本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì) + 績效評(píng)價(jià)��； 參考：《湘潭大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度的兩權(quán)分離使得企業(yè)的所有者與經(jīng)營者之間產(chǎn)生“委托-代理”問題,企業(yè)經(jīng)營者為了自身目標(biāo)函數(shù)可能會(huì)做出有損股東利益的行為。道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和逆向選擇的存在使得企業(yè)建立激勵(lì)和約束機(jī)制顯得十分重要。股權(quán)激勵(lì)將企業(yè)所有者與經(jīng)營者的利益緊密結(jié)合,授予企業(yè)的激勵(lì)對(duì)象一定數(shù)量的股票或期權(quán)讓經(jīng)營者能作為股東的身份和企業(yè)的所有者利益共享、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)共擔(dān),因而股權(quán)激勵(lì)歷來備受矚目。我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板于2009年開始正式運(yùn)行,其上市企業(yè)從2010年便開始不停地摸索股權(quán)激勵(lì),并以迅猛之勢(shì)發(fā)展,民營企業(yè)成為股權(quán)激勵(lì)潮流中的中堅(jiān)力量。然而,許多企業(yè)在實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的過程中遇到了重重問題而以失敗結(jié)尾;也有許多學(xué)者研究發(fā)現(xiàn)股權(quán)激勵(lì)與企業(yè)績效并無關(guān)聯(lián),并對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的效果產(chǎn)生質(zhì)疑。而創(chuàng)業(yè)板第一批上市企業(yè)北京鼎漢技術(shù)股份有限公司似乎十分傾向于股權(quán)激勵(lì),先后于2011年、2013年、2015年和2016年推出四次激勵(lì)方案。那么鼎漢技術(shù)股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案設(shè)計(jì)得如何?公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)是否對(duì)其績效有促進(jìn)作用?本文重點(diǎn)對(duì)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)前后的財(cái)務(wù)績效進(jìn)行評(píng)價(jià)。這篇論文從股權(quán)激勵(lì)相關(guān)理論入手,介紹了股權(quán)激勵(lì)理論基礎(chǔ)、相關(guān)概念以及企業(yè)績效評(píng)價(jià)方法,進(jìn)而對(duì)我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市企業(yè)股權(quán)激勵(lì)情況進(jìn)行統(tǒng)計(jì)分析。隨后該論文著手對(duì)鼎漢技術(shù)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的研究:首先介紹公司基本情況,然后對(duì)公司實(shí)施的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案進(jìn)行介紹,并著重對(duì)公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)前后的財(cái)務(wù)績效進(jìn)行評(píng)價(jià)。在進(jìn)行績效評(píng)價(jià)時(shí),該篇論文首先采用財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)分析法和杜邦分析法從縱向角度對(duì)公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)前后的財(cái)務(wù)績效變化進(jìn)行分析,其次通過功效系數(shù)法將公司與其他同行業(yè)同主板上市公司進(jìn)行比較,從橫向角度對(duì)公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)財(cái)務(wù)績效進(jìn)行評(píng)價(jià)。研究結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)前公司績效較差,而實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)后公司績效提升。經(jīng)過進(jìn)一步研究得出結(jié)論:公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)公司績效有一定程度的促進(jìn)作用。最后,該篇論文對(duì)公司實(shí)施的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案提出建議,以期能夠完善公司以后的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案,從而達(dá)到更好的激勵(lì)效果。
[Abstract]:The separation of two rights in modern enterprise system leads to the problem of "principal-agent" between the owner and the operator of the enterprise, and the enterprise manager may act to the detriment of the shareholders' interests for the sake of his own objective function. The existence of moral hazard and adverse selection makes it very important for enterprises to establish incentive and restraint mechanism. Equity incentive closely combines the interests of the owner and the operator of the enterprise. The incentive object granted to the enterprise is a certain number of stock or options so that the operator can share the interests of the shareholder and the owner of the enterprise and share the risks. As a result, equity incentives have always been the focus of attention. The gem of our country began to operate formally in 2009, and its listed enterprises began to explore the stock right incentive continuously from 2010, and with the rapid development, the private enterprise becomes the backbone of the stock right incentive trend. However, many enterprises have encountered many problems in the process of implementing equity incentive plan and ended with failure. Many scholars have found that equity incentive has no relationship with enterprise performance, and has doubts about the effect of equity incentive. The first listed companies on the gem, Beijing Dinghan Technology Co., Ltd., seem to be very inclined to equity incentive, introduced four incentive schemes in 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2016. So how about the design of Tin-Han technology equity incentive scheme? Does the company implement equity incentive to promote its performance? This paper focuses on the implementation of equity incentives before and after the evaluation of financial performance. This paper starts with the theory of equity incentive, introduces the theoretical basis of equity incentive, related concepts and enterprise performance evaluation methods, and then makes a statistical analysis of equity incentive situation of listed enterprises in gem of our country. Then the paper begins with the research on the technology equity incentive of Ding Han: firstly, it introduces the basic situation of the company, then introduces the equity incentive scheme implemented by the company, and emphatically evaluates the financial performance of the company before and after the implementation of the equity incentive. In the performance evaluation, the paper firstly uses the financial index analysis method and DuPont analysis method to analyze the financial performance changes before and after the implementation of equity incentive from a vertical perspective. Secondly, it compares the company with other listed companies in the same industry and main board through the efficiency coefficient method, and evaluates the financial performance of equity incentive from the horizontal angle. The results show that the performance of the company is poor before the implementation of equity incentive, but the performance of the company is improved after the implementation of equity incentive. After further study, it is concluded that the implementation of equity incentive has a certain degree of promoting effect on corporate performance. In the end, the paper puts forward some suggestions on the stock right incentive scheme in order to perfect the stock right incentive scheme in the future, so as to achieve a better incentive effect.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F426.4;F272.92;F406.7

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