本文選題：高新技術(shù)企業(yè) + 科技人才��； 參考：《西南交通大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：在當(dāng)今知識(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)時(shí)代,高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)作為一種人才密集和知識(shí)密集的經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)體,正在日漸取代傳統(tǒng)產(chǎn)業(yè)的優(yōu)勢(shì)地位,成為一個(gè)國(guó)家獲取長(zhǎng)期競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)的主要源動(dòng)力。據(jù)統(tǒng)計(jì),高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)對(duì)專門人才的需求是傳統(tǒng)產(chǎn)業(yè)的5倍之多,所以從某種意義上來說,高新技術(shù)企業(yè)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)歸根到底是人才的競(jìng)爭(zhēng),尤其是高素質(zhì)科技人才的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。因此,長(zhǎng)期有效地吸引并保留公司核心技術(shù)人才,開發(fā)、轉(zhuǎn)移和固化企業(yè)核心技術(shù)人才的價(jià)值,是企業(yè)獲取長(zhǎng)期競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)并保持持續(xù)發(fā)展的關(guān)鍵。 然而,在目前我國(guó)的許多高新技術(shù)企業(yè)中,仍存在著思念觀念落后、激勵(lì)機(jī)制不靈活、短期激勵(lì)和長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)問的沖突和失衡、激勵(lì)方式盲目使用水土不服等問題,這使得高新科技人才的聰明才智得不到充分發(fā)揮,嚴(yán)重阻礙了他們工作的積極性和創(chuàng)造性,久而久之,造成人才的流失。在這樣的情況下,就需要有一種比較合理的激勵(lì)措施,將企業(yè)的利益與員工的利益緊緊聯(lián)系在一起。而在目前的情況下,股權(quán)激勵(lì)被證明是能完成此項(xiàng)任務(wù)的最佳激勵(lì)方式,所以,研究高新技術(shù)企業(yè)中科技人才的股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制,具有重要的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 本文的研究建立在委托——代理理論、激勵(lì)理論、人力資本理論以及生命周期理論之上,在分析國(guó)內(nèi)外關(guān)于股權(quán)激勵(lì)理論及實(shí)踐研究的基礎(chǔ)上,并結(jié)合高新技術(shù)企業(yè)及高新技術(shù)企業(yè)科技人才的一般特征,提出了適合高新技術(shù)企業(yè)科技人才股權(quán)激勵(lì)的一般模式。之后,通過對(duì)XP生物公司目前人才激勵(lì)現(xiàn)狀的分析,針對(duì)其存在的具體問題,提出了虛擬股票期權(quán)這一股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃。在對(duì)相關(guān)要素設(shè)計(jì)之后,針對(duì)XP生物公司的高新科技人才進(jìn)行了具體的實(shí)施。最后就實(shí)施的結(jié)果進(jìn)行了相關(guān)的分析,并提出改進(jìn)建議。通過本文的研究,對(duì)于我國(guó)其他的高新技術(shù)企業(yè)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制具有現(xiàn)實(shí)參考意義。
[Abstract]:In the era of knowledge economy, high and new technology industry, as a kind of economic entity with concentrated talents and knowledge, is gradually replacing the advantage position of traditional industry and becoming the main motive force for a country to obtain long-term competitive advantage. According to statistics, the demand for specialized talents in high-tech industries is 5 times as much as that in traditional industries, so in a sense, the competition of high-tech enterprises is in the final analysis the competition of talents, especially the competition of high-quality scientific and technological talents. Therefore, it is the key for enterprises to gain long-term competitive advantage and maintain sustainable development by effectively attracting and retaining the core technical talents, developing, transferring and solidifying the value of the core technical talents. However, in many high and new technology enterprises in our country, there are still some problems, such as backward thinking, inflexible incentive mechanism, conflict and imbalance between short-term incentive and long-term incentive, blind use of incentive mode, etc. This makes the talents of high and new technology can not be brought into full play, seriously hinders their enthusiasm and creativity in their work, and causes the brain drain over time. In this case, we need to have a more reasonable incentive measures, the interests of the enterprise and the interests of employees are closely linked. In the present situation, the equity incentive is proved to be the best incentive way to accomplish this task. Therefore, it is of great practical significance to study the equity incentive mechanism of scientific and technological talents in high-tech enterprises. The research of this paper is based on the principal-agent theory, incentive theory, human capital theory and life cycle theory. Combined with the general characteristics of high-tech enterprises and high-tech enterprises, the paper puts forward a general mode of equity incentive for high-tech enterprises. Then, through the analysis of the current situation of talent incentive in XP Biological Company, the paper puts forward the equity incentive plan of virtual stock option in view of its specific problems. After the design of relevant elements, XP biology company for the implementation of high-tech personnel. Finally, the results of the implementation of the relevant analysis, and put forward suggestions for improvement. Through the research of this paper, it has practical reference significance for other high-tech enterprises in our country to implement equity incentive mechanism.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F426.72;F272.92

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