本文關(guān)鍵詞： 高管減持 中小板上市公司 信號傳遞效應(yīng)　出處：《華南理工大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：相較于普通投資者而言，上市公司高管掌握著本家上市公司更多的真實、有效信息，同時對有關(guān)公司前景以及行業(yè)的發(fā)展趨勢也有著相對準(zhǔn)確的把握。信號傳遞理論認為，由于信息的不對稱和市場的不完全有效，高管的減持行為可以成為一種有效傳遞內(nèi)部信息的工具，來達到內(nèi)部管理者與外部投資者的信息均衡，投資者也可以根據(jù)市場的反應(yīng)來判斷公司的發(fā)展?fàn)顩r和質(zhì)量。由于中國證券市場發(fā)展尚未成熟，公司的治理結(jié)構(gòu)尚不完善，，中小板上市公司高管減持行為的研究也未得到國內(nèi)學(xué)者和管理部門的充分重視，因此對中小板上市公司高管減持行為信號傳遞效應(yīng)進行研究分析具有一定的現(xiàn)實意義。 本文在信號傳遞理論、委托代理理論和有效市場理論的研究基礎(chǔ)上，以我國中小板上市公司高管股票減持股票行為作為研究對象，對我國中小板上市公司高管的減持行為的現(xiàn)狀以及原因進行總結(jié)，并且結(jié)合2008-2010年我國中小板上市公司經(jīng)濟數(shù)據(jù)，采用事件研究法，分析我國中小板上市公司高管減持信息的披露與股票異常收益率的關(guān)系，研究中小板高管減持的信號傳遞效應(yīng)，并使用2011年數(shù)據(jù)對結(jié)果進行穩(wěn)健性檢驗，最終得出本文的結(jié)論。研究結(jié)果表明：1.中小板上市公司高管減持行為信號傳遞效應(yīng)較差。2.中小板上市公司高管減持股票占流通股比例越大，越易于在減持公告日后造成負的異常收益，而減持股票占流通股比例越小，則該種信息的傳遞變得相對不明確。3.中小板上市公司高管減持頻率顯著影響減持事件信號傳遞效應(yīng)。 最后，根據(jù)實證結(jié)果，對如何進一步規(guī)范中小板高管的減持行為的監(jiān)管，增強減持行為的信號傳遞效應(yīng)方面提了一些合理化建議。
[Abstract]:Compared with ordinary investors, executives of listed companies hold more real and effective information about their listed companies. At the same time, we also have a relatively accurate grasp of the prospects of the company and the development trend of the industry. The theory of signal transmission holds that because of the asymmetry of information and the incomplete effectiveness of the market. The behavior of executive reduction can become an effective tool to transfer internal information to achieve the information balance between internal managers and external investors. Investors can also judge the development and quality of the company according to the reaction of the market. Because the development of Chinese securities market is not mature, the corporate governance structure is not perfect. The research on the behavior of executive reduction in small and medium-sized listed companies has not been paid enough attention by domestic scholars and management departments. Therefore, it is of practical significance to study and analyze the signal transmission effect of executive reduction behavior in small and medium board listed companies. Based on the research of signal transmission theory, principal-agent theory and efficient market theory, this paper takes the stock reduction behavior of senior executives of small and medium-sized board listed companies as the research object. This paper summarizes the current situation and reasons of the reduction behavior of the senior executives of the small and medium-sized board listed companies in our country, and combines the economic data of China's small and medium-sized board listed companies from 2008 to 2010, adopts the event research method. This paper analyzes the relationship between the disclosure of the information of senior management reduction and the abnormal return on stock of the small and medium-sized board listed companies in China, studies the signalling effect of the reduction, and uses the data of 2011 to test the stability of the results. Finally the conclusion of this paper. The research results show that the small and medium-sized board listed company executive reduction behavior signal transmission effect is poor .2. the small and medium-sized board listed company executive reduction shares in the proportion of outstanding shares is larger. The easier it is to cause negative abnormal returns after the announcement of the reduction, and the smaller the proportion of shares in circulation. Then the transmission of this kind of information becomes relatively unclear. 3. The frequency of senior management reduction of small and medium-sized board listed companies has a significant impact on the signal transmission effect of the reduction event. Finally, according to the empirical results, this paper puts forward some reasonable suggestions on how to further regulate the regulation of the reduction behavior of senior executives in small and medium-sized boards, and enhance the signaling effect of the reduction behavior.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華南理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.51

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