本文選題：并購績效 + 高管技能�。� 參考：《哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：眾所周知,兼并重組相對企業(yè)來說是一項(xiàng)重要的戰(zhàn)略層決策,是企業(yè)擴(kuò)張壯大直接而有效的方式。然而從市場兼并重組的實(shí)際效果來看,并購重組在為企業(yè)帶來資本擴(kuò)張也帶來了一定的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。并購市場表面紅火,但內(nèi)部卻存在著大量的異常資本配置。而公司高管作為兼并重組環(huán)節(jié)中主要的戰(zhàn)略實(shí)施人,他們的行為會直接影響并購重組的績效�；谝陨显�,本文試圖研究高管薪酬與并購績效之間的關(guān)系。這對指導(dǎo)企業(yè)制訂合適的薪酬激勵政策意義較大。本文的主要研究方法包括實(shí)證分析,以2010-2016年間發(fā)生在美國上市公司間、并購交易價(jià)值超過10億美金的并購事件作為樣本,并對樣本進(jìn)行了主成分分析以及回歸分析。實(shí)證研究內(nèi)容主要包括三部分,在第一部分的研究中,通過主成分分析,研究了上述樣本基于并購事件而發(fā)生的績效的變化。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),樣本公司在并購前,公司績效經(jīng)歷了一個(gè)先上升而后并購當(dāng)年下降,最后并購后兩年又趨于上升的過程;第二部分基于企業(yè)委托代理理論中的信息不對稱與道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題和效率工資理論中的效率問題,借助回歸以及方差分析,研究了高管道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)代表因素:高管權(quán)利與效率代表因素:高管技能對高管薪酬的影響,以及二者對薪酬的影響程度。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)高管技能與權(quán)利對于薪酬的獲得都有著顯著地正向地積極的影響;而且進(jìn)一步研究表明高管技能相對于高管權(quán)利對薪酬有著更大的影響,所以美國上市企業(yè)中的委托代理問題并不是非常突出。緊接著又分析了公司績效對高管薪酬的各組成部分的敏感性。發(fā)現(xiàn)薪金,獎金,股權(quán)激勵計(jì)劃三者之中,基于市場變化的股權(quán)激勵計(jì)劃對績效的變化最為敏感。第三部分基于尋租理論,首先分析了高管尋租收益以及薪酬對并購績效的影響,隨后探究了薪酬與尋租收益的對績效影響程度,發(fā)現(xiàn)尋租收益對于績效的提高具有消極效應(yīng),而薪酬呈現(xiàn)積極效應(yīng),并且相對于尋租收益,薪酬是決定并購績效的主要影響因素。所以針對企業(yè)績效提高的理論建議,應(yīng)以合適的薪酬激勵為主,而在薪酬的具體設(shè)置中,應(yīng)突出股權(quán)激勵計(jì)劃的地位。最后基于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好理論,依據(jù)高管薪酬各組成部分占總薪酬比例的不同,將并購分為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好型與厭惡型兩類,進(jìn)行一個(gè)總體績效的比較。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)相比于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)厭惡型收購,偏好型收購的績效表現(xiàn)更好,這與前人所得出的理論結(jié)果相悖,本文也對原因做了簡單的介紹,但尚未證實(shí)。
[Abstract]:As we all know, merger and reorganization is an important strategic decision relative to enterprises, and it is a direct and effective way for enterprises to expand and expand. However, from the actual effect of market merger and reorganization, M & A brings some risks to the capital expansion of enterprises. M & A market surface fire, but there are a large number of internal abnormal capital allocation. As the main strategic implementers in the process of merger and reorganization, corporate executives' behavior will directly affect the performance of mergers and acquisitions. Based on the above reasons, this paper attempts to study the relationship between executive compensation and M & A performance. This instructs the enterprise to formulate the appropriate salary incentive policy significance. The main research methods of this paper include empirical analysis, taking the M & A events with a value of more than US $1 billion in the period 2010-2016 as a sample, and the principal component analysis and regression analysis of the samples. The empirical research includes three parts. In the first part of the study, the change of performance of the above samples based on M & A events is studied by principal component analysis. The study found that the performance of the sample company before M & A experienced a process of first rising, then declining in the year of M & A, and then increasing in the last two years after M & A. The second part is based on the information asymmetry and moral hazard in the principal-agent theory and the efficiency problem in the efficiency wage theory, with the help of regression and variance analysis. This paper studies the representative factors of executive moral hazard: executive rights and efficiency: the influence of executive skills on executive compensation and the degree of their influence on compensation. The study found that executive skills and rights had significantly positive and positive effects on the acquisition of compensation, and further studies showed that executive skills had a greater impact on compensation than executive rights. So the principal-agent problem in American listed enterprises is not very prominent. Then it analyzes the sensitivity of corporate performance to the components of executive compensation. It is found that among salary, bonus and equity incentive plan, equity incentive plan based on market change is most sensitive to the change of performance. The third part based on rent-seeking theory, first analyzes the effect of executive rent-seeking income and compensation on M & A performance, then explores the impact of compensation and rent-seeking income on performance, and finds that rent-seeking income has a negative effect on performance improvement. The compensation shows a positive effect, and relative to the rent-seeking income, salary is the main factor that determines the M & A performance. Therefore, the theoretical suggestions for the improvement of enterprise performance should be based on appropriate compensation incentives, while in the specific setting of compensation, the status of equity incentive plan should be highlighted. Finally, based on the theory of risk preference, according to the different proportion of executive compensation to total compensation, M & A is divided into two types: risk preference and aversion, and a comparison of overall performance is made. It is found that the performance of preference buy-out is better than that of risk-averse buy-out, which is contrary to the previous theoretical results. This paper also gives a brief introduction to the reasons, but it has not been proved.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F271;F275

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