裝備制造業(yè)企業(yè)應(yīng)對技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘的差異化創(chuàng)新策略研究
本文選題:技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘 + 裝備制造業(yè) ; 參考:《東北財經(jīng)大學》2013年碩士論文
【摘要】:在國際貿(mào)易的發(fā)展歷程中,發(fā)展中國家與發(fā)達國家始終處于不平等的地位,發(fā)達國家基于自身利益考慮的貿(mào)易政策始終是國際貿(mào)易政策變化的風向標。進入21世紀,在全球貿(mào)易自由化的大背景下,貿(mào)易保護主義不但沒有退出國際貿(mào)易的舞臺,反而以更加靈活、更加隱蔽的形式--技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘存在著。 技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘主要包括技術(shù)法規(guī)、標準和合格評定程序,表現(xiàn)出隱蔽性、合理性、靈活性、動態(tài)性、連鎖性、差異性、爭議性等特點,成為貨物和服務(wù)自由貿(mào)易的障礙。起初的技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘更多的是出于經(jīng)濟目的,隨著不斷應(yīng)用和發(fā)展,技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘的政治目的愈發(fā)明顯,經(jīng)濟安全與政治安全不再是兩個獨立的安全領(lǐng)域,兩者交集處于不斷擴大的趨勢。很大程度上,經(jīng)濟安全正在逐步取代政治安全,成為發(fā)達國家遏制發(fā)展中國家的主要途徑。 裝備制造業(yè)作為制造業(yè)的核心,作為國民經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展支柱,是國家經(jīng)濟安全的核心領(lǐng)域,正成為發(fā)達國家干預發(fā)展中國家發(fā)展的新領(lǐng)域。以歐盟、美國、日本為代表的發(fā)達經(jīng)濟體,設(shè)置了針對裝備制造業(yè)的技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘,作為中國主要的貿(mào)易伙伴,不可逾越的技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘體系嚴重制約著我國對外貿(mào)易的發(fā)展。作為全球四大經(jīng)濟體,中、歐、美、日任何一方的貿(mào)易措施都會對全球貿(mào)易發(fā)展產(chǎn)生舉足輕重的影響,彼此之間博弈的激烈程度不言而喻。同時,進口國企業(yè)唆使政府設(shè)置技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘與出口國企業(yè)進行技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的博弈,很大程度上影響著技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘的實施以及大國之間的政治博弈。鑒于此,本文主要遵循動態(tài)演化博弈模型的思想,分析歐、美、日與中國在裝備制造業(yè)領(lǐng)域的技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘博弈,進而為我國裝備制造業(yè)企業(yè)克服國外復雜的技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘體系提供一些建議。 文章共分為五個部分: 第一部分緒論,包括選題背景與研究意義、文獻綜述、結(jié)構(gòu)安排以及創(chuàng)新點和不足之處。綜述已有的研究成果,可以發(fā)現(xiàn)國內(nèi)外學者分別從技術(shù)標準、技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘與技術(shù)創(chuàng)新三個角度進行了十分詳盡的研究,但對于技術(shù)標準、技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘與技術(shù)創(chuàng)新三者之間相互影響的動態(tài)關(guān)系的研究則比較滯后。 第二部分分析進口國技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘與出口國技術(shù)創(chuàng)新間的動態(tài)演化關(guān)系。從表面上看,技術(shù)標準的提高會促進技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘的形成,而技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘又會促使出口企業(yè)進行技術(shù)創(chuàng)新,但實際三者之間的動態(tài)關(guān)系遠不止這么簡單,該部分運用動態(tài)演化博弈模型,著重分析進口國企業(yè)唆使政府制定技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘與出口國裝備制造業(yè)企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新之間的動態(tài)博弈過程,并尋找演化博弈的穩(wěn)態(tài)均衡點。 第三部分分析我國裝備制造業(yè)出口的技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘。從我國裝備制造業(yè)面臨的技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘角度,通過機電行業(yè)和通信設(shè)備行業(yè)遭受的技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘展示技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘發(fā)展的動態(tài)性、復雜性、政治性。從技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘與技術(shù)創(chuàng)新之間的實證分析角度,選取歐盟、美國、日本為分析對象,通過分析進口國設(shè)置技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘與出口國企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新之間的相關(guān)性,尋找二者動態(tài)演化博弈的軌跡以及穩(wěn)態(tài)均衡點。 第四部分從一般性和特殊性的角度分析我國裝備制造業(yè)應(yīng)對技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘的創(chuàng)新策略。從一般性角度來說,政府、行業(yè)協(xié)會和企業(yè)應(yīng)充分合作,建立全面的技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘應(yīng)對的創(chuàng)新機制,確保經(jīng)濟安全,進而維護國家政治安全;從特殊性角度來說,針對性地應(yīng)對歐、美、日等目標市場,嚴格按照動態(tài)演化博弈軌跡選擇相應(yīng)的技術(shù)創(chuàng)新強度和市場轉(zhuǎn)移策略。 第五部分結(jié)論,梳理文章的整體思路,總結(jié)全文的主要觀點。
[Abstract]:In the course of the development of international trade, the developing countries and the developed countries are always in the unequal position. The trade policy based on their own interests is always the vane of the change of international trade policy. In the twenty-first Century, the trade protectionism not only did not withdraw from the international trade under the background of the global trade liberalization. The stage, however, exists in a more flexible and more subtle form -- technical barriers to trade.
Technical barriers to trade mainly include technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures, showing the characteristics of concealment, rationality, flexibility, dynamics, linkage, difference and disputability, and become obstacles to free trade in goods and services. The initial technical barriers to trade are more economic purposes, with the continuous application and development of technology. The political purpose of the trade barriers is becoming more and more obvious. Economic security and political security are no longer the two independent security areas. The intersection of the two is in a growing trend. To a large extent, economic security is gradually replacing political security and becoming the main way for developed countries to contain the development of China's home.
As the core of the manufacturing industry, as the core of the development of the national economy, the equipment manufacturing industry is the core area of the national economic security. It is becoming a new field for the developed countries to intervene in the development of the developing countries. The developed economies, represented by the EU, the United States and Japan, have set up technical barriers to trade in the manufacturing industry as the main China. Trade partners, insuperable technical barriers to trade barriers seriously restrict the development of China's foreign trade. As the four largest economy in the world, the trade measures of China, Europe, the United States and Japan will have a decisive influence on the development of Global trade. The intensity of the game between each other is self-evident. At the same time, the importing enterprises abet The game between the technical barriers to trade and the technological innovation of the exporters has a great influence on the implementation of the technical barriers to trade and the political game between the big countries. In view of this, this paper mainly follows the idea of dynamic evolutionary game model, and analyzes the technical trade of Europe, the United States, Japan and China in the field of equipment manufacturing. The barrier game provides some suggestions for China's equipment manufacturing enterprises to overcome the complicated technical barriers to trade in foreign countries.
The article is divided into five parts:
The first part is the introduction, including the background and significance of the topic, the literature review, the structure arrangement and the innovation points and inadequacies. A summary of the existing research results can be found that the scholars at home and abroad have studied the technical standards, technical trade barriers and technological innovation in three angles, but for technical standards and technical trade. The research on the dynamic relationship between the three barriers and technological innovation is lagging behind.
The second part analyzes the dynamic relationship between the technical barriers to trade and the technological innovation of the exporting countries. On the surface, the improvement of technical standards will promote the formation of technical barriers to trade, and the technical barriers to trade will encourage the export enterprises to carry out technological innovation, but the dynamic relationship between the three parties is far more than that simple. In this part, the dynamic evolutionary game model is used to analyze the dynamic game between the instigated government of the importing country and the technological innovation of the exporting country's equipment manufacturing enterprise, and to find the steady equilibrium point of the evolutionary game.
The third part analyzes the technical barriers to trade in the export of the equipment manufacturing industry in China. From the technical barriers to trade in the equipment manufacturing industry in China, the technical barriers to trade in the mechanical and electrical industry and the communication equipment industry show the dynamic, complex and political nature of the development of technical barriers to trade, from technical trade barriers and technology. In the empirical analysis of innovation, we choose the EU, the United States and Japan as the analysis object. Through the analysis of the correlation between the import countries' technical barriers to trade and the technological innovation of the exporters, we find the trajectory of the two dynamic evolutionary game and the steady equilibrium point.
The fourth part analyzes the innovation strategy of China's equipment manufacturing industry to deal with technical barriers to trade from the perspective of general and special. From a general point of view, the government, industry associations and enterprises should cooperate fully to establish an innovative mechanism to deal with the technical barriers to trade, to ensure economic security and to safeguard national political security; In the special point of view, we should deal with the target markets of Europe, America and Japan, and select the corresponding technological innovation intensity and market transfer strategy according to the dynamic evolutionary game trajectory.
The fifth part of the conclusion, combing the overall thinking of the article, summarizes the main points of the full text.
【學位授予單位】:東北財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】:碩士
【學位授予年份】:2013
【分類號】:F426.4;F752.02
【參考文獻】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條
1 何楓,馮宗憲,曾凡銀;經(jīng)濟全球化下我國的產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展及其升級戰(zhàn)略[J];安徽大學學報;2001年01期
2 周勤;田珊珊;;技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘、質(zhì)量管制和產(chǎn)業(yè)成長——基于歐盟CR法案對溫州打火機行業(yè)影響的案例分析[J];產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟研究;2010年03期
3 陳淑梅;;基于歐盟標準化外部性的我國出口企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的路徑探究[J];東南大學學報(哲學社會科學版);2006年06期
4 姚志毅;技術(shù)壁壘:趨勢與影響[J];國際商務(wù).對外經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易大學學報;2005年02期
5 張秀娥;國外技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘特點及對策分析[J];工業(yè)技術(shù)經(jīng)濟;2005年01期
6 顧國達;牛曉婧;張錢江;;技術(shù)壁壘對國際貿(mào)易影響的實證分析——以中日茶葉貿(mào)易為例[J];國際貿(mào)易問題;2007年06期
7 趙志強;胡培戰(zhàn);;技術(shù)標準戰(zhàn)略、技術(shù)貿(mào)易壁壘與出口競爭力的關(guān)系——基于浙江出口美日歐的實證研究[J];國際貿(mào)易問題;2009年10期
8 夏良康;;非正式貿(mào)易壁壘:特征、產(chǎn)生原因和對策[J];管理世界;2013年01期
9 姚志毅;;技術(shù)貿(mào)易壁壘對出口貿(mào)易的影響:中國的檢驗[J];河北經(jīng)貿(mào)大學學報;2009年02期
10 侯俊軍;謝建敢;;對外直接投資跨越技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘的途徑分析[J];海南金融;2006年07期
,本文編號:2106969
本文鏈接:http://sikaile.net/guanlilunwen/shengchanguanlilunwen/2106969.html