本文選題：供應(yīng)鏈 + 合同設(shè)計(jì)��； 參考：《天津大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來(lái),供應(yīng)鏈管理,尤其是如何使供給與需求達(dá)到匹配已受到越來(lái)越多的關(guān)注.解決供給與需求匹配的一個(gè)有效的辦法就是在銷(xiāo)售期之前,讓零售商對(duì)市場(chǎng)需求進(jìn)行預(yù)測(cè).然而,零售商往往不愿意披露關(guān)于市場(chǎng)需求預(yù)測(cè)的準(zhǔn)確程度.因此,如何對(duì)零售商擁有關(guān)于市場(chǎng)需求準(zhǔn)確度的私人信息的供應(yīng)鏈進(jìn)行合同設(shè)計(jì)具有重要的研究意義. 本文考慮的是包含一個(gè)強(qiáng)勢(shì)供應(yīng)商與一個(gè)弱勢(shì)零售商之間的供應(yīng)鏈的合同設(shè)計(jì)問(wèn)題.其中,零售商擁有關(guān)于市場(chǎng)需求預(yù)測(cè)準(zhǔn)確程度的私人信息.作為基準(zhǔn),首先考慮了完全信息下的最優(yōu)合同形式.結(jié)果表明無(wú)論對(duì)于高預(yù)測(cè)準(zhǔn)確程度的零售商還是對(duì)于低預(yù)測(cè)準(zhǔn)確程度的零售商來(lái)說(shuō),最優(yōu)的訂貨量都存在一個(gè)門(mén)檻.同時(shí),當(dāng)零售商關(guān)于市場(chǎng)需求的預(yù)測(cè)為高時(shí),很難判斷哪一種預(yù)測(cè)準(zhǔn)確程度對(duì)生產(chǎn)商來(lái)說(shuō)更為有利,而是取決于做高準(zhǔn)確度預(yù)測(cè)的性?xún)r(jià)比.然而,當(dāng)零售商關(guān)于市場(chǎng)需求的預(yù)測(cè)為低時(shí),低準(zhǔn)確程度的預(yù)測(cè)總是更好的.進(jìn)一步地,得到了存在不對(duì)稱(chēng)信息時(shí)的最優(yōu)合同形式.通過(guò)與完全信息下的合同形式相比,發(fā)現(xiàn)訂貨量的門(mén)檻有所扭曲.而且,生產(chǎn)商的期望收益始終不大于在完全信息下的收益.最后,考慮了不存在預(yù)測(cè)成本這一特殊情形,并給出了數(shù)值算例來(lái)闡釋本文的結(jié)論.
[Abstract]:In recent years, more and more attention has been paid to supply chain management, especially how to match supply and demand. An effective solution to matching supply and demand is to allow retailers to forecast market demand before the sales period. However, retailers are often reluctant to disclose the accuracy of market demand forecasts. Therefore, it is of great significance to study how to design the supply chain in which retailers have private information about the accuracy of market demand. This paper considers the contract design of supply chain between a strong supplier and a weak retailer. Among them, retailers have private information about the accuracy of market demand forecasts. As a benchmark, the optimal contract form under complete information is first considered. The results show that there is a threshold for the optimal order quantity for both the retailers with high prediction accuracy and those with low prediction accuracy. At the same time, when the retailer's forecast of market demand is high, it is difficult to judge which kind of forecast is more favorable to the manufacturer, but depends on the performance and price ratio of the high accuracy forecast. However, when retailers' forecasts of market demand are low, low-precision forecasts are always better. Furthermore, the optimal contract form with asymmetric information is obtained. By comparing with the contract form under complete information, the threshold of order quantity is found to be distorted. Moreover, the manufacturer's expected returns are never greater than those under complete information. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the conclusion of this paper.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F274;F224.32

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本文編號(hào)：2037637