【摘要】：隨著近幾年我國食品安全情況的日益嚴(yán)峻,鮮活水產(chǎn)品作為食品大類中特殊并且重要的一個類別,其安全情況也令人堪憂,接連出現(xiàn)的安全事件,使人們一次次陷入恐慌,嚴(yán)重影響了消費者的消費信心和熱情,這使得我國鮮活水產(chǎn)品行業(yè)的發(fā)展受到了阻礙。而第三方檢測機構(gòu)作為食品安全檢測中重要的內(nèi)容,在西方發(fā)達國家已經(jīng)有很長的發(fā)展歷史,在被廣泛引用的同時也起到了積極有效的作用。此外,在我國目前對水產(chǎn)品的監(jiān)管體系中,存在著機構(gòu)重疊、職責(zé)重復(fù)、資源浪費等問題,并且各監(jiān)管部門對鮮活水產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈源頭的監(jiān)控相比于其他環(huán)節(jié)較為薄弱,這與發(fā)達國家的監(jiān)管理念相違背。因此,本文利用演化博弈的思想,通過研究政府在對鮮活水產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈源頭引入第三方檢測機構(gòu)后,第三方檢測機構(gòu)與養(yǎng)殖戶之間的博弈情況,試圖得到有益的結(jié)論,并從引入第三方檢測機制的角度,為提高我國鮮活水產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈源頭的質(zhì)量安全保障以及推動鮮活水產(chǎn)品行業(yè)的進一步發(fā)展提供新的思路。本文首先針對政府在對鮮活水產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈源頭的質(zhì)量檢測中面臨的自行檢測還是委托第三方檢測機構(gòu)進行檢測兩種方案之間的選擇,通過決策樹分析了兩種方案下政府的成本和收益,并從期望收益的角度對上述兩個方案各自的期望收益進行比較,最終得出的結(jié)論為,對政府來說委托第三方檢測機構(gòu)檢測相比于自行檢測,更能夠降低檢測成本,提升檢測效率,因此政府選擇委托獨立第三方檢測機構(gòu)對養(yǎng)殖戶的養(yǎng)殖情況進行檢測這一方案是較優(yōu)方案。然后本文在政府引入第三方檢測機構(gòu)對鮮活水產(chǎn)品源頭——即養(yǎng)殖戶的養(yǎng)殖情況進行檢測的基礎(chǔ)上,利用演化博弈的相關(guān)知識,根據(jù)第三方檢測機構(gòu)和養(yǎng)殖戶之間的收益情況,建立收益矩陣,得出該演化博弈的進化穩(wěn)定策略,并對各進化穩(wěn)定策略下的條件進行了分析,進而提出了相應(yīng)的措施建議。通過分析發(fā)現(xiàn),博弈可以趨向于實現(xiàn)養(yǎng)殖戶選擇合格生產(chǎn),而第三方檢測機構(gòu)選擇弱監(jiān)管的理想狀態(tài)。這證明引入第三方檢測機構(gòu)對于提高鮮活水產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈源頭的質(zhì)量安全保障,以及促進水產(chǎn)品行業(yè)的行為規(guī)范,從而進一步推動水產(chǎn)品行業(yè)的健康發(fā)展起到了積極的作用。最后本文從政府的角度出發(fā),對其在水產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全監(jiān)管中引入第三方檢測機構(gòu)時需要把握的相關(guān)認(rèn)知和定位,以及應(yīng)該采取的相應(yīng)舉措提出了可供參考的意見和建議。
[Abstract]:With the increasing severity of food safety in China in recent years, fresh aquatic products, as a special and important category of food, are also worrisome. The successive safety incidents have caused people to fall into panic time and again. It seriously affects consumer confidence and enthusiasm, which hinders the development of fresh aquatic products industry in China. As an important part of food safety testing, third-party testing institutions have a long history of development in western developed countries, and have played a positive and effective role in the widely cited. In addition, in the current regulatory system of aquatic products in China, there are problems such as overlapping of institutions, duplication of responsibilities, waste of resources, and the supervision of the source of fresh aquatic products supply chain is relatively weak compared with other links. This goes against the idea of regulation in developed countries. Therefore, this paper makes use of the idea of evolutionary game to study the game situation between the third party inspection organization and the farmers after the government introduces the third party inspection institution to the supply chain source of fresh aquatic products, and tries to get the beneficial conclusion. From the angle of introducing the third party inspection mechanism, it provides a new way to improve the quality and safety of the supply chain of fresh aquatic products in China and to promote the further development of the fresh aquatic products industry. This article first aims at the government in the fresh aquatic product supply chain source quality inspection to face in the self-inspection or entrusts the third party inspection organization to carry on the inspection between the two kinds of plan choice. This paper analyzes the cost and benefit of the two schemes through the decision tree, and compares the expected income of the two schemes from the perspective of expected income. Finally, the conclusion is as follows: As far as the government is concerned, the commission of third-party testing institutions can lower the cost of testing and improve the efficiency of testing, rather than self-testing. Therefore, the government chooses to entrust the independent third party inspection organization to carry on the inspection to the breeding situation of the farmer this scheme is the better scheme. Then, on the basis of the government's introduction of third-party inspection agencies to detect the breeding situation of fresh aquatic products, that is, the breeding situation of farmers, and using the relevant knowledge of evolutionary game, according to the income situation between the third-party detection institutions and farmers, The income matrix is established, the evolutionary stability strategy of the evolutionary game is obtained, and the conditions under each evolutionary stability strategy are analyzed, and the corresponding measures are put forward. Through analysis, it is found that the game can realize the farmers to choose qualified production, while the third party detection institutions choose the ideal state of weak supervision. This proves that the introduction of third-party inspection institutions has played a positive role in improving the quality and safety assurance of the supply chain of fresh aquatic products and in promoting the standards of conduct of the aquatic products industry, thus further promoting the healthy development of the aquatic products industry. Finally, from the point of view of the government, this paper puts forward some suggestions and suggestions for reference on the cognition and orientation of the third party inspection institution when it introduces the aquatic product quality and safety supervision, and the corresponding measures that should be taken.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F322

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相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 張連英;;淺談水產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全[J];食品研究與開發(fā);2011年07期

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本文編號：2170574