【摘要】：近年來(lái),愈來(lái)愈多的企業(yè)通過(guò)網(wǎng)絡(luò)購(gòu)物平臺(tái),直接將產(chǎn)品賣給終端的購(gòu)物者,這就是電子商務(wù)直銷渠道銷售產(chǎn)品模式。但同時(shí),這些企業(yè)并沒(méi)有選擇關(guān)閉傳統(tǒng)零售渠道,兩種銷售渠道并存的狀態(tài)形成了一種新型的供應(yīng)鏈模式,即雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈銷售模式。由于直銷渠道的加入,使得供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)更加復(fù)雜,供應(yīng)鏈各成員之間的信息不對(duì)稱現(xiàn)象嚴(yán)重。一方面,在渠道分化情形下,信息分享程度對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈的影響值得深入探討。另一方面,在現(xiàn)實(shí)中作為雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的主導(dǎo)者,制造商的邊際生產(chǎn)成本可能會(huì)隨產(chǎn)量的增加而加大,出現(xiàn)生產(chǎn)規(guī)模不經(jīng)濟(jì)的情況。本文基于雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈和信息不對(duì)稱下的博弈理論,將制造商規(guī)模不經(jīng)濟(jì)引入到雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的信息共享問(wèn)題中。考慮了一個(gè)開設(shè)直銷渠道且生產(chǎn)規(guī)模不經(jīng)濟(jì)的制造商和一個(gè)零售商組成的簡(jiǎn)單二級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈,制造商和零售商各自擁有部分市場(chǎng)預(yù)測(cè)信息。分析了考慮制造商規(guī)模不經(jīng)濟(jì)下,信息共享與不共享時(shí)渠道成員的定價(jià)策略、最大期望收益及信息共享價(jià)值,并研究了制造商規(guī)模不經(jīng)濟(jì)程度對(duì)成員定價(jià)策略、最大期望收益以及信息共享價(jià)值的影響。研究結(jié)果表明,無(wú)論信息是否共享,在最優(yōu)定價(jià)策略中,批發(fā)價(jià)格,零售渠道的零售價(jià)格,直銷渠道的直銷價(jià)格都將隨著規(guī)模不經(jīng)濟(jì)程度的增加而增大,且信息共享總能使制造商獲益。但隨著規(guī)模不經(jīng)濟(jì)程度的增加,制造商獲取零售商私有信息的意愿愈來(lái)愈強(qiáng)。分析發(fā)現(xiàn)滿足某些特定條件時(shí),信息共享才會(huì)有利于零售商,并且隨著規(guī)模不經(jīng)濟(jì)程度的增加,零售商進(jìn)行信息分享的意愿會(huì)越弱。最后,運(yùn)用了Mathematica進(jìn)行數(shù)值分析,研究了規(guī)模不經(jīng)濟(jì)對(duì)渠道成員定價(jià)策略、最優(yōu)期望利潤(rùn)以及信息共享價(jià)值的影響,驗(yàn)證了本文所得結(jié)論的有效性,給出了一些管理視角的解釋。
[Abstract]:In recent years, more and more enterprises sell products directly to the shoppers through the network shopping platform. This is the model of selling products in the direct marketing channel of e-commerce. At the same time, these enterprises have not chosen to close the traditional retail channels. The coexistence of the two channels of sales has formed a new supply chain model, that is, the dual channel supply. The supply chain system is more complex and the information asymmetry between the members of the supply chain is serious because of the direct marketing channel. On the one hand, the influence of information sharing on the supply chain is worth exploring. On the other hand, as the leader of the supply chain in the dual channel, manufacturing is the leader of the supply chain in the reality. The marginal production cost of the business may increase with the increase of production, and the production scale is uneconomical. Based on the game theory under the dual channel supply chain and information asymmetry, this paper introduces the manufacturer scale uneconomy into the information sharing problem of the dual channel supply chain. A simple two level supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer with a manufacturer and a retailer each has part of the market forecast information. The pricing strategy, maximum expected income and information sharing value of the channel members are analyzed considering the manufacturer's scale uneconomical, information sharing and non sharing, and the uneconomic process of the manufacturer's scale is studied. The results show that, whether the information is shared or not, the wholesale price, the retail price of the retail channel, the direct selling price of the direct channel will increase with the increase of the scale of the uneconomy in the optimal pricing strategy, and the information sharing can always make the manufacturer. But with the increase in scale of scale, the willingness of manufacturers to obtain private information from retailers is becoming stronger. The analysis finds that information sharing will be beneficial to retailers when certain specific conditions are met, and with the increase of the scale of scale, the less willing of the retailers to share information. Finally, the use of Mathematica The effect of scale uneconomy on the pricing strategy of channel members, the optimal expected profit and the value of information sharing is studied. The validity of the conclusions in this paper is verified and some management perspectives are explained.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F274

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