發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-08-22 16:12

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為一項(xiàng)長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)機(jī)制，已經(jīng)在西方的到了廣泛的運(yùn)用，有著深厚的理論基礎(chǔ)和實(shí)踐基礎(chǔ)。理論研究上，，股權(quán)激勵(lì)有委托代理理論、人力資本理論、激勵(lì)理論、產(chǎn)權(quán)激勵(lì)理論作為支撐；實(shí)證研究上，有學(xué)者持管理層持股與企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)相關(guān)論，也有學(xué)者持管理層持股與企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)無(wú)關(guān)論，但是大部分學(xué)者都認(rèn)為管理層持股對(duì)于企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)的提升具有很強(qiáng)的促進(jìn)作用。近年來(lái)，股權(quán)激勵(lì)也開(kāi)始逐步在國(guó)內(nèi)得到重視和運(yùn)用。國(guó)內(nèi)大部分學(xué)者認(rèn)同股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)的積極作用，企業(yè)和政府也逐步認(rèn)同了實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的重要性和必要性。自國(guó)有企業(yè)改革以來(lái)，國(guó)有企業(yè)高管薪酬一直頗具爭(zhēng)議。股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為國(guó)有企業(yè)改革所邁出的重要一步，在深化國(guó)有企業(yè)改革，提高國(guó)有企業(yè)績(jī)效，實(shí)現(xiàn)國(guó)有資產(chǎn)保值增值上具有重要意義。但是在國(guó)有企業(yè)中推行股權(quán)激勵(lì)還有很多障礙，包括治理結(jié)構(gòu)因素、法律法規(guī)因素、資本市場(chǎng)因素、業(yè)績(jī)指標(biāo)設(shè)置不當(dāng)?shù)鹊确矫妗?光明乳業(yè)是上海國(guó)有企業(yè)推行股權(quán)激勵(lì)的第一單。光明乳業(yè)選擇了限制性股票作為股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式，設(shè)置了合理的業(yè)績(jī)指標(biāo)和解鎖條件，但另一方面，在行權(quán)價(jià)格和考核指標(biāo)的設(shè)計(jì)上還存在缺陷，但總體上光明乳業(yè)的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案是合理的。光明乳業(yè)股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案無(wú)疑對(duì)我國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)推行股權(quán)激勵(lì)具有很強(qiáng)的示范作用。要讓股權(quán)激勵(lì)真正起到激勵(lì)國(guó)有企業(yè)管理層的作用，筆者認(rèn)為需要在提高資本市場(chǎng)有效性、完善企業(yè)治理結(jié)構(gòu)、設(shè)置合理的考核指標(biāo)體系方面著手改善。
[Abstract]:As a long-term incentive mechanism, equity incentive has been widely used in the West and has a deep theoretical and practical basis. On the theoretical research, there are principal-agent theory, human capital theory, incentive theory, property right incentive theory as the support. Some scholars hold the view that management ownership has nothing to do with enterprise performance, but most scholars think that management ownership plays a very important role in promoting enterprise performance. In recent years, equity incentive has gradually been attached importance and applied in our country. The majority of domestic scholars agree that equity incentive plays an active role in corporate performance, and enterprises and governments have gradually recognized the importance and necessity of implementing equity incentive. Since the reform of state-owned enterprises, executive compensation of state-owned enterprises has been controversial. As an important step in the reform of state-owned enterprises, equity incentive is of great significance in deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises, improving the performance of state-owned enterprises, and realizing the preservation and appreciation of state-owned assets. However, there are still many obstacles to the implementation of equity incentive in state-owned enterprises, including governance structure factors, laws and regulations, capital market factors, improper performance indicators and so on. Bright dairy industry is Shanghai state-owned enterprises to promote equity incentives the first single. Guangming Dairy has chosen restricted stock as the stock right incentive mode, set up reasonable performance index and unlocking condition, but on the other hand, there are still some defects in the design of exercise price and examination index. But overall bright dairy industry's equity incentive plan is reasonable. There is no doubt that the equity incentive scheme of Guangming dairy industry has a strong demonstration effect on the implementation of equity incentive in Chinese state-owned enterprises. In order to encourage the management of state-owned enterprises, the author thinks that it is necessary to improve the efficiency of capital market, perfect the corporate governance structure and set up a reasonable evaluation index system.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華中科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F426.82

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