本文選題：壟斷行業(yè) + 激勵性規(guī)制�。� 參考：《江漢論壇》2017年10期

【摘要】：壟斷行業(yè)激勵性規(guī)制屬于供給側(cè)改革的范疇,近年來已經(jīng)成為國際學(xué)術(shù)界規(guī)制經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究的熱點。激勵性規(guī)制理論是在傳統(tǒng)規(guī)制經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)停滯不前的領(lǐng)域興起,不再關(guān)注特定的規(guī)制制度,而是以博弈論與信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)為分析工具,研究最優(yōu)規(guī)制的機(jī)制設(shè)計理論。它是在保持原有規(guī)制結(jié)構(gòu)和信息不對稱的委托—代理框架下,設(shè)計激勵方案,給予企業(yè)一定的自由裁量權(quán),以誘導(dǎo)企業(yè)正確地利用信息優(yōu)勢,選擇規(guī)制者所期望的行為,提高經(jīng)營績效,減少逆向選擇、道德風(fēng)險等問題,最終企業(yè)降低了成本,獲得了利潤,實現(xiàn)了社會福利最大化的目標(biāo)。
[Abstract]:Incentive regulation in monopoly industry belongs to the category of supply-side reform and has become a hot topic in the research of regulation economics in international academic circles in recent years. Incentive regulation theory is rising in the field of traditional regulation economics, which no longer pays attention to specific regulation system, but studies the mechanism design theory of optimal regulation with game theory and information economics as the analysis tool. Under the framework of principal-agent, which maintains the original regulatory structure and asymmetric information, it designs incentive schemes and gives certain discretion to enterprises, in order to induce enterprises to make correct use of information advantages and to choose the behavior expected by regulators. To improve business performance, reduce adverse selection, moral hazard and other problems, the enterprise reduces the cost, gains profits, and realizes the goal of maximizing social welfare.
【作者單位】： 西安交通大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與金融學(xué)院;中南財經(jīng)政法大學(xué)金融學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家社會科學(xué)基金項目“深化壟斷行業(yè)改革中利益主體的博弈模式與激勵性規(guī)制改革的路徑研究”(14BJL002) 教育部人文社會科學(xué)基金規(guī)劃項目“信息不對稱下壟斷行業(yè)激勵規(guī)制改革的路徑及政策優(yōu)化選擇研究”(11YJA790204) 陜西省軟科學(xué)項目“基于陜西省碳排放特征的陜西省減排潛力與減排路徑研究”(2016KRM0632016)
【分類號】：F124

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1 陳加潤;論企業(yè)服務(wù)質(zhì)量[J];湖北汽車工業(yè)學(xué)院學(xué)報;1999年04期

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