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配額交易制下發(fā)電廠商市場行為選擇研究

發(fā)布時間:2018-05-07 05:47

  本文選題:配額交易 + 市場行為; 參考:《華北電力大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文


【摘要】:伴隨著中國經(jīng)濟的快速發(fā)展,中國能源消費總量持續(xù)上升,2011年全社會用電量累計達46928億千瓦時,同比增長11.7%。而經(jīng)濟與資源環(huán)境協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展,要求中國全力推進可再生能源發(fā)電產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展。中國的可再生能源發(fā)電產(chǎn)業(yè)已初具規(guī)模,具備了運用配額制發(fā)展可再生能源發(fā)電的市場環(huán)境和政策基礎(chǔ)。可再生能源“十二五”規(guī)劃中提出,為實現(xiàn)可再生能源發(fā)電目標,制定和實施可再生能源配額制,分配和落實可再生能源電量占總電量指標。在新的配額交易機制下,發(fā)電廠商的市場行為決定著該制度的實施效果如何,因此其市場行為的研究就顯得尤為重要。 本文首先從理論層面介紹了配額交易機制的理論基礎(chǔ)和影響機理,以及國內(nèi)外配額機制實施的經(jīng)驗。然后運用產(chǎn)業(yè)組織經(jīng)濟學(xué)的SCP理論,從市場供需、集中度、進入退出壁壘和縱向生產(chǎn)一體化等角度深入分析了中國電力市場結(jié)構(gòu)。然后,在此基礎(chǔ)上,分析了配額交易機制下中國電力市場中發(fā)電廠商的市場行為,主要運用托賓的q值理論研究廠商的投資行為,運用寡頭博弈的思想研究了發(fā)電廠商的最優(yōu)投資規(guī)模,最后運用理性預(yù)期仿真模型討論了在允許綠色證書存儲情況下,市場中的綠色證書供給同綠色證書價格之間的關(guān)系,并與不允許存儲的情況進行對比,探討綠色證書存儲對于價格的波動性以及存儲的影響。 結(jié)論如下:第一,企業(yè)的投資行為,受到罰金額度、綠色證書價格以及新建可再生能源發(fā)電廠邊際成本大小的制約,企業(yè)會在三者中選擇成本最小的做出投資選擇;第二,在寡頭壟斷電力市場中,企業(yè)在選擇自己的最優(yōu)投資規(guī)模時,應(yīng)當(dāng)充分考慮企業(yè)的邊際成本,競爭對手的邊際成本以及配額比例和綠色證書的價格;第三,允許綠色證書存儲情況下,在市場上綠色證書供給達到一定范圍時,才會有廠商進行存儲,此時市場上的綠色證書價格要高于不允許綠色證書存儲的情況,降低了市場中綠色證書價格的波動性。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of China's economy, China's total energy consumption continues to rise, with the total social electricity consumption reaching 4.6928 trillion kilowatt-hours in 2011, an increase of 11.7 percent over the same period last year. The coordinated development of economy and resources and environment requires China to promote the development of renewable energy generation industry. China's renewable energy power generation industry has begun to take shape and has the market environment and policy basis for the use of quota system to develop renewable energy generation. In the 12th Five-Year Plan of Renewable Energy, it is proposed that in order to achieve the goal of renewable energy generation, the quota system of renewable energy should be formulated and implemented, and the renewable energy quantity should be allocated and implemented. Under the new quota trading mechanism, the market behavior of power generation firms determines the effect of the implementation of the system, so the study of market behavior is particularly important. This paper first introduces the theoretical basis and influence mechanism of quota trading mechanism from the theoretical level, as well as the experience of the implementation of quota mechanism at home and abroad. Then, using the SCP theory of industrial organization economics, the structure of China's electricity market is deeply analyzed from the perspectives of market supply and demand, concentration degree, entry and exit barriers and vertical production integration. Then, on this basis, the paper analyzes the market behavior of power generation firms in China's electricity market under the quota trading mechanism, mainly using Tobin's Q value theory to study the investment behavior of the manufacturers. Using the idea of oligopoly game, this paper studies the optimal investment scale of power generation firm, and finally discusses the relationship between green certificate supply and green certificate price in the market under the condition of allowing green certificate storage by using rational expectation simulation model. In this paper, the effect of green certificate storage on price fluctuation and storage is discussed by comparing with the situation that storage is not allowed. The conclusions are as follows: first, the investment behavior of the enterprise is restricted by the fine amount, the price of the green certificate and the marginal cost of the new renewable energy power plant. In the oligopoly power market, enterprises should take into account the marginal cost of the enterprise, the marginal cost of the competitors, the quota ratio and the price of the green certificate when choosing their optimal investment scale. If green certificates are allowed to be stored, when the supply of green certificates in the market reaches a certain range, some manufacturers will store them. At this time, the price of green certificates in the market is higher than that in which green certificates are not allowed to be stored. Reduced the volatility of green certificate prices in the market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:華北電力大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2013
【分類號】:F426.61

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6 秦s牶,

本文編號:1855643


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