【摘要】：本文將利他偏好引入閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的定價(jià)策略模型,對(duì)制造商回收和零售商回收條件下的由一個(gè)零售商和一個(gè)制造商組成的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈進(jìn)行研究。首先,研究了未引入利他偏好的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈定價(jià)和引入了利他偏好的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈定價(jià)策略,然后比較兩種情況下制造商回收和零售商回收時(shí)的定價(jià)策略。通過數(shù)學(xué)模型推導(dǎo)和數(shù)值分析,得到結(jié)論:在零售商進(jìn)行回收時(shí),制造商利他屬性的增強(qiáng),既有利于零售商收益的增加,又有利于供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)找娴脑黾?零售商利他屬性的增強(qiáng)雖然對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)找娴脑黾佑欣珜?duì)制造商是不利的。零售商效用和供應(yīng)鏈效用是零售商利他偏好的增函數(shù),制造商效用是零售商利他偏好的減函數(shù)。在制造商進(jìn)行回收時(shí),制造商利他屬性的增強(qiáng),既有利于零售商收益的增加,又有利于供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)找娴脑黾?零售商利他屬性的增強(qiáng),有利于制造商收益的增加,但對(duì)整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)找娴奶岣呤遣焕�。制造商效用和供�?yīng)鏈效用是零售商利他偏好的增函數(shù),零售商效用是零售商利他偏好的減函數(shù)。這表明零售商利他水平越高對(duì)自身造成的損失越嚴(yán)重,以至于即使提高制造商收益也無法彌補(bǔ)自身利益損失對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)找嬖斐傻膿p害。因此零售商作為營(yíng)利性組織,當(dāng)自己的利益低于期望時(shí),會(huì)適當(dāng)降低自己的利他程度,因此零售商無法達(dá)到完全利他水平。無論是制造商回收模式還是零售商回收模式,利他偏好的存在能夠促進(jìn)供應(yīng)鏈上下游決策者的合作,提高供應(yīng)鏈整體的利潤(rùn)和效用,實(shí)現(xiàn)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈整體利潤(rùn)的協(xié)調(diào),使其高于不考慮利他偏好時(shí)的利潤(rùn)。在制造商回收時(shí),制造商和零售商總是維持在較低的利他行為傾向,以保證自身利潤(rùn)的最大化。在零售商回收時(shí),制造商會(huì)降低自身的利他偏好甚至不考慮利他行為,而且更愿意選擇與具有低利他行為傾向的零售商合作。
[Abstract]:In this paper altruistic preference is introduced into the pricing strategy model of closed-loop supply chain and the closed-loop supply chain which consists of one retailer and one manufacturer under the condition of manufacturer recovery and retailer recovery is studied. Firstly, the closed-loop supply chain pricing without altruistic preference and the closed-loop supply chain pricing strategy with altruistic preference are studied. Through mathematical model derivation and numerical analysis, it is concluded that the enhancement of manufacturer's altruistic property is not only conducive to the increase of retailer's income, but also to the increase of supply chain's income. The increase in retailer altruism is beneficial to the increase in supply chain revenue but not to manufacturers. Retailer utility and supply chain utility are the increasing function of retailer altruistic preference and manufacturer utility is the decreasing function of retailer altruistic preference. The enhancement of manufacturer's altruistic property is not only conducive to the increase of retailer's income, but also to the increase of supply chain's income, and the enhancement of retailer's altruistic attribute is beneficial to the increase of manufacturer's income. But to the whole supply chain income enhancement is disadvantageous. Manufacturer utility and supply chain utility are the increasing function of retailer altruistic preference and retailer utility is the decreasing function of retailer altruistic preference. This indicates that the higher the retailer's altruistic level, the more serious the loss to itself, so that even increasing the manufacturer's income cannot compensate for the damage caused by the loss of self-interest to the supply chain's income. Therefore, as a for-profit organization, retailers can reduce their altruism properly when their interests are lower than expected, so retailers can not reach the level of complete altruism. The existence of altruistic preference can promote the cooperation of upstream and downstream decision makers in the supply chain, improve the overall profit and utility of the supply chain, and realize the coordination of the overall profit of the closed-loop supply chain. Make it higher than the profit if altruistic preference is not taken into account. When the manufacturer reclaims, the manufacturer and the retailer always maintain the low altruistic behavior tendency, in order to guarantee their own profit maximization. When retailers recycle, manufacturers reduce their altruistic preferences or even ignore altruism, and prefer to cooperate with retailers with low altruistic tendencies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：青島大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F274

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