建筑市場(chǎng)中尋租行為的制度分析
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, the construction industry of our country has made great progress after a long period of rapid development, and has become an important pillar of the national economy. However, due to the imperfect construction market in our country and the double-track price operation in the course of market transition, the construction field has become a major disaster area for rent-seeking activities, especially in the current large scale of project investment and construction projects. Under the background of fast construction, the problem of rent-seeking in the construction market is more prominent. This paper analyzes the rent-seeking activities in the construction market of our country by using the rent-seeking theory of modern economics, defines the connotation of rent-seeking, and distinguishes between rent-seeking and profit-seeking, rent-seeking and corruption. The author thinks that the root of rent-seeking behavior lies in the system defect, which can not be simply attributed to market failure and government failure. This paper expounds the performance of the rent-seeking activities in the construction market, such as planning and design, bidding, supervision and acceptance, and expounds the serious harm caused by the rent-seeking behavior from the economic principle. The rent-seeking activities in the construction market not only lead to the loss of social wealth and great waste of social resources, but also to the inefficient operation of the market mechanism, but also poison the social atmosphere, disintegrate the social norms, seriously damage the authority of the government and lead to the crisis of trust. On the basis of deeply analyzing the phenomenon of rent-seeking in the construction market of our country, this paper expounds the institutional origin of the rent-seeking behavior in the construction market from the angle of institutional economics. From the perspective of new institutional economics, this paper analyzes the causes of rent-seeking behavior in the construction market of our country, and points out that the defects of formal institution, the weakening of informal institution and the path dependence are the fundamental reasons for the proliferation of rent-seeking behavior in the construction market. By establishing the mechanism of rent dissipation, perfecting the construction market system, cultivating the intermediary organization of the construction industry and strengthening the internal restraint mechanism of anti-rent-seeking, the system of anti-rent-seeking is constructed by using the theory of institutional innovation. In order to reduce and eliminate the building market rent-seeking activities.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:天津商業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2013
【分類號(hào)】:F426.92
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條
1 楊太華;鄭慶華;;建設(shè)工程中質(zhì)檢站、監(jiān)理機(jī)構(gòu)和承包商尋租行為的博弈分析[J];四川建筑科學(xué)研究;2009年05期
2 賈洪;;建筑業(yè)尋租行為的博弈分析[J];北京交通大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2008年03期
3 賀衛(wèi),王浣塵;試論產(chǎn)權(quán)與尋租[J];財(cái)經(jīng)研究;1999年08期
4 張向達(dá);政府尋租及尋租社會(huì)的改革[J];當(dāng)代財(cái)經(jīng);2002年12期
5 盧現(xiàn)祥;論尋租的成本問題[J];貴州財(cái)經(jīng)學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào);1999年Z1期
6 任志濤,張世英;業(yè)主和承包商的尋租分析[J];河北建筑科技學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào);2004年01期
7 鄧衛(wèi)寧;建筑業(yè)內(nèi)尋租活動(dòng)分析及其對(duì)策[J];建筑管理現(xiàn)代化;2005年04期
8 A·克魯格,劉麗明;尋租社會(huì)的政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)體制比較;1988年05期
9 王海鴻;李田;;基于政企關(guān)系視角的房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)中政府尋租問題研究[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革;2010年02期
10 朱學(xué)紅;基于我國(guó)建筑市場(chǎng)政府尋租的分析[J];技術(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì);2004年07期
本文編號(hào):2121046
本文鏈接:http://sikaile.net/guanlilunwen/shengchanguanlilunwen/2121046.html