發(fā)布時間：2018-02-11 05:23

  本文關鍵詞： 高管持股 員工持股計劃 核心員工 企業(yè)績效　出處：《南京大學》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：委托代理問題一直都是公司治理研究的熱點問題,理論研究者和實際工作者一直在努力探索有效的高管激勵方式,以緩解委托代理問題,以期實現(xiàn)企業(yè)績效的最大化。員工股權激勵計劃自在美國最先實施以來,效果良好,一直被當作研究高管股權激勵的切入點,備受學者們的關注。本文突破了前人將員工股權激勵等同于高管股權激勵的研究方式,對員工股權激勵計劃的對象一高管人員和核心員工分別加以研究。本文首先總結了研究中所涉及的相關理論和研究成果,經(jīng)過深入的理論分析,本文認為高管持股比例與企業(yè)績效正相關,而員工持股計劃和股權集中度作為調節(jié)變量,對兩者具有正向的調節(jié)作用。為了深入探討四者之間的關系,本文提出了四個假設,構建了八個模型,通過實證的方法,分別對四個假設進行了一一驗證和分析。本文以2010-2015年我國滬深兩市A股市場的上市公司為例,剔除了不符合研究條件的公司,最終獲得222個樣本,通過實證檢驗,主要得出了以下三大結論:(1)高管持股比例與企業(yè)績效正相關;(2)員工持股計劃中,對核心員工的激勵范圍正向調節(jié)高管團隊持股比例和企業(yè)績效之間的關系;(3)員工持股計劃中,對核心員工的激勵規(guī)模正向調節(jié)高管團隊持股比例和企業(yè)績效之間的關系。希望可以通過本文的研究,給企業(yè)內外部的利益相關者以啟發(fā),不斷完善和推動我國股權激勵計劃的順利施行
[Abstract]:The principal-agent problem has always been a hot issue in the research of corporate governance. Theoretical researchers and practical workers have been trying to explore an effective way to encourage senior executives to alleviate the principal-agent problem. In order to maximize the performance of the enterprise. Since the first implementation of the employee equity incentive plan in the United States, the results have been good, has been used as the entry point for the study of executive equity incentive. This paper breaks through the previous research methods that equate employee equity incentive with executive equity incentive. The object of employee equity incentive plan, senior management and core staff, are studied separately. Firstly, this paper summarizes the relevant theories and research results involved in the research, after in-depth theoretical analysis, This paper holds that the proportion of executive ownership is positively related to enterprise performance, while the employee stock ownership plan and ownership concentration, as regulating variables, play a positive role in regulating the two. In order to explore the relationship between the four, this paper puts forward four hypotheses. Eight models are constructed, and the four hypotheses are tested and analyzed respectively by empirical methods. This paper takes the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets from 2010 to 2015 as an example to eliminate the companies that do not meet the requirements of the research. Finally, 222 samples were obtained. By empirical test, the following three conclusions were drawn: 1) the proportion of executive stock ownership is positively related to corporate performance. The incentive range for the core staff is positively adjusted to adjust the relationship between the proportion of senior management team shareholding and the performance of the enterprise. (3) in the ESOP, The incentive scale of the core staff positively adjusts the relationship between the proportion of the top management team holding shares and the enterprise performance. It is hoped that through the research of this paper, it can enlighten the internal and external stakeholders of the enterprise. Continuously perfecting and promoting the smooth implementation of China's Equity incentive Plan
【學位授予單位】：南京大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.91;F272.5;F832.51
，

本文編號：1502299