基于委托代理理論的眾包獎(jiǎng)金模式研究
[Abstract]:Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes the reasons why the fixed bonus is applicable in crowdsourcing, taking the reward model of single winning bid as an example. In the linear principal-agent model, variables such as participants' skill level, task difficulty and mental motivation are added to the model, and the factors influencing the participants' effort and the incentive coefficient of the payer are discussed. The results show that the skill level of participants, competitive environment, personal interest, incentive coefficient positively affect the effort level of participants, while the cost coefficient and task difficulty degree negatively affect the effort level of participants; Participants' skill level positively affects incentive coefficient, while competitive environment, personal interest, risk aversion, task difficulty and cost coefficient negatively affect incentive coefficient.
【作者單位】: 中南民族大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院;
【基金】:國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(12BGL046) 中央高;究蒲袠I(yè)務(wù)費(fèi)專項(xiàng)資金資助項(xiàng)目(CSZ11005)
【分類號(hào)】:F272.92
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