【摘要】：從董事網(wǎng)絡(luò)到高管(TMT)連鎖網(wǎng)絡(luò),在目前的公司治理的研究中,網(wǎng)絡(luò)特征越來越突出。遵從價(jià)值投資規(guī)律,股東的投資應(yīng)該有一個(gè)合理的回報(bào),激勵(lì)股東愿意做持續(xù)性的投入,這是資本市場(chǎng)的一個(gè)合理趨勢(shì),然而,在相對(duì)復(fù)雜的網(wǎng)絡(luò)特征下,企業(yè)的現(xiàn)有股東政策是否實(shí)現(xiàn)了該目的,值得進(jìn)一步探討,所以本文從股東長(zhǎng)期和短期激勵(lì)有效性角度研究高管連鎖網(wǎng)絡(luò)的調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng)。單獨(dú)的內(nèi)外每個(gè)環(huán)節(jié),現(xiàn)有的研究已經(jīng)很普遍,在復(fù)雜社會(huì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)結(jié)構(gòu)下,網(wǎng)絡(luò)的調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng)如何,這種網(wǎng)絡(luò)特征對(duì)傳統(tǒng)的公司治理理論產(chǎn)生怎樣的沖擊和影響,目前的研究很少,所以本文研究的問題很突出。本文在社會(huì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)視角下,實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)TMT連鎖網(wǎng)絡(luò)(高管圈子)對(duì)股東激勵(lì)有效性的影響。TMT連鎖網(wǎng)絡(luò)(高管圈子)對(duì)股東激勵(lì)有效性可能會(huì)帶來兩種不同的效應(yīng):一是短期內(nèi)的股東對(duì)股利攀比的利益訴求,相互之間的高管圈子可能會(huì)加劇這種攀比效應(yīng),通過抬高股價(jià)或其他財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)等方式引發(fā)財(cái)富攀比效應(yīng);二是長(zhǎng)期角度而言,股東對(duì)企業(yè)的價(jià)值增值的價(jià)值訴求,相互之間的高管圈子會(huì)加劇這種競(jìng)賽效應(yīng),促使企業(yè)將股利分紅投入到研發(fā)環(huán)節(jié),注重長(zhǎng)期的能力建設(shè)和企業(yè)核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的培養(yǎng),引發(fā)知識(shí)競(jìng)賽效應(yīng)。在前人研究的基礎(chǔ)上,基于股利政策角度研究股東短期激勵(lì)有效性,基于研發(fā)投入角度研究股東長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)有效性,分析高管(TMT)連鎖網(wǎng)絡(luò)對(duì)股東激勵(lì)有效性的調(diào)節(jié)作用,并以此為基礎(chǔ)構(gòu)建理論模型和數(shù)理模型,以模型為基礎(chǔ)提出研究假設(shè)。最后基于A股生物醫(yī)藥上市公司的2012-2014年的面板數(shù)據(jù)對(duì)研究假設(shè)進(jìn)行檢驗(yàn)。主要研究結(jié)論如下:第一,股東短期激勵(lì)有效性顯著;第二,TMT連鎖網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心度對(duì)股東短期激勵(lì)有效性具有正向調(diào)節(jié)作用;第三,股東長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)有效性顯著;第四,TMT連鎖網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心度對(duì)股東長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)有效性具有負(fù)向調(diào)節(jié)作用。TMT連鎖網(wǎng)絡(luò)與公司治理間的關(guān)系,不僅僅體現(xiàn)在企業(yè)外部治理結(jié)構(gòu)網(wǎng)絡(luò)化對(duì)公司治理的影響,還體現(xiàn)在公司治理機(jī)制動(dòng)態(tài)地影響網(wǎng)絡(luò)結(jié)構(gòu),進(jìn)而再次對(duì)公司治理績(jī)效產(chǎn)生影響的動(dòng)態(tài)演化過程。首先,本文定量識(shí)別、理解二元網(wǎng)絡(luò)分析框架下的TMT連鎖網(wǎng)絡(luò)對(duì)公司治理機(jī)制產(chǎn)生的影響,將為深入理解中國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)公司治理行為的特殊性提供一個(gè)新的重要研究視角。可以從更深層次上解釋中國(guó)公司治理轉(zhuǎn)型過程中企業(yè)決策所面臨的外部治理環(huán)境,突破只見"圈子"不見"網(wǎng)絡(luò)"的研究困境。其次,關(guān)于連鎖董事網(wǎng)絡(luò)與公司治理行為的研究,雖然文獻(xiàn)中已有一些研究,但更多地是從網(wǎng)絡(luò)結(jié)構(gòu)、政治關(guān)聯(lián)、資源依賴等視角展開,對(duì)連鎖網(wǎng)絡(luò)與公司治理的作用機(jī)制,特別地,目前尚缺乏對(duì)微觀的傳導(dǎo)作用機(jī)制的嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)和系統(tǒng)理論與實(shí)證分析。更重要的是,本文并不是簡(jiǎn)單照搬國(guó)外的相關(guān)研究思路和方法,然后套上中國(guó)的數(shù)據(jù)。
[Abstract]:From the director network to the executive (TMT) chain network, the network features are more and more prominent in the current corporate governance research. Following the law of value investment, shareholders' investment should have a reasonable return and encourage shareholders to make sustained investment. This is a reasonable trend in the capital market. However, under the relatively complex network characteristics, It is worth further discussing whether the existing shareholder policy has achieved this goal, so this paper studies the regulatory effect of executive chain network from the perspective of long-term and short-term incentive effectiveness of shareholders. In the complex social network structure, how to adjust the effect of the network, what impact and impact this network characteristics on the traditional corporate governance theory, there is little research at present. So the problem studied in this paper is very prominent. From the perspective of social network, Empirical study on the impact of TMT chain Network (Executive Circle) on shareholder incentive effectiveness. The effect of TMT chain Network on shareholder incentive effectiveness may bring two different effects: one is the short-term shareholders' interest demand for dividend comparison. Mutual executive circles may exacerbate this comparison effect, creating a wealth comparison effect by pushing up stock prices or other financial indicators; and, in the long run, shareholders' claims to the value added to the company's value. This kind of competition effect will be aggravated by the mutual executive circle, which will urge the enterprise to invest dividends in R & D, pay attention to the long-term capacity-building and the cultivation of the core competence of the enterprise, and trigger the effect of knowledge competition. On the basis of previous studies, this paper studies the short-term incentive effectiveness of shareholders based on dividend policy, the long-term incentive effectiveness of shareholders based on R & D investment, and analyzes the regulatory effect of (TMT) chain network on shareholder incentive effectiveness. The theoretical model and mathematical model are constructed, and the research hypothesis is put forward based on the model. Finally, the research hypothesis is tested based on the 2012-2014 panel data of A-share Biopharmaceutical listed companies. The main conclusions are as follows: first, the effectiveness of shareholders' short-term incentive is significant; second, the centrality of TMT chain network has a positive effect on the short-term incentive effectiveness of shareholders; third, the long-term incentive effectiveness of shareholders is significant; Fourth, the centrality of TMT chain network has a negative effect on the effectiveness of shareholders' long-term incentive. The relationship between TMT chain network and corporate governance is not only reflected in the influence of external governance structure networking on corporate governance. It is also reflected in the dynamic evolution process in which corporate governance mechanism influences the network structure dynamically and then affects corporate governance performance again. Firstly, this paper quantitatively identifies and understands the influence of TMT chain network on corporate governance mechanism under the framework of binary network analysis, which will provide a new and important perspective for further understanding the particularity of corporate governance behavior in China's capital market. It can further explain the external governance environment in the process of corporate governance transformation in China, and break through the research dilemma of "circle" and "network". Secondly, the research on the chain director network and corporate governance behavior, although there have been some studies in the literature, but more from the network structure, political connections, resource dependence and other perspectives, the chain network and corporate governance mechanism. In particular, there is a lack of rigorous and systematic theoretical and empirical analysis of the microscopic conduction mechanism. More importantly, this paper does not simply copy the relevant foreign research ideas and methods, and then apply Chinese data.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江工商大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F272.91

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