【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵作為一項長期激勵機制，已經(jīng)在西方的到了廣泛的運用，有著深厚的理論基礎(chǔ)和實踐基礎(chǔ)。理論研究上，，股權(quán)激勵有委托代理理論、人力資本理論、激勵理論、產(chǎn)權(quán)激勵理論作為支撐；實證研究上，有學(xué)者持管理層持股與企業(yè)業(yè)績相關(guān)論，也有學(xué)者持管理層持股與企業(yè)業(yè)績無關(guān)論，但是大部分學(xué)者都認為管理層持股對于企業(yè)業(yè)績的提升具有很強的促進作用。近年來，股權(quán)激勵也開始逐步在國內(nèi)得到重視和運用。國內(nèi)大部分學(xué)者認同股權(quán)激勵對企業(yè)業(yè)績的積極作用，企業(yè)和政府也逐步認同了實施股權(quán)激勵的重要性和必要性。自國有企業(yè)改革以來，國有企業(yè)高管薪酬一直頗具爭議。股權(quán)激勵作為國有企業(yè)改革所邁出的重要一步，在深化國有企業(yè)改革，提高國有企業(yè)績效，實現(xiàn)國有資產(chǎn)保值增值上具有重要意義。但是在國有企業(yè)中推行股權(quán)激勵還有很多障礙，包括治理結(jié)構(gòu)因素、法律法規(guī)因素、資本市場因素、業(yè)績指標設(shè)置不當(dāng)?shù)鹊确矫妗?光明乳業(yè)是上海國有企業(yè)推行股權(quán)激勵的第一單。光明乳業(yè)選擇了限制性股票作為股權(quán)激勵模式，設(shè)置了合理的業(yè)績指標和解鎖條件，但另一方面，在行權(quán)價格和考核指標的設(shè)計上還存在缺陷，但總體上光明乳業(yè)的股權(quán)激勵方案是合理的。光明乳業(yè)股權(quán)激勵方案無疑對我國國有企業(yè)推行股權(quán)激勵具有很強的示范作用。要讓股權(quán)激勵真正起到激勵國有企業(yè)管理層的作用，筆者認為需要在提高資本市場有效性、完善企業(yè)治理結(jié)構(gòu)、設(shè)置合理的考核指標體系方面著手改善。
[Abstract]:As a long-term incentive mechanism, equity incentive has been widely used in the West and has a deep theoretical and practical basis. On the theoretical research, there are principal-agent theory, human capital theory, incentive theory, property right incentive theory as the support. Some scholars hold the view that management ownership has nothing to do with enterprise performance, but most scholars think that management ownership plays a very important role in promoting enterprise performance. In recent years, equity incentive has gradually been attached importance and applied in our country. The majority of domestic scholars agree that equity incentive plays an active role in corporate performance, and enterprises and governments have gradually recognized the importance and necessity of implementing equity incentive. Since the reform of state-owned enterprises, executive compensation of state-owned enterprises has been controversial. As an important step in the reform of state-owned enterprises, equity incentive is of great significance in deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises, improving the performance of state-owned enterprises, and realizing the preservation and appreciation of state-owned assets. However, there are still many obstacles to the implementation of equity incentive in state-owned enterprises, including governance structure factors, laws and regulations, capital market factors, improper performance indicators and so on. Bright dairy industry is Shanghai state-owned enterprises to promote equity incentives the first single. Guangming Dairy has chosen restricted stock as the stock right incentive mode, set up reasonable performance index and unlocking condition, but on the other hand, there are still some defects in the design of exercise price and examination index. But overall bright dairy industry's equity incentive plan is reasonable. There is no doubt that the equity incentive scheme of Guangming dairy industry has a strong demonstration effect on the implementation of equity incentive in Chinese state-owned enterprises. In order to encourage the management of state-owned enterprises, the author thinks that it is necessary to improve the efficiency of capital market, perfect the corporate governance structure and set up a reasonable evaluation index system.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華中科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275;F426.82

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