本文選題：盈余管理 + 家族企業(yè)��； 參考：《貴州財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：改革開放以來,特別是隨著我國經(jīng)濟(jì)的迅猛發(fā)展,民營企業(yè)的經(jīng)濟(jì)地位不斷上升。而民營企業(yè)的集中代表-家族企業(yè),因其具有初始融資迅速、管理成本低、決策效率高、家族成員凝聚力強(qiáng)等優(yōu)勢,在我國經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展所起的作用也日益增大。且伴隨著一些家族企業(yè)的上市,這些企業(yè)更躋身于經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的前列。因此管理層對上市公司的盈余管理行為也就備受相關(guān)利益者的關(guān)注。如果企業(yè)的盈余管理行為導(dǎo)致了投資者無法根據(jù)客觀、公允的會(huì)計(jì)信息作出正確的決策判斷時(shí),我們就認(rèn)為影響了正常的資本市場運(yùn)行。而機(jī)構(gòu)投資者作為資本市場中的重要組成部分,在公司治理、信息披露、資產(chǎn)定價(jià)方面發(fā)揮重要作用。并且當(dāng)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在持股比例、持股時(shí)間、監(jiān)督成本等特征的不同,給企業(yè)帶來監(jiān)督作用也有所不同。 本文以2008-2010年新會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)表中的上市家族企業(yè)為樣本進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析。通過對1486家上市家族企業(yè)的盈余管理程度進(jìn)行的有效計(jì)量和對其機(jī)構(gòu)投資者差異性持股的分析發(fā)現(xiàn)。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者積極持股與盈余管理程度明顯負(fù)相關(guān),即積極持股會(huì)降低家族企業(yè)盈余管理的程度；機(jī)構(gòu)投資者消極持股與盈余管理程度正相關(guān),即消極持股會(huì)刺激到家族企業(yè)的盈余管理行為。而混合持股與盈余管理正相關(guān)但是不顯著的。 由于家族企業(yè)的所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)并存的特殊性,所以本文從內(nèi)容上研究了由于家族企業(yè)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者差異性持股對盈余管理的影響也是不同的�？疾觳煌愋蜋C(jī)構(gòu)投資者對上市家族企業(yè)盈余管理行為的影響,為我國監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)穩(wěn)定資本市場而大力發(fā)展機(jī)構(gòu)投資者并使其參與到上市公司的公司治理中提供一個(gè)參考依據(jù),從而得出更具體的結(jié)論,提出更具體的相關(guān)的建議。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, especially with the rapid development of China's economy, the economic status of private enterprises has been rising. Because of its advantages such as rapid initial financing, low management cost, high decision-making efficiency and strong cohesion of family members, family enterprises play an increasingly important role in the economic development of our country. And with the listing of some family enterprises, these enterprises are in the forefront of economic development. Therefore, the management of listed companies earnings management behavior is concerned by the relevant stakeholders. If the enterprise's earnings management behavior leads to investors unable to make a correct decision based on objective and fair accounting information, we think it affects the normal operation of the capital market. As an important part of capital market, institutional investors play an important role in corporate governance, information disclosure and asset pricing. And when institutional investors in the shareholding ratio, holding time, supervision costs and other characteristics of different, to the enterprise supervision role is also different. This paper makes an empirical analysis on the listed family firms in the new accounting statements of 2008-2010. Through the effective measurement of the earnings management degree of 1486 listed family enterprises and the analysis of their institutional investors' differential shareholding. The positive shareholding of institutional investors is negatively correlated with the degree of earnings management, that is, the degree of earnings management is reduced by active shareholding, and the degree of earnings management is positively correlated with the negative shareholding of institutional investors. That is, negative ownership will stimulate the earnings management behavior of family firms. The mixed shareholding and earnings management are positively related but not significant. Because of the particularity of the coexistence of ownership and management right of family business, this paper studies the influence of institutional investors' different shareholding on earnings management. This paper investigates the influence of different types of institutional investors on the earnings management behavior of listed family enterprises, and provides a reference basis for our country's regulators to stabilize the capital market and vigorously develop institutional investors and make them participate in the corporate governance of listed companies. In order to draw more specific conclusions, put forward more specific recommendations.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：貴州財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224

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本文編號(hào)：1989961