本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì) + 風(fēng)險(xiǎn)識(shí)別��； 參考：《華中科技大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：在兩權(quán)分離條件下，股權(quán)激勵(lì)是解決委托代理問題的需要。由于行權(quán)條件低、業(yè)績(jī)考核不嚴(yán)等問題，使股權(quán)激勵(lì)蘊(yùn)藏較大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。如何做好風(fēng)險(xiǎn)識(shí)別、評(píng)估和控制，以達(dá)到激勵(lì)目的，對(duì)我國(guó)企業(yè)具有重要意義。 本文研究的伊利股份，是在股權(quán)分置改革完成的條件下，第一批推出股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案并實(shí)施的公司，在股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度和法規(guī)不太健全的前提下，方案推出和實(shí)施的過程中飽受爭(zhēng)議。通過對(duì)伊利股份的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案做出風(fēng)險(xiǎn)識(shí)別、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制分析，希望對(duì)其它公司也有借鑒作用，從而有效促進(jìn)上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案制定和實(shí)施。首先，本文介紹了股權(quán)激勵(lì)在我國(guó)的發(fā)展沿革，包括相關(guān)法規(guī)的配套和完善對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的影響，闡明了選題背景、選題意義。其次，介紹股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制相關(guān)的理論基礎(chǔ)，包括委托-代理理論、激勵(lì)理論和內(nèi)部控制人論；對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度相關(guān)的國(guó)內(nèi)外經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和管理學(xué)的基本理論進(jìn)行了綜述，為論文的研究奠定了理論基礎(chǔ)。接著，采用案例分析法，以伊利股份為對(duì)象，分析了伊利股份的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案的特點(diǎn)和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)識(shí)別。然后，從系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和非系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，對(duì)伊利股份的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案做出風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估。最后，介紹了股權(quán)激勵(lì)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)影響，包括系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和非系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，闡述了股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案制訂和實(shí)施過程中，需要從政策風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、規(guī)范證券市場(chǎng)、規(guī)范經(jīng)理人市場(chǎng)、完善稅收制度、規(guī)范公司治理、完善薪酬體系建設(shè)、股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案設(shè)計(jì)、實(shí)施控制和績(jī)效約束等方面，綜合做好股權(quán)激勵(lì)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制，進(jìn)而有效激勵(lì)經(jīng)理人，達(dá)到股東、經(jīng)理人和投資者的多贏。
[Abstract]:Under the condition of separation of two rights, equity incentive is the need to solve the principal-agent problem. Due to low exercise conditions, performance evaluation and other issues, equity incentives contain greater risks. How to identify, evaluate and control the risk in order to achieve the purpose of motivation is of great significance to Chinese enterprises. The Yili shares studied in this paper, under the condition of the completion of the reform of the split share structure, are the first companies to launch and implement the equity incentive scheme, under the premise that the equity incentive system and regulations are not perfect. The process of launching and implementing the program was controversial. Through risk identification, risk assessment and risk control analysis of the equity incentive scheme of Yili shares, it is hoped that it can be used for reference by other companies so as to effectively promote the formulation and implementation of equity incentive schemes of listed companies. First of all, this paper introduces the development of equity incentive in China, including the relevant laws and regulations and the impact of perfection on equity incentive, clarify the background of the topic, the significance of the topic. Secondly, it introduces the theoretical basis of equity incentive system and risk control, including principal-agent theory, incentive theory and internal control theory, and summarizes the basic theories of economics and management related to equity incentive system at home and abroad. It lays a theoretical foundation for the research of this paper. Then, the paper analyzes the characteristics and risk identification of the equity incentive scheme of Yili shares by case analysis. Then, from systemic risk and non-systemic risk, the equity incentive scheme of Yili shares is evaluated. Finally, the paper introduces the risk impact of equity incentive, including systemic risk and non-systematic risk, and expounds the need to standardize the security market and manager market in the process of formulating and implementing the equity incentive scheme. Perfecting tax system, standardizing corporate governance, perfecting salary system construction, designing equity incentive scheme, implementing control and performance restriction, and so on, comprehensively doing well the risk control of equity incentive, and then effectively motivating managers, reaching shareholders, etc. Multiple wins by managers and investors.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華中科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F426.82

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