本文選題：城市基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施 + PPP�。� 參考：《浙江財經(jīng)大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：我國正處于城鎮(zhèn)化進程的快速發(fā)展階段,僅靠現(xiàn)有的財政支出和地方政府投融資已無法填補城市基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)的資金缺口。公私合作制(PPP)通過私人資金的引入,可以緩解政府財政壓力,提高運營效率。但是,由于城市基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施具有自然壟斷性和準公共物品性,政府與社會資本的合作過程中存在很多風險因素,如果政府部門不能對其進行有效的監(jiān)管,那么在城市基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施PPP項目實施和運行過程中就容易產(chǎn)生市場失靈等問題,從而降低運營效率和服務(wù)質(zhì)量,使消費者利益遭受損失。因此,建立科學完善的監(jiān)管體系,對于城市基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施公私合作模式的推行具有重要的意義。本文的主要內(nèi)容有以下幾個方面:1.在PPP基本特點和風險分析的基礎(chǔ)上提出政府監(jiān)管需求。從我國城市基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施PPP的基本特點和風險因素出發(fā),理清與政府監(jiān)管密切相關(guān)的風險因素,包括政府政策變更風險、政府干預風險、政府信用風險、社會風險、道德風險等風險,并分析造成這些風險的主要原因。進而結(jié)合城市基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施PPP的自然壟斷性、社會性、盈利性和風險因素指出,為有效解決市場失靈和控制項目風險、調(diào)和城市基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的公共性與私人合作企業(yè)盈利性之間的矛盾,必須進行政府監(jiān)管。2.深層次分析目前城市基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施PPP監(jiān)管存在的突出問題。通過對PPP相關(guān)政策法規(guī)的梳理指出現(xiàn)有的監(jiān)管法律法規(guī)不健全,缺乏統(tǒng)一立法,政策銜接不夠,導致現(xiàn)有的監(jiān)管缺乏執(zhí)法依據(jù);通過對多個監(jiān)管機構(gòu)的博弈分析指出目前多監(jiān)管機構(gòu)職能交叉,勢必會造成監(jiān)管真空和監(jiān)管重疊等現(xiàn)象;通過對文獻的梳理,并結(jié)合監(jiān)管現(xiàn)狀指出目前監(jiān)管隨意性大,缺乏科學的監(jiān)管績效評價,將導致監(jiān)管機構(gòu)缺乏激勵。3.通過案例對比分析總結(jié)監(jiān)管經(jīng)驗教訓以及對構(gòu)建監(jiān)管體系的啟示。通過對北京地鐵四號線和泉州刺桐大橋兩個典型案例的對比研究分析,總結(jié)在城市基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施PPP項目中的監(jiān)管經(jīng)驗與教訓,同時,針對泉州刺桐大橋監(jiān)管過程中存在的突出問題,指出完善的監(jiān)管法規(guī)、高效的監(jiān)管機構(gòu)和科學的監(jiān)管績效評價是進行有效監(jiān)管的前提、條件和保障措施。4.構(gòu)建了城市基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施PPP監(jiān)管體系。在對我國目前PPP監(jiān)管體系存在的突出問題分析與案例對比分析的基礎(chǔ)上,提出城市基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施PPP監(jiān)管體系的基本框架,并從立法目標與原則、立法架構(gòu)和立法內(nèi)容等方面探討如何完善監(jiān)管法規(guī)政策體系,從建立集權(quán)與分權(quán)有效結(jié)合的分層監(jiān)管縱向權(quán)力配置機制、監(jiān)管機構(gòu)與政策性部門協(xié)調(diào)運行的橫向權(quán)利配置機制探討如何建立有效的監(jiān)管機構(gòu)體系,從監(jiān)管績效評價主體、評價客體、評價模型、評價實施探討如何建立科學的監(jiān)管績效評價體系。本文可能在以下幾個方面有所創(chuàng)新:(1)提出并論證了城市基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施PPP監(jiān)管體系的整體框架。本文探索性的從監(jiān)管依據(jù)、監(jiān)管主體和監(jiān)管績效三個方面構(gòu)建了城市基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施PPP監(jiān)管體系,為實現(xiàn)政府有效監(jiān)管提供理論基礎(chǔ)和基本思路。(2)設(shè)計縱橫有序的PPP監(jiān)管機構(gòu)體系。本文建立了集權(quán)與分權(quán)有效結(jié)合的分層監(jiān)管縱向權(quán)力配置機制,監(jiān)管機構(gòu)與政策性部門協(xié)調(diào)運行的橫向權(quán)利配置機制。從而在縱向和橫向兩方面實現(xiàn)對PPP監(jiān)管機構(gòu)體系的設(shè)計。(3)建立了科學的PPP監(jiān)管績效評價體系。本文認為應(yīng)結(jié)合監(jiān)管者、PPP合作企業(yè)和消費者,從監(jiān)管投入和監(jiān)管效果兩方面對監(jiān)管機構(gòu)進行績效評價。
[Abstract]:China is in the rapid development stage of urbanization process. Only the existing financial expenditure and local government investment and financing can not fill the capital gap of urban infrastructure construction. The public private partnership (PPP) can relieve the government financial pressure and improve the operation efficiency through the introduction of private funds. However, because of the natural infrastructure of the city, it is natural. There are many risk factors in the process of cooperation between government and social capital in the process of cooperation between government and social capital. If the government can not supervise it effectively, the market failure will easily occur in the implementation and operation of the urban infrastructure PPP project, which reduces the operating efficiency and service quality and makes the consumers benefit. Therefore, the establishment of a scientific and perfect regulatory system is of great significance to the implementation of the mode of public and private cooperation in urban infrastructure. The main contents of this paper are as follows: 1. on the basis of the basic characteristics of PPP and the risk analysis, the demand for government supervision is put forward. The basic characteristics and risks of the urban infrastructure PPP in China are based on the basic characteristics and risk analysis. To clarify the risk factors closely related to government regulation, including the risk of government policy change, government intervention risk, government credit risk, social risk, moral risk and so on, and analyze the main causes of these risks, and then combine the natural monopoly, sociality, profitability and risk factors of the urban infrastructure PPP. In order to effectively solve the problem of market failure and control project risk and to reconcile the contradiction between the public property of urban infrastructure and the profitability of private cooperative enterprises, the government supervision.2. must be carried out to deeply analyze the outstanding problems existing in the current urban infrastructure PPP supervision. The existing regulatory laws are pointed out through the combing of the policies and regulations of the PPP phase. The regulations are not perfect, lack of unified legislation and lack of policy cohesion, which leads to the lack of law enforcement basis. Through the game analysis of multiple regulatory agencies, it is pointed out that the overlapping of the supervision vacuum and supervision will result in the overlapping of supervision vacuum and supervision. The lack of scientific supervision performance evaluation will lead to the lack of incentive.3. supervision institutions to summarize the experience and lessons through case comparison and analysis of the supervision system. Through the comparison and analysis of the two typical cases of Beijing metro line four and Quanzhou Tung Tung bridge, this paper summarizes the supervision of the urban infrastructure facilities in the PPP project. At the same time, in view of the outstanding problems in the supervision process of Quanzhou tung tree bridge, the paper points out that the perfect regulation and regulation, the efficient supervision organization and the scientific supervision performance evaluation are the precondition of effective supervision, and the conditions and safeguard measures.4. construct the PPP supervision system of the urban infrastructure construction. In the current PPP supervision system in China On the basis of the analysis of the outstanding problems and the comparison and analysis of the cases, the basic framework of the PPP supervision system of urban infrastructure is put forward, and how to improve the regulatory system from the legislative objectives and principles, the legislative structure and the legislative content is discussed, and the vertical power allocation mechanism is regulated from the establishment of the effective combination of centralization and decentralization. The lateral rights allocation mechanism coordinated by the regulatory agency and the policy sector discusses how to establish an effective regulatory institutional system, from supervising performance evaluation subject, evaluation object, evaluation model, and evaluation implementation how to establish a scientific supervision performance evaluation system. This paper may be innovative in the following aspects: (1) put forward and demonstrate The overall framework of the PPP regulatory system of urban infrastructure. This paper constructs the PPP regulatory system of urban infrastructure from three aspects of supervision basis, supervision subject and supervision performance, which provides the theoretical basis and basic ideas for the realization of effective government supervision. (2) the design of PPP regulatory system with a sequence and sequence. The vertical power allocation mechanism is regulated by the division of power and power effectively, and the horizontal rights allocation mechanism of the regulatory agency and the policy sector is coordinated. The design of the PPP regulatory system is realized both vertically and horizontally. (3) a scientific performance evaluation system for the PPP supervision is established. This paper considers that the supervisor, the PPP cooperation enterprise and the PPP should be combined. Consumers conduct performance evaluation on regulatory agencies from two aspects of regulatory input and regulatory effectiveness.

【學位授予單位】：浙江財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F283

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