【摘要】：政策利好與經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型的雙重驅(qū)動(dòng),國(guó)內(nèi)并購(gòu)交易規(guī)模在最近十年大幅提升,并購(gòu)重組已逐漸成為資本市場(chǎng)中企業(yè)實(shí)現(xiàn)跨越式發(fā)展的重要方式。并購(gòu)交易市場(chǎng)火熱的背后隱藏著高溢價(jià)的隱性地雷,過(guò)高的溢價(jià)支付影響了資本市場(chǎng)中公司的并購(gòu)效率與并購(gòu)績(jī)效,但企業(yè)高層管理者仍然熱衷支付高額并購(gòu)溢價(jià)。一般說(shuō)來(lái),企業(yè)高管在并購(gòu)相關(guān)決策中起著舉足輕重的作用,除了必要的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益驅(qū)動(dòng),高層管理者的個(gè)體特質(zhì)與認(rèn)知偏差也會(huì)深刻影響并購(gòu)決策的最終走向,過(guò)度自信的管理者較易高估自己的管理能力從而產(chǎn)生決策偏差,因此從行為金融學(xué)角度研究管理者的并購(gòu)溢價(jià)支付行為具有較強(qiáng)的理論與現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。同時(shí),管理者過(guò)度自信的企業(yè)較其他企業(yè)更偏好債務(wù)融資,負(fù)債能力的大小對(duì)管理者的經(jīng)營(yíng)決策也有著重要影響,所以本文從企業(yè)的債務(wù)容量或者說(shuō)債務(wù)能力角度出發(fā),研究管理者過(guò)度自信與并購(gòu)溢價(jià)的關(guān)系。本文以2007-2015年的并購(gòu)交易事件為研究對(duì)象,結(jié)合現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)的研究結(jié)果梳理了目前管理者過(guò)度自信、債務(wù)容量與并購(gòu)溢價(jià)的研究現(xiàn)狀,基于前景理論、高階理論與自我歸因偏差理論分析了管理者過(guò)度自信對(duì)并購(gòu)溢價(jià)支付的影響,同時(shí)從融資優(yōu)序理論、委托代理理論與債務(wù)約束角度出發(fā)分析了債務(wù)容量的調(diào)節(jié)作用,從而提出了本文的三個(gè)假設(shè)。通過(guò)理論與實(shí)證分析,本文得出以下結(jié)論:管理者過(guò)度自信的公司在并購(gòu)決策中更容易支付較高溢價(jià);管理者過(guò)度自信的民營(yíng)企業(yè)比國(guó)有企業(yè)更可能支付高溢價(jià);管理者過(guò)度自信的公司支付較高溢價(jià),債務(wù)容量在其中起著正向調(diào)節(jié)作用。債務(wù)容量的大小影響公司的舉債成本與難易程度,而過(guò)度自信的管理者一般偏好債務(wù)融資,債務(wù)容量大的公司更容易獲得低成本且限制小的可支配債務(wù)資本,所以在并購(gòu)決策中,債務(wù)容量大的管理者過(guò)度自信公司更容易發(fā)生過(guò)度支付行為。根據(jù)上述研究成果,本文提出了四點(diǎn)建議:首先是完善公司的內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制,適當(dāng)限制職業(yè)經(jīng)理人的控制權(quán);其次是建立高層管理者學(xué)習(xí)與進(jìn)修機(jī)制,建立良好的學(xué)習(xí)機(jī)制;第三是改進(jìn)管理者激勵(lì)與考核機(jī)制,減少管理者的盲目性;最后要完善債權(quán)人對(duì)企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)管理決策的監(jiān)管機(jī)制。
[Abstract]:The domestic M & A transaction scale has been greatly increased in the last ten years, and M & A has gradually become an important way for enterprises to achieve leapfrog development in the capital market. There is a hidden mine of high premium behind the hot M & A market. The excessive premium payment affects the efficiency and performance of M & A in the capital market, but the top managers are still keen to pay the high M & A premium. Generally speaking, corporate executives play an important role in M & A related decisions. Besides the necessary economic benefits driving, the individual characteristics and cognitive bias of senior managers will also profoundly affect the final trend of M & A decisions. Overconfident managers tend to overestimate their management ability, which leads to decision deviation. Therefore, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study managers'M & A premium payment behavior from the perspective of behavioral finance. At the same time, enterprises with overconfidence of managers prefer debt financing more than other enterprises, and the size of debt ability also has an important impact on managers' management decisions, so this paper starts from the perspective of debt capacity or debt capacity of enterprises. To study the relationship between manager overconfidence and M & A premium. Taking the M & A events from 2007 to 2015 as the research object, this paper combs the current research status of managers' overconfidence, debt capacity and M & A premium, based on the prospect theory, combined with the research results of the existing literature. Higher order theory and self-attribution deviation theory analyze the influence of manager overconfidence on M & A premium payment. At the same time, from the perspective of financing order theory, principal-agent theory and debt constraint theory, this paper analyzes the regulating effect of debt capacity. Thus, three hypotheses of this paper are put forward. Through theoretical and empirical analysis, this paper draws the following conclusions: managers overconfident companies are more likely to pay a higher premium in M & A decisions, private enterprises with managers overconfidence are more likely to pay a high premium than state-owned enterprises. Overconfident managers pay a higher premium, and debt capacity plays a positive role. The size of debt capacity affects the cost and ease of borrowing, while overconfident managers tend to prefer debt financing, and companies with large debt capacities are more likely to have access to low-cost and limited disposable debt capital. Therefore, in the M & A decision, overconfident managers with large debt capacity are more likely to overpay. Based on the above research results, this paper puts forward four suggestions: first, to perfect the internal governance mechanism of the company, and to restrict the control rights of professional managers; secondly, to establish the learning and learning mechanism of senior managers and establish a good learning mechanism. The third is to improve the incentive and appraisal mechanism of managers to reduce the blindness of managers, and finally to perfect the supervision mechanism of creditors on the decision-making of enterprise management.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F272.91;F275;F271.4

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本文編號(hào)：2250330