本文選題：控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移 + 高管更替�。� 參考：《河南大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著2016年《上市公司重大資產(chǎn)重組管理辦法》的頒布,全年A股上市公司控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移事件高達(dá)58起,實(shí)際控制人及高管更替的新聞也屢現(xiàn)電視熒屏。但由于我國控制權(quán)市場體系尚不完備導(dǎo)致控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移效率低下,公司治理績效難以判別。我國高管人員大多由控股股東或政府行政任命,導(dǎo)致高管決策行為偏向團(tuán)體利益而非公司利益。但隨著法律體系及控制權(quán)市場的完善,管理低效率使高管人員面臨被更替的威脅。充分發(fā)揮資源配置功能,更替不稱職高管成為驅(qū)動(dòng)公司控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移的關(guān)鍵因素。高管作為公司最主要的人力資本,處于公司權(quán)力核心地位并擁有公司經(jīng)營權(quán)和決策權(quán),堪比“掌舵人”。公司治理績效往往取決于高管人員的管理和運(yùn)營能力,為了實(shí)現(xiàn)利潤最大化,所有者會(huì)采取一定的激勵(lì)措施增加代理人的忠實(shí)度并以此降低代理成本。同時(shí)設(shè)計(jì)適當(dāng)?shù)谋O(jiān)督機(jī)制對高管人員進(jìn)行業(yè)績考核,及時(shí)更替無效率、不稱職高管,優(yōu)化公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)以提高績效水平。高管更替對治理績效起到了不容小覷的影響,因此如何在公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)變革和調(diào)整中正確定位高管人員,高管更替對公司治理績效產(chǎn)生何種影響,早已成為公司治理領(lǐng)域的焦點(diǎn)。相關(guān)學(xué)者對高管更替與公司治理績效進(jìn)行研究,但目前仍未形成統(tǒng)一的結(jié)論。在相關(guān)理論基礎(chǔ)上,以我國發(fā)生控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移的280家非金融A股上市公司為基礎(chǔ)樣本,運(yùn)用指標(biāo)體系法確定被解釋變量,主要采用因子分析法以增加公司治理績效指標(biāo)的全面性和科學(xué)性,在全面梳理前人研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上設(shè)計(jì)相關(guān)解釋變量和控制變量,根據(jù)相關(guān)假設(shè)對構(gòu)建模型進(jìn)行描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)和二元Logistic回歸分析,并采用更換被解釋變量的方法對實(shí)證結(jié)果進(jìn)行穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn)。實(shí)證結(jié)果表明控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移作為控制權(quán)市場一項(xiàng)活躍的經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng),往往伴隨著高管更替,且這一活動(dòng)能有效改善公司治理績效,是一種積極的公司治理措施。同時(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn)高管人員控股程度也會(huì)影響公司治理績效,根據(jù)管理防御理論和管理層權(quán)力理論,股權(quán)過高會(huì)引起尋租行為導(dǎo)致公司價(jià)值毀損,由此得出了高管持股比例越大公司治理績效越差的結(jié)論。最后結(jié)合我國控制權(quán)市場發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀提出了促進(jìn)控制權(quán)市場有效運(yùn)行對策及可行性建議。希望能夠?yàn)橥晟莆覈鲜泄局卫斫Y(jié)構(gòu),優(yōu)化控制權(quán)市場環(huán)境提供理論依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:With the promulgation of the "measures for the Management of Major assets reorganization of listed companies" in 2016, 58 cases of transfer of control of A-share listed companies occurred in the whole year, and the news of the turnover of actual controllers and executives also appeared repeatedly on television screens. However, due to the incompleteness of the market system of control rights in China, the efficiency of control transfer is low, and the performance of corporate governance is difficult to judge. Most senior executives in China are appointed by controlling shareholders or the government, which results in executives' decision-making in favor of group interests rather than corporate interests. But with the improvement of the legal system and the market of control, management inefficiency threatens the replacement of executives. Giving full play to the function of resource allocation and replacing incompetent executives are the key factors driving the transfer of corporate control. As the most important human capital of the company, executives are at the core of the company's power and have the power to operate and make decisions, which is comparable to the "leader". Corporate governance performance often depends on the management and operation ability of executives. In order to maximize profits, owners will take certain incentives to increase the loyalty of agents and thus reduce agency costs. At the same time, we design a proper supervision mechanism to evaluate the performance of the executives, to replace the inefficient and incompetent executives in time, and to optimize the corporate governance structure to improve the performance level. The turnover of senior executives has played an important role in governance performance, so how to correctly position the senior executives in the transformation and adjustment of corporate governance structure, and how to influence the corporate governance performance by the turnover of senior executives? Has become the focus of corporate governance. Relevant scholars study on the turnover of executives and corporate governance performance, but there is still no unified conclusion. On the basis of relevant theories, 280 non-financial A-share listed companies in our country are taken as the basic samples, and the explained variables are determined by the method of index system. This paper mainly adopts factor analysis method to increase the comprehensiveness and scientificalness of corporate governance performance index, and designs related explanatory variables and control variables on the basis of combing the previous research results. According to the relevant assumptions, descriptive statistics and binary logistic regression analysis were carried out to construct the model, and the method of replacing the explained variables was used to test the robustness of the empirical results. The empirical results show that as an active economic activity in the control market, the transfer of control is often accompanied by the turnover of executives, and this activity can effectively improve the performance of corporate governance, and it is an active measure of corporate governance. At the same time, it is found that the controlling degree of senior managers will also affect corporate governance performance. According to management defense theory and management power theory, excessive equity rights will lead to rent-seeking behavior leading to the destruction of corporate value. From this, we draw the conclusion that the bigger the proportion of senior management is, the worse the corporate governance performance is. Finally, combined with the development of China's control market, the paper puts forward the countermeasures and feasible suggestions to promote the effective operation of the control market. This paper hopes to provide theoretical basis for perfecting the governance structure of listed companies and optimizing the market environment of control rights.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F832.51;F272.91

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