發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-04 08:41

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：國(guó)防裝備采辦合同定價(jià)模型及策略研究　出處：《南京航空航天大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 裝備采辦 委托代理 合同定價(jià) 信息不對(duì)稱(chēng) 定價(jià)策略

【摘要】：市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)條件下的裝備采辦是一種典型的委托代理關(guān)系。雖然當(dāng)前我國(guó)裝備采辦體制發(fā)生了重大變化，合同制管理的模式初步建立，但與市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展要求仍不相適應(yīng)，裝備采辦市場(chǎng)主體行為仍欠規(guī)范，現(xiàn)階段裝備采辦中的委托代理關(guān)系尚不完善，合同定價(jià)中信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)的情況依然存在，，由此誘發(fā)的代理問(wèn)題如逆向選擇和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為等嚴(yán)重的制約了采辦效益的提高。 論文基于委托代理一般理論，以軍方和國(guó)防承包商的收益為著眼點(diǎn)，對(duì)完善裝備采辦委托代理關(guān)系以及合同定價(jià)模型及定價(jià)策略問(wèn)題進(jìn)行了研究。在裝備采辦的內(nèi)涵及其原理分析的基礎(chǔ)上，對(duì)我國(guó)裝備采辦中的委托代理關(guān)系分析得出其改進(jìn)的可能方向；基于委托代理理論，構(gòu)建了壟斷條件下裝備采辦合同定價(jià)模型，重點(diǎn)研究信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)情況下，逆向選擇和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)對(duì)合同定價(jià)策略的影響；構(gòu)建了競(jìng)爭(zhēng)條件下地裝備采辦合同定價(jià)模型，重點(diǎn)研究信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)情況下努力水平可觀(guān)察和不可觀(guān)察兩種情況下的合同定價(jià)策略。研究均表明，信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)的出現(xiàn)，降低了軍方裝備采辦的效益，資源配置的最優(yōu)水平發(fā)生了偏移。
[Abstract]:Purchase of equipment under the condition of market economy is a typical principal-agent relationship. Although China's current equipment acquisition system has undergone major changes, the initial establishment of system management mode of the contract, but the requirements of the development of market economy and is not fit for the main equipment acquisition market behavior, is still not standardized principal-agent relationship at the present stage of equipment acquisition the situation is still not perfect, the information asymmetry in the pricing of the contract still exists, which induced agency problems such as adverse selection and moral hazard behavior restricts the acquisition efficiency.
The general principal-agent theory based on the military and defense contractors return as the starting point, to improve the equipment acquisition of principal-agent relationship and contract pricing model and pricing strategy are studied. Based on the analysis of the connotation and principle of the equipment acquisition, the principal-agent relationship between China's equipment procurement analysis may be improved direction; based on the principal-agent theory, constructs the monopoly conditions of equipment acquisition contract pricing model, focusing on the condition of information asymmetry, adverse selection and moral risk of contract pricing strategy influence; constructing the competitive conditions of equipment acquisition contract pricing model, focusing on the situation of information asymmetry to the level of observable and unobservable contract pricing strategy under the two conditions. Research shows that information asymmetry, reduce the efficiency of military equipment acquisition, The optimal level of resource allocation has been offset.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京航空航天大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F274;F426.4

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