【摘要】：隨著電子商務(wù)和網(wǎng)絡(luò)技術(shù)的發(fā)展,雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈成為供應(yīng)鏈未來(lái)發(fā)展的一種趨勢(shì)。在網(wǎng)店與實(shí)體店并存的情形下,消費(fèi)者在購(gòu)買產(chǎn)品時(shí)有了更多的參照對(duì)象。因此,參照效應(yīng)的存在對(duì)雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的運(yùn)作有很大的影響。價(jià)格參照是引發(fā)渠道沖突的主要原因,網(wǎng)店的出現(xiàn)使原來(lái)實(shí)體店之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)轉(zhuǎn)換為實(shí)體店與網(wǎng)店的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。消費(fèi)者除了關(guān)注產(chǎn)品的價(jià)格外,現(xiàn)在也越來(lái)越重視消費(fèi)體驗(yàn)和消費(fèi)品質(zhì)。為了最大限度的滿足消費(fèi)者,在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中獲得優(yōu)勢(shì),實(shí)體店和網(wǎng)店不斷提高和完善自身服務(wù)水平。在實(shí)體店服務(wù)和網(wǎng)店服務(wù)的刺激下,參照效應(yīng)會(huì)產(chǎn)生新的變化。本文針對(duì)制造商開辟網(wǎng)店的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈,首先,構(gòu)建了制造商和實(shí)體店間的Stackelberg博弈模型,探討參照效應(yīng)對(duì)實(shí)體店和網(wǎng)店定價(jià)策略的影響,通過(guò)分析制造商和實(shí)體店的利潤(rùn)變化,嘗試建立有效契約提高雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈成員的利潤(rùn)水平;然后,綜合考慮實(shí)體店服務(wù)產(chǎn)生的需求正溢出效應(yīng)和參照效應(yīng),構(gòu)建了影響參照價(jià)格的動(dòng)態(tài)方程,研究實(shí)體店服務(wù)影響供應(yīng)鏈運(yùn)作結(jié)果的復(fù)雜機(jī)理;最后,將網(wǎng)店的服務(wù)納入研究范圍,探究網(wǎng)店和實(shí)體店同時(shí)利用服務(wù)開展競(jìng)爭(zhēng)時(shí),參照效應(yīng)如何影響雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的運(yùn)作。研究結(jié)果表明:(1)參照效應(yīng)能夠緩解實(shí)體店和網(wǎng)店的價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng),有效降低消費(fèi)者渠道偏好對(duì)制造商收益和實(shí)體店收益產(chǎn)生的影響,從而改善雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的運(yùn)作效率。與集中決策模式相比,分散決策模式下供應(yīng)鏈整體利潤(rùn)水平會(huì)降低,合理設(shè)計(jì)的兩部定價(jià)契約能夠作為協(xié)調(diào)雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的有效機(jī)制。在協(xié)調(diào)契約中,參照效應(yīng)同時(shí)影響制造商的批發(fā)價(jià)格和給予實(shí)體店單位產(chǎn)品的銷售補(bǔ)貼,作為主導(dǎo)方的制造商應(yīng)該積極利用參照效應(yīng)尋求與實(shí)體店的合作。(2)實(shí)體店服務(wù)影響供應(yīng)鏈運(yùn)作的機(jī)理非常復(fù)雜。一方面,消費(fèi)者搭便車行為會(huì)削弱實(shí)體店提供服務(wù)的意愿;另一方面,參照效應(yīng)的存在會(huì)使實(shí)體店付出更多的努力來(lái)提高自身服務(wù)水平。簡(jiǎn)單的批發(fā)價(jià)格契約無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈整體協(xié)調(diào),分散決策模式下實(shí)體店的服務(wù)水平會(huì)顯著降低,從而導(dǎo)致供應(yīng)鏈整體利潤(rùn)水平的下降。制造商主導(dǎo)的服務(wù)成本分擔(dān)契約可以實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈的完全協(xié)調(diào),在實(shí)體店服務(wù)意愿不足的情況下,制造商能夠通過(guò)設(shè)計(jì)合理的激勵(lì)機(jī)制來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)“雙贏”。(3)在實(shí)體店服務(wù)和網(wǎng)店服務(wù)并存的情形下,參照效應(yīng)能同時(shí)提高兩個(gè)渠道的服務(wù)水平。與集中決策模式相比,分散決策模式下實(shí)體店的服務(wù)水平會(huì)降低,但網(wǎng)店的服務(wù)水平?jīng)]有變化。雙向成本分擔(dān)契約并不能使雙渠道實(shí)現(xiàn)完全協(xié)調(diào),作為主導(dǎo)方的制造商去主動(dòng)分擔(dān)實(shí)體店的服務(wù)成本,然后向?qū)嶓w店收取固定的費(fèi)用,在實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈成員收益Pareto改進(jìn)的同時(shí),使供應(yīng)鏈達(dá)到完全協(xié)調(diào)。參照效應(yīng)的存在,可以增加制造商與實(shí)體店之間建立協(xié)調(diào)契約的可能性。在現(xiàn)實(shí)中,制造企業(yè)開辟獨(dú)立網(wǎng)店銷售產(chǎn)品的現(xiàn)象越來(lái)越普遍,本文的研究可以為企業(yè)決策提供很多借鑒。例如,參照效應(yīng)的存在可以有效緩解渠道之間的價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng),增大制造商和實(shí)體店之間合作的可能性。作為主導(dǎo)方的制造企業(yè)應(yīng)該利用參照效應(yīng)對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈競(jìng)爭(zhēng)策略和合作契約的影響,積極尋求與下游企業(yè)開展合作,在增加雙方收益的同時(shí)改善供應(yīng)鏈整體收益。
[Abstract]:With the development of e-commerce and network technology, the dual-channel supply chain has become a trend of the future development of the supply chain. In the case where the online store and the entity store coexist, the consumer has more reference objects when purchasing the product. Therefore, the existence of the reference effect has great influence on the operation of the dual-channel supply chain. The price reference is the main cause of the channel conflict, and the appearance of the online store makes the competition between the original and the solid stores converted to the competition between the solid store and the online store. In addition to paying attention to the price of the product, the consumer is now paying more attention to the consumption experience and the consumption quality. To maximize customer satisfaction, gain advantages in competition, solid stores and online stores constantly improve and improve their own service levels. The reference effect creates new changes with the stimulus of the entity store service and the online store service. In this paper, a two-channel supply chain is opened for the manufacturer. First, the Stackelberg game model between the manufacturer and the entity store is built, the influence of the reference effect on the pricing strategy of the physical store and the online store is discussed, and the profit change of the manufacturer and the entity store is analyzed. In this paper, we try to set up an effective contract to improve the profit level of the members of the dual-channel supply chain. Then, considering the demand positive spillover effect and the reference effect of the entity store service, the dynamic equation affecting the reference price is constructed, and the complex mechanism of the operation result of the supply chain is studied. and finally, the service of the online store is included in the research range, and when the online store and the entity store are used for competition with the service, the reference effect influences the operation of the dual-channel supply chain. The results show that (1) the reference effect can reduce the price competition of the physical store and the online store, effectively reduce the influence of the consumer channel preference on the manufacturer's income and the income of the entity store, thereby improving the operation efficiency of the dual-channel supply chain. Compared with the centralized decision-making mode, the overall profit level of the supply chain in the decentralized decision-making mode can be reduced, and the two pricing contracts that are reasonably designed can serve as an effective mechanism for coordinating the dual-channel supply chain. In the coordination contract, the reference effect affects the wholesale price of the manufacturer and the sales subsidy to the entity store unit product. The manufacturer of the leading party should actively use the reference effect to seek the cooperation with the entity store. (2) The mechanism of the operation of the supply chain is very complicated. On the one hand, the consumer's hitchhiking will weaken the will of the physical store to provide services; on the other hand, the presence of the reference effect will give the physical store more effort to improve its own level of service. The simple wholesale cheap contract can not realize the overall supply chain coordination, and the service level of the entity store in the decentralized decision-making mode can be significantly reduced, resulting in a decrease in the overall profit level of the supply chain. The manufacturer-led service cost-sharing contract can achieve full coordination of the supply chain, and the manufacturer can achieve the 鈥渨in-win鈥，

本文編號(hào)：2404043