【摘要】：進(jìn)入21世紀(jì),大多數(shù)制造企業(yè)把產(chǎn)品的定義從簡單的有形產(chǎn)品,拓展到基于產(chǎn)品的增值服務(wù),即產(chǎn)品的服務(wù)化。供應(yīng)商提供的產(chǎn)品服務(wù)在一定程度上影響了產(chǎn)品的需求以及利潤,同時零售商在選擇供應(yīng)商進(jìn)貨時會參考產(chǎn)品服務(wù)水平以及進(jìn)貨價等因素,綜合制定銷售策略,當(dāng)然零售商也會面對退貨帶來的利潤損失,如何與供應(yīng)商協(xié)調(diào)退貨費用,實現(xiàn)利潤達(dá)到最佳成為企業(yè)和學(xué)者研究的熱點。本文對供應(yīng)商服務(wù)水平以及零售商定價退貨策略問題進(jìn)行了分析,考慮一個供應(yīng)商與一個零售商的二級服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈,研究其供應(yīng)商與零售商的利益分配博弈問題。本文首先綜述了服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈、逆向供應(yīng)鏈定價模型、納什均衡和斯坦克爾伯格均衡等理論;其次,研究供應(yīng)商提供產(chǎn)品服務(wù),零售商退貨給供應(yīng)商,并且零售商要制定相應(yīng)的產(chǎn)品零售價格,在一個供應(yīng)商和一個零售商的供應(yīng)鏈前提下,考慮服務(wù)水平、產(chǎn)品定價和退貨這三個因素,建立供應(yīng)商服務(wù)與零售商定價與退貨的利潤數(shù)學(xué)模型,利用納什均衡與斯坦克爾伯格均衡理論進(jìn)行求解;最后,通過算例,對所建模型和算法的可行性與有效性以及推論的正確性和實效性進(jìn)行了驗證。研究表明,在供應(yīng)商與零售商各自利潤達(dá)到最優(yōu)的前提下,獲得的供應(yīng)商為零售商分擔(dān)退貨物流成本最優(yōu)比例、供應(yīng)商最優(yōu)服務(wù)水平和零售商最優(yōu)定價,納什均衡時的最優(yōu)解是唯一的,此時供應(yīng)商不會分擔(dān)退貨物流成本;在斯坦克爾伯格均衡中,模型中的供應(yīng)商分擔(dān)退貨物流成本比例依據(jù)批發(fā)價大小而定。
[Abstract]:In the 21st century, most manufacturing enterprises expand the definition of products from simple tangible products to product-based value-added services, that is, service-oriented products. The product service provided by the supplier to a certain extent affects the demand and profit of the product. At the same time, the retailer will make a comprehensive sales strategy by referring to the factors such as the level of product, service and purchase price when selecting the supplier. Of course, retailers will also face the loss of profits brought by return. How to coordinate the cost of return with suppliers and achieve the best profit has become a hot spot for enterprises and scholars. In this paper, the supplier service level and the retailer's pricing and return strategy are analyzed. Considering the two-level service supply chain between a supplier and a retailer, the benefit distribution game between the supplier and the retailer is studied. This paper first summarizes the service supply chain, reverse supply chain pricing model, Nash equilibrium and Steinkerberg equilibrium theory. In addition, retailers should set the corresponding retail prices of products, considering three factors, namely, service level, product pricing and return, under the premise of a supplier and a retailer's supply chain. The profit model of supplier service and retailer's pricing and return is established and solved by using Nash equilibrium and Steinkerberg equilibrium theory. The feasibility and validity of the proposed model and algorithm and the correctness and effectiveness of the corollary are verified. The results show that under the premise of the optimal profit of the supplier and the retailer, the supplier shares the optimal proportion of the return logistics cost for the retailer, the optimal service level of the supplier and the optimal pricing of the retailer. The optimal solution of Nash equilibrium is the only one, in which the supplier will not share the cost of return logistics; in the Stankelberg equilibrium, the proportion of suppliers sharing the cost of return logistics depends on the wholesale price.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：合肥工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274

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