本文關(guān)鍵詞： OEM供應(yīng)鏈 質(zhì)量水平 品牌溢價 混合渠道 協(xié)調(diào)機制　出處：《南京航空航天大學(xué)》2014年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：在市場經(jīng)濟帶來的貿(mào)易全球化、生產(chǎn)全球化和企業(yè)全球化的背景下,企業(yè)需要面對競爭越來越激烈的復(fù)雜環(huán)境。買方市場需求的波動性以及個性化需求的凸顯催生了技術(shù)進步及擴散速度、產(chǎn)品更新?lián)Q代速度的加快,企業(yè)生存需要面臨著縮短交貨期、提高產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量、降低成本和改進服務(wù)等挑戰(zhàn)。要在這激烈的市場競爭中立于不敗之地,企業(yè)必須準確把握、及時響應(yīng)競爭的焦點,不斷地開發(fā)出滿足用戶需求的產(chǎn)品。然而,單個企業(yè)單純靠自身的資源難以應(yīng)對這富于變化的市場,傳統(tǒng)的供應(yīng)鏈也表現(xiàn)出了難以適應(yīng)的窘態(tài),以剝離弱勢、打造優(yōu)勢業(yè)務(wù)為核心的專業(yè)化聯(lián)盟的OEM供應(yīng)鏈在滿足市場需求方面顯現(xiàn)了生存優(yōu)勢。針對品牌溢價和混合渠道環(huán)境下OEM供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)問題,本文構(gòu)造了以質(zhì)量—品牌—渠道為脈絡(luò)的邏輯結(jié)構(gòu)展開深入研究。面向市場,品牌的保值、增值是OEM供應(yīng)鏈關(guān)心的核心問題,產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量既影響產(chǎn)品的銷售價格又影響需求是品牌溢價表現(xiàn)的兩個重要方面,通過提高產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量獲得高的銷售價格、主導(dǎo)市場需求無疑是OEM供應(yīng)鏈的理想追求,然而,供應(yīng)鏈合作雙方屬于各自獨立的決策主體,在權(quán)衡付出和收益之間存在著個體理性與集體理性的沖突,本文以產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量的品牌溢價效應(yīng)既影響銷售價格又影響市場需求為切入點,以通過貼牌生產(chǎn)實現(xiàn)合作雙方的收益改善為目的,運用博弈論、委托代理理論、優(yōu)化方法、契約理論等理論工具,探討了品牌商檢測水平和檢測概率有限下的提高制造商產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量水平選擇的策略、品牌商分擔(dān)制造商質(zhì)量投資成本以改進質(zhì)量、擴大市場需求的策略,進一步研究對雙方共同努力實現(xiàn)品牌溢價進行分配的品牌溢價共享契約,分析契約的有效性及其參數(shù)條件;針對制造商會在傳統(tǒng)貼牌渠道外開展直銷渠道而形成的混合渠道,作為供應(yīng)鏈領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的品牌商需與制造商之間建立有效的協(xié)調(diào)機制,以實現(xiàn)雙方的“雙贏”。本文的研究主要包括以下幾個方面:(1)提高OEM供應(yīng)鏈產(chǎn)品品牌溢價的質(zhì)量改進策略。制造商基于成本考慮,會選擇生產(chǎn)某種質(zhì)量水平的產(chǎn)品,以最小化自身付出的總質(zhì)量成本;而高質(zhì)量能夠通過高溢價而獲得高利潤,因此品牌商更加注重提供高質(zhì)量的產(chǎn)品。在品牌商的檢測水平有限和外部損失分擔(dān)的情況下,研究了OEM供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量決策主體之間的決策依賴性和行為誘導(dǎo)性,為改善產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量、提高品牌溢價提供策略選擇。(2)質(zhì)量的品牌溢價效應(yīng)影響需求的成本分擔(dān)協(xié)調(diào)�；谫|(zhì)量—成本、質(zhì)量—需求關(guān)系的研究,通過OEM供應(yīng)鏈學(xué)習(xí)曲線效應(yīng)將質(zhì)量、需求、成本聯(lián)系在一起,構(gòu)造質(zhì)量的品牌溢價效應(yīng)影響需求的函數(shù),在質(zhì)量影響投資成本和需求的雙重關(guān)系下,以集中決策和分散決策為比較標(biāo)準,通過供應(yīng)鏈總利潤最大化下的最優(yōu)決策、各自利潤最大化下的最優(yōu)決策,研究投資成本分擔(dān)策略使品牌商、制造商和OEM供應(yīng)鏈總利潤較分散決策Pareto改進的條件。(3)品牌溢價共享的收益分配研究。構(gòu)造由品牌商和制造商共同努力實現(xiàn)的品牌溢價函數(shù),對于品牌溢價的分配這一現(xiàn)實問題,給出了以一般批發(fā)價格加品牌溢價共享的價格契約,對品牌商和制造商分別從個體理性和集體理性出發(fā)選擇努力水平的收益進行博弈,得到收益的博弈矩陣。通過個體收益的比較,得出均衡解下最優(yōu)品牌溢價分配比例的影響因素及其對品牌商、制造商和OEM供應(yīng)鏈收益的影響;通過整體收益的比較發(fā)現(xiàn)個體收益比較下得出的均衡解存在的不足,探索一定影響因素條件下的品牌溢價分配比例作為規(guī)避雙方道德風(fēng)險的協(xié)調(diào)契約,以實現(xiàn)雙方收益的共同改進。(4)混合渠道的協(xié)調(diào)。為了迎合消費者需求的異質(zhì)性和在與品牌商的博弈中爭取一定的地位,制造商會在傳統(tǒng)的貼牌渠道外發(fā)展直接面向消費者的直銷渠道,從而形成OEM供應(yīng)鏈的混合渠道,制造商開辟的直銷渠道會分流掉一部分傳統(tǒng)貼牌渠道的消費者,使得制造商既是品牌商的合作伙伴又是品牌商的競爭對手。針對品牌商主導(dǎo)且考慮品牌溢價的制造商開辟直銷渠道的情況,需要研究混合渠道結(jié)構(gòu)的構(gòu)建基礎(chǔ),找出各自需要具備的優(yōu)勢和相互作用的優(yōu)化機理;通過混合渠道的分散決策與集中決策的比較,分析混合渠道雙方收益的改進空間,研究能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)品牌商和制造商收益Pareto改進并實現(xiàn)混合渠道OEM供應(yīng)鏈總利潤最大化的完美協(xié)調(diào)機制。
[Abstract]:In the market economy and trade globalization, production globalization and enterprises under the background of globalization, the complex environment enterprises need to face increasingly fierce competition. The market demand volatility and the demand for personalized highlights spawned technological progress and diffusion rate, product replacement fast, enterprise survival needs shorten delivery time, improve product quality, reduce costs and improve service and other challenges. In an invincible position in the fierce market competition, the enterprise must accurately grasp the focus of a timely response to the competition, constantly developed to meet user demand for products. However, individual enterprises simply rely on their own resources to cope with the changing market, traditional supply the chain also showed it is difficult to adapt to the embarrassment, to remove the weak advantage as the core business of professional league OEM in supply chain to meet the market The demand side show survival advantage. According to the coordination of OEM supply chain brand premium and mixed channel environment, this paper constructs the quality brand channels for the logical structure of context studies. Market oriented, brand value, value chain is the core issue about the supply of OEM, the quality of the products not only affect the sales of the product the price and demand are two important aspects of brand premium performance, high sales price by improving product quality, leading the market demand is undoubtedly OEM supply chain's pursuit of ideal, however, supply chain cooperation between the two sides belong to their respective independent decision-making body, the trade-off between the costs and benefits there is a conflict between individual rationality and collective rationality in this paper, premium brand product quality not only affects the sales prices affect the market demand as the starting point, to realize the cooperation between the two sides through OEM revenue For the purpose of improving, using the game theory, principal-agent theory, optimization method, theory of contract theory, discusses the strategy of brands testing level and improve the quality level of product manufacturers limited probability of selection under the brand share of manufacturers of quality investment to improve quality, expand the market demand strategy, further research on both sides to realize the brand premium distribution brand premium sharing contract, contract validity analysis and parameter conditions; mixed channels for manufacturers in the traditional OEM channels to carry out direct sales channels formed, as between the supply chain leader brands and manufacturers need to establish an effective coordination mechanism, the two sides in order to achieve "win-win" in this paper. The research mainly includes the following aspects: (1) to improve the quality of OEM supply chain product brand premium manufacturer based on improved strategy. This consideration, will choose to produce a quality product, the total quality cost to minimize their pay; and high quality can obtain high profits through high premium brands, so pay more attention to provide high quality products. In the brand's detection level is limited and the external loss sharing case study between OEM supply chain quality decision-making decision dependence and induced behavior, to improve product quality, improve the brand premium strategy choice. (2) the cost of premium brand quality influence demand sharing coordination. The research is based on the quality, quality demand relationship, through the OEM supply chain learning curve effect quality the cost, demand, together, affect the demand function of premium brand construction quality, double investment in quality cost and demand, with centralized decision-making and decision-making for the comparison of dispersion The optimal decision criteria, total profit of the supply chain to maximize the profit maximization under their optimal decisions, investment cost sharing strategy of brands, total profits of manufacturers and OEM supply chain is decentralized Pareto improved conditions. (3) study on the income distribution structure. By sharing brand premium brands and manufacturers efforts to achieve the brand premium function, for the problem of distribution of brand premium, given to the general wholesale price plus the premium brand share price contract, the brand and manufacturer respectively from the individual rationality and collective rationality choice of effort level of the income of the game, get the game matrix. Through the comparison of individual income income the obtained equilibrium factors under the influence of the optimal allocation proportion of premium brand and brand influence, manufacturers and OEM supply chain revenue; by comparing the overall revenue To find out the problems of individual income compared with the equilibrium solution of the coordination contract explore brand premium distribution ratio under the condition of certain influence factors as to avoid the moral risk, to achieve mutual benefits for both sides to improve. (4) coordination of hybrid channels. In order to cater to the heterogeneity of consumer demand and strive for a certain position in the game with the brands, manufacturers development of direct sales channels directly to consumers in the traditional OEM channels, thereby forming a OEM hybrid channel supply chain, manufacturers direct sales channels opened will be split off part of the traditional OEM channels to consumers, the brand manufacturers is not only business partners and brand competition. The leading brands and consider the premium brand manufacturers to open up sales channels, to build on the hybrid channel structure, to find out their needs with The optimization mechanism of advantages and interaction preparation; through the comparison of decentralized decision and centralized decision mixed channels, analysis of improved hybrid channels both benefits, research can achieve the maximization of total profit of OEM hybrid channels supply chain and improve the brand and manufacturer profits Pareto the perfect coordination mechanism.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京航空航天大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274;F224

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