【摘要】：中國(guó)大量企業(yè)借助技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓推進(jìn)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新,理清技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓談判要素對(duì)技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓競(jìng)合格局的影響,研究技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓交互策略顯得尤為重要。梳理已有研究,構(gòu)建納什談判博弈模型,基于平等主義和功利主義測(cè)度局中人支付值;引入支付讓渡權(quán)和可信威脅假設(shè),基于最小化最大值理論和差分博弈求得兩種新解;基于中國(guó)奇瑞汽車(chē)公司的實(shí)際數(shù)據(jù),驗(yàn)證3種均衡解的存在性,探討其差異性根源。研究結(jié)果表明,納什談判博弈均衡解是功利主義原則和平等主義原則的折衷;對(duì)于引進(jìn)方而言,支付讓渡權(quán)及可信威脅條件下的新均衡解都優(yōu)于一般均衡解,而且支付讓渡權(quán)相對(duì)于可信威脅對(duì)引進(jìn)方更有利;3種均衡解的差異性源于3種基礎(chǔ)性均衡理論,3種基礎(chǔ)性均衡理論分別適用于不同的技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓談判情境,并產(chǎn)生競(jìng)合格局的差別。研究結(jié)論有助于設(shè)計(jì)技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓攻防策略和可信威脅,強(qiáng)化技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓競(jìng)合格局,提高技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓績(jī)效,推動(dòng)引進(jìn)方技術(shù)進(jìn)步。
[Abstract]:With the help of technology transfer, a large number of Chinese enterprises promote technological innovation and clarify the influence of technology transfer negotiation elements on the pattern of technology transfer competition and cooperation, so it is particularly important to study the interactive strategy of technology transfer. Combing the existing research, constructing Nash negotiation game model, based on egalitarian and utilitarian measurement of human payment value, introducing payment transfer right and credible threat hypothesis, based on minimization maximum theory and difference game to find two new solutions; Based on the actual data of China Chery Automobile Company, the existence of the three equilibrium solutions is verified and the root causes of their differences are discussed. The results show that the equilibrium solution of Nash negotiation game is a compromise between utilitarianism principle and egalitarian principle, for the importer, the new equilibrium solution under the condition of payment transfer right and credible threat is superior to the general equilibrium solution. Moreover, the difference of the three equilibrium solutions of the right to pay transfer is more favorable to the importer than the credible threat. The difference between the three basic equilibrium theories and the three basic equilibrium theories respectively applies to different negotiation situations of technology transfer. And produce the difference of competing pattern. The conclusion is helpful to design the strategy and credible threat of technology transfer, strengthen the competing pattern of technology transfer, improve the performance of technology transfer, and promote the technological progress of the importing party.
【作者單位】： 西北工業(yè)大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;西安郵電大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金(71173172,71102149) 教育部人文社會(huì)科學(xué)研究項(xiàng)目(12YJC790084) 陜西省教育廳人文社科專(zhuān)項(xiàng)資助項(xiàng)目(12JK0056)~~
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F426.471;F273.1
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本文編號(hào)：2171154