本文選題：高新技術(shù)企業(yè) + 科技人才�。� 參考：《西南交通大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：在當(dāng)今知識經(jīng)濟時代,高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)作為一種人才密集和知識密集的經(jīng)濟實體,正在日漸取代傳統(tǒng)產(chǎn)業(yè)的優(yōu)勢地位,成為一個國家獲取長期競爭優(yōu)勢的主要源動力。據(jù)統(tǒng)計,高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)對專門人才的需求是傳統(tǒng)產(chǎn)業(yè)的5倍之多,所以從某種意義上來說,高新技術(shù)企業(yè)的競爭歸根到底是人才的競爭,尤其是高素質(zhì)科技人才的競爭。因此,長期有效地吸引并保留公司核心技術(shù)人才,開發(fā)、轉(zhuǎn)移和固化企業(yè)核心技術(shù)人才的價值,是企業(yè)獲取長期競爭優(yōu)勢并保持持續(xù)發(fā)展的關(guān)鍵。 然而,在目前我國的許多高新技術(shù)企業(yè)中,仍存在著思念觀念落后、激勵機制不靈活、短期激勵和長期激勵問的沖突和失衡、激勵方式盲目使用水土不服等問題,這使得高新科技人才的聰明才智得不到充分發(fā)揮,嚴(yán)重阻礙了他們工作的積極性和創(chuàng)造性,久而久之,造成人才的流失。在這樣的情況下,就需要有一種比較合理的激勵措施,將企業(yè)的利益與員工的利益緊緊聯(lián)系在一起。而在目前的情況下,股權(quán)激勵被證明是能完成此項任務(wù)的最佳激勵方式,所以,研究高新技術(shù)企業(yè)中科技人才的股權(quán)激勵機制,具有重要的現(xiàn)實意義。 本文的研究建立在委托——代理理論、激勵理論、人力資本理論以及生命周期理論之上,在分析國內(nèi)外關(guān)于股權(quán)激勵理論及實踐研究的基礎(chǔ)上,并結(jié)合高新技術(shù)企業(yè)及高新技術(shù)企業(yè)科技人才的一般特征,提出了適合高新技術(shù)企業(yè)科技人才股權(quán)激勵的一般模式。之后,通過對XP生物公司目前人才激勵現(xiàn)狀的分析,針對其存在的具體問題,提出了虛擬股票期權(quán)這一股權(quán)激勵計劃。在對相關(guān)要素設(shè)計之后,針對XP生物公司的高新科技人才進行了具體的實施。最后就實施的結(jié)果進行了相關(guān)的分析,并提出改進建議。通過本文的研究,對于我國其他的高新技術(shù)企業(yè)實施股權(quán)激勵機制具有現(xiàn)實參考意義。
[Abstract]:In the era of knowledge economy, high and new technology industry, as a kind of economic entity with concentrated talents and knowledge, is gradually replacing the advantage position of traditional industry and becoming the main motive force for a country to obtain long-term competitive advantage. According to statistics, the demand for specialized talents in high-tech industries is 5 times as much as that in traditional industries, so in a sense, the competition of high-tech enterprises is in the final analysis the competition of talents, especially the competition of high-quality scientific and technological talents. Therefore, it is the key for enterprises to gain long-term competitive advantage and maintain sustainable development by effectively attracting and retaining the core technical talents, developing, transferring and solidifying the value of the core technical talents. However, in many high and new technology enterprises in our country, there are still some problems, such as backward thinking, inflexible incentive mechanism, conflict and imbalance between short-term incentive and long-term incentive, blind use of incentive mode, etc. This makes the talents of high and new technology can not be brought into full play, seriously hinders their enthusiasm and creativity in their work, and causes the brain drain over time. In this case, we need to have a more reasonable incentive measures, the interests of the enterprise and the interests of employees are closely linked. In the present situation, the equity incentive is proved to be the best incentive way to accomplish this task. Therefore, it is of great practical significance to study the equity incentive mechanism of scientific and technological talents in high-tech enterprises. The research of this paper is based on the principal-agent theory, incentive theory, human capital theory and life cycle theory. Combined with the general characteristics of high-tech enterprises and high-tech enterprises, the paper puts forward a general mode of equity incentive for high-tech enterprises. Then, through the analysis of the current situation of talent incentive in XP Biological Company, the paper puts forward the equity incentive plan of virtual stock option in view of its specific problems. After the design of relevant elements, XP biology company for the implementation of high-tech personnel. Finally, the results of the implementation of the relevant analysis, and put forward suggestions for improvement. Through the research of this paper, it has practical reference significance for other high-tech enterprises in our country to implement equity incentive mechanism.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F426.72;F272.92

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