本文選題：畜牧業(yè)上市公司　切入點：高管薪酬　出處：《東北農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：薪酬契約是否可以對高管形成有效的激勵,從而提升企業(yè)績效是學(xué)術(shù)界以及實務(wù)界當(dāng)中比較重要的一個課題。上市公司所有權(quán)以及控制權(quán)的相互獨立造成了高管薪酬激勵出現(xiàn)了一系列的問題,企業(yè)所有者同經(jīng)營者相互間形成了目標(biāo)不一致、信息不對稱的情況�，F(xiàn)如今社會經(jīng)濟(jì)不斷發(fā)展,企業(yè)所處的經(jīng)營環(huán)境越來越紛繁復(fù)雜,企業(yè)所有者同經(jīng)營者之間的利益沖突越發(fā)尖銳,通過合理的薪酬契約機(jī)制能夠很好地調(diào)和這一矛盾。此外,高級管理人才現(xiàn)如今已經(jīng)是提升企業(yè)競爭力的重要因素,因此,企業(yè)想要得到更好的發(fā)展就需要收納更多的高級管理人才,同時施行科學(xué)的激勵制度從而達(dá)到提升企業(yè)績效的目的,文中主要研究薪酬契約怎樣可以更加有效地激勵高管,盡量避免代理矛盾的出現(xiàn),最終使得企業(yè)的績效得以提升。本文首先研究畜牧業(yè)上市企業(yè)、高管薪酬、企業(yè)績效等一些較為核心的概念,之后通過利用委托代理理論、經(jīng)營者激勵理論、最優(yōu)契約理論以及終極產(chǎn)權(quán)理論作為理論基礎(chǔ)來研究高管薪酬是怎樣對績效產(chǎn)生作用的,利用相關(guān)的理論來開展課題的探究,其中就包含了高管的薪資水平同企業(yè)績效之間的關(guān)系、高管持股比例同企業(yè)績效之間的關(guān)系還有高管的在職消費水平同企業(yè)績效之間的關(guān)系,最后再通過對實例的研究來進(jìn)行假設(shè)的驗證。本文以經(jīng)過篩選的12家畜牧業(yè)上市公司來進(jìn)行相關(guān)的研究,收集畜牧業(yè)上市公司2002到2016年這期間內(nèi)的數(shù)據(jù)作為樣本容量,運用因子分析法構(gòu)建企業(yè)績效綜合模型,依照終極產(chǎn)權(quán)方面的差異來對畜牧業(yè)上市公司進(jìn)行國有以及非國有公司的劃分,通過使用多元線性回歸分析的辦法來對這部分的企業(yè)當(dāng)中的高管薪酬同企業(yè)績效相互關(guān)系、高管薪酬激勵政策在國有以及非國有控股上市公司間的差異進(jìn)行研究。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):畜牧業(yè)上市公司高管貨幣薪酬同企業(yè)績效存在非常明顯的正向關(guān)系,并且國有控股上市公司當(dāng)中這種正向的激勵效果要高于非國有控股上市公司。畜牧業(yè)上市公司高管持股比例與企業(yè)績效顯著正相關(guān),非國有控股上市公司高管持股比例所帶來的企業(yè)績效正向影響會高于國有控股上市公司。畜牧業(yè)上市公司高管在職消費對企業(yè)績效都表現(xiàn)出了負(fù)向的影響關(guān)系,但是這種負(fù)向激勵效果國有控股上市公司中是顯著的,而在非國有控股上市公司中是不顯著的。所以,需要更好地構(gòu)建高管薪酬激勵制度,要從各個方面來使得這一制度得到落實。適當(dāng)提升高管薪酬水平和持股比例,規(guī)范高管在職消費,培養(yǎng)出更多具有較好專業(yè)素養(yǎng)的經(jīng)理人,嚴(yán)格進(jìn)行人員的選用、任用、激勵、考核,使其符合市場規(guī)律。加強(qiáng)對國有企業(yè)的管理程度,將政治和企業(yè)的經(jīng)營相互分離,限制企業(yè)高管在政治體系當(dāng)中晉升的機(jī)會,將其行為控制在市場經(jīng)濟(jì)當(dāng)中。
[Abstract]:Whether pay contracts can provide effective incentives for executives, Therefore, improving corporate performance is an important topic in academic and practical circles. The independence of ownership and control rights of listed companies has caused a series of problems in executive compensation incentive. The enterprise owners and managers have formed a situation of inconsistent objectives and asymmetric information. Nowadays, with the continuous development of social economy, the business environment in which the enterprise is operating is becoming more and more complicated. The conflict of interest between the owner and the operator is becoming more and more acute, which can be reconciled well through a reasonable salary contract mechanism. In addition, senior management talents are now an important factor to enhance the competitiveness of the enterprise. In order to get better development, enterprises need to accept more senior management talents, and carry out scientific incentive system to achieve the purpose of improving the performance of enterprises. This paper mainly studies how the compensation contract can motivate executives more effectively. This paper first studies some core concepts, such as stockbreeding listed enterprises, executive compensation, corporate performance, and so on, and then by using principal-agent theory, this paper makes use of the principal-agent theory. The executive incentive theory, the optimal contract theory and the ultimate property right theory are used as the theoretical basis to study how the executive compensation affects the performance. It includes the relationship between executive pay level and enterprise performance, the relationship between executive ownership ratio and enterprise performance, as well as the relationship between executive in-service consumption level and enterprise performance. Finally, through the case study to verify the hypothesis. In this paper, 12 listed stockbreeding companies were selected to carry out the relevant research, and collected the data from 2002 to 2016 as the sample size. Using the factor analysis method to construct the comprehensive model of enterprise performance, according to the difference of ultimate property right, to divide the listed companies of animal husbandry into state-owned companies and non-state-owned companies. By using the method of multiple linear regression analysis, the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance in this part of the enterprise is analyzed. The difference of executive compensation incentive policy between state-owned and non-state-controlled listed companies is studied. It is found that there is a very obvious positive relationship between executive monetary compensation and corporate performance in stockbreeding listed companies. Moreover, the positive incentive effect of the listed companies is higher than that of the non-state-owned holding companies. The proportion of stock ownership by senior managers in the listed companies is significantly positively correlated with the performance of the enterprises. The positive effect of the proportion of the senior executives' shareholding in non-state-owned holding listed companies will be higher than that of the state-owned holding listed companies. The in-service consumption of the senior executives of the listed stockbreeding companies has a negative impact on the performance of the enterprises. However, this negative incentive effect is significant in the state-owned holding listed companies, but not in the non-state-owned holding listed companies. Therefore, it is necessary to better build the executive compensation incentive system. It is necessary to implement this system from various aspects. We should properly raise the executive compensation level and shareholding ratio, regulate the in-service consumption of senior executives, cultivate more managers with better professional qualities, and strictly carry out the selection, appointment and encouragement of personnel. Strengthen the management of state-owned enterprises, separate politics from enterprise management, limit the opportunities for executives to advance in the political system, and control their behavior in the market economy.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F302.6;F326.3

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