(cái)政分權(quán)背景下,地方政府競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)環(huán)境污染具有一定的抑制作用,意味著觀察期內(nèi)地方政府的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)進(jìn)入了全方位競(jìng)爭(zhēng)階段,逐漸降低了對(duì)污染容忍程度,產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)升級(jí)也對(duì)高污染產(chǎn)生了一定的擠出效應(yīng)；(3)地方環(huán)境治理支出與廢水污染、廢氣污染以及固體廢棄物污染等均存在顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,考慮到地方政府的環(huán)保支出后,財(cái)政分權(quán)變量與廢水污染、廢氣污染以及固體廢棄物污染等變量的回歸系數(shù)仍為顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,表明環(huán)保支出對(duì)三廢污染具有抑制效應(yīng)以及改善作用；(4)中央轉(zhuǎn)移支付與廢水污染、廢氣污染以及固體廢棄物污染等環(huán)境污染水平存在正相關(guān)關(guān)系,考慮到中央轉(zhuǎn)移支付后,財(cái)政分權(quán)與環(huán)境污染仍保持顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系。這表明我國(guó)中央轉(zhuǎn)移支付制度對(duì)環(huán)境污染沒(méi)有發(fā)揮抑制效應(yīng)；(5)高污染產(chǎn)業(yè)增加值除與廢水污染存在顯著的正相關(guān)外,與固體廢棄物污染、廢氣污染均存在顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系�？紤]到高污染產(chǎn)業(yè)增加值后,財(cái)政分權(quán)變量仍與廢水污染、廢氣污染以及固體廢棄物等存在顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系,這表明財(cái)政分權(quán)中以經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展為單一維度的政績(jī)考核激勵(lì)方式,導(dǎo)致區(qū)域高污染產(chǎn)業(yè)的快速發(fā)展,并最終加劇區(qū)域環(huán)境污染。本文的研究結(jié)論與已有關(guān)于這一主題的實(shí)證研究并不完全一致,這種差異主要來(lái)自于樣本選取、測(cè)量方式和模型構(gòu)建上的不同。 通過(guò)以環(huán)境污染為主要研究對(duì)象,采用省級(jí)面板數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析,本文對(duì)公共財(cái)政學(xué)領(lǐng)域做出了有價(jià)值的理論和實(shí)踐貢獻(xiàn)：在理論上本文擴(kuò)展了財(cái)政分權(quán)與地方公共產(chǎn)品供給關(guān)系的研究,深化了關(guān)于財(cái)政分權(quán)影響環(huán)境污染機(jī)制和渠道的認(rèn)識(shí),在實(shí)踐上本文的研究結(jié)論能夠幫助政策設(shè)計(jì)者進(jìn)行對(duì)應(yīng)的制度調(diào)整和政策修正,從而促使政府走出當(dāng)前的環(huán)境監(jiān)管和治理困境。具體的政策建議包括：進(jìn)一步理清各級(jí)政府的環(huán)保責(zé)權(quán),加強(qiáng)環(huán)境保護(hù)垂直管理與跨區(qū)域協(xié)調(diào),探索環(huán)境保護(hù)稅緩解環(huán)保支出壓力,在一般性轉(zhuǎn)移支付中充分考慮環(huán)境因素,加強(qiáng)轉(zhuǎn)移支付制度對(duì)環(huán)境保護(hù)的激勵(lì)引導(dǎo),建立生態(tài)補(bǔ)償財(cái)政轉(zhuǎn)移支付,強(qiáng)化行政首長(zhǎng)對(duì)本轄區(qū)的環(huán)境保護(hù)責(zé)任,完善公眾參與環(huán)境監(jiān)督的渠道,全方位推進(jìn)環(huán)境規(guī)制立法、執(zhí)法與監(jiān)督。
[Abstract]:Thirty years of reform and opening up, China's political, economic and social changes happened to turn the world upside down in the field, and toward the modernization of the country in the fast forward. The transformation of our country, the reform of the financial sector has been at the centre of the economic development and social progress plays a key role in the "CPC Central Committee on the third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee. Several major issues of comprehensive reform decision", and the history of hitherto unknown height to financial function for the position, given the financial to the "special status of foundation and an important pillar of national governance", which further highlights the importance of financial sector reform and research and urgent.
Scholars generally believe that Chinese decades of fiscal reform is central to the decentralization as the fundamental characteristics of the impact of this decentralization trend is complex and profound: on the one hand, it aroused the enthusiasm of local economic development, promote the competition among local governments, so as to lay the foundation for the system I our economy has made great achievements; on the other hand, decentralization and devolution of power also has some negative effects, the most prominent is the lack of local public goods supply.
In order to strengthen the national governance capacity and governance system modernization, it is necessary to optimize the design of financial system, which requires us to fully understand the existing financial system based on the existing problems and puts forward some pertinent suggestions. However, on the current fiscal decentralization system and the research results mainly focus on fiscal decentralization and health, education and infrastructure the construction of facilities for the supply of public goods, fiscal decentralization and land transfer, and fiscal decentralization with local government debt, neglecting another important negative impact brought about fiscal decentralization: sound of environmental pollution.
In recent years, with the increasing environmental pollution and the importance of environmental protection, the environmental problem has become the focus of public debate. The Party of eighteen put forward the overall layout including the construction of ecological civilization, "five in one", in 2014 the government work report made clear that the heavy strengthen pollution control, pollution and resolutely to war. Is the environmental governance to enhance the national strategic height. The causes and improve the governance environment must first understand the causes of environmental pollution, environmental pollution in China is complex and diverse, is one of the important reasons for the local government environmental regulation on the "Absence" of the "Absence" behind the local government is a rational choice in the current financial and personnel incentive mechanism. Therefore, this article from the finance and public economics to analyze and explain the behavior of the local government is good to And this preference for environmental supervision and governance behavior, not only provides a new perspective for understanding the environmental pollution problems in China, but also enriches the management of environmental pollution in China. Through the incentive mechanism to clarify the ideas behind the financial system, hope to provide experience supporting a top-level design for the future of the financial reform, to improve the public finance, improve national welfare and protection of ecological environment of great significance.
From the existing literature, foreign research on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and environmental pollution is clearly more mature, empirical analysis of the model is more abundant, but the domestic research in this regard starts late. From the current domestic study, most believe that fiscal decentralization will hinder the improvement of environmental quality, but the study on the relationship between fiscal decentralization with the environmental pollution problems in two aspects: first, the existing research on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and environmental pollution, has not formed a more consistent answer. This data and existing research in selected time, fiscal decentralization index, are empirical method. Second, fiscal decentralization to the conduction mechanism of environment the impact on fiscal decentralization is not clear. The behavior selection effect of institutional environment to play a role, but the present study will be the government The internal behavior selection process is regarded as a "black box" and does not make an in-depth analysis of its mechanism.
Therefore, this article will focus on the exploration of the two aspects: first, based on previous research, through the selection of dynamic panel data, empirical method of fiscal decentralization index and control variables is more comprehensive and adopt more appropriate, effects of fiscal decentralization, local government competition on regional environmental pollution, analysis of the impact of fiscal decentralization on local government incentives and the environmental supervision behavior. Second, through theoretical analysis and summary, the mechanism of fiscal decentralization on environmental pollution is classified into three paths: one is to change the environment of fiscal expenditure structure and the mode of the impact of the local government investment, and ultimately affect the level of environmental pollution; two is through the change of strength and the direction of the central transfer payment effect of local government investment in terms of the environment; three is affected by the local government industrial policy and industrial structure. And it has an impact on the emission of pollutants.
Aimed at shortcomings of previous studies, this paper puts forward the corresponding research hypothesis, and constructs the research model of fiscal decentralization in the impact of environmental pollution. The key of this model lies in the analysis of the specific impact of fiscal decentralization on environmental pollution, and fiscal decentralization through fiscal expenditure, environmental impact of the three ways the central transfer payments and the industrial structure level of pollution.
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本文編號(hào)：1632809