本文選題：供應(yīng)商 + 自主研發(fā)決策　； 參考：《重慶大學(xué)》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：供應(yīng)商研發(fā)決策研究包括供應(yīng)商自主研發(fā)決策與供應(yīng)商被動(dòng)參與研發(fā)決策兩大類，本文在Bhaskaran和Krishnan研究結(jié)論的基礎(chǔ)上通過：①供應(yīng)商進(jìn)行以降低成本為目的的研發(fā)；②供應(yīng)商進(jìn)行以提升產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量為目的的研發(fā)；③供應(yīng)商分擔(dān)制造商研發(fā)成本三種形式來研究供應(yīng)商研發(fā)決策問題。 供應(yīng)商分擔(dān)制造商研發(fā)成本是供應(yīng)商被動(dòng)參與研發(fā)的常見方式之一，供應(yīng)商應(yīng)制造商的要求投入資源參與研發(fā)以達(dá)到降低成本和分擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的目的，但隨著產(chǎn)品技術(shù)的日益復(fù)雜以及供應(yīng)商技術(shù)能力的不斷提高，，供應(yīng)商開始承擔(dān)越來越多的研發(fā)任務(wù)，并在研發(fā)決策中面臨更大的挑戰(zhàn)。供應(yīng)商不僅參與研發(fā)，而且在面向多制造商供貨的現(xiàn)實(shí)場(chǎng)景中進(jìn)行自主研發(fā)決策，其自主研發(fā)決策不僅受到自身資源約束，還受到外部環(huán)境，特別是制造商的約束。在資源一定的情況下，供應(yīng)商在自主研發(fā)決策時(shí)面臨選擇共性技術(shù)還是專用性技術(shù)路線的兩難選擇，即：供應(yīng)商針對(duì)面向所有制造商進(jìn)行的提升產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量或降低部件成本的共性技術(shù)研發(fā)決策；或供應(yīng)商針對(duì)某一個(gè)特定制造商進(jìn)行的提升產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量或降低部件成本的專用性技術(shù)研發(fā)決策。 本文以我國汽車行業(yè)為對(duì)象，以汽車零部件企業(yè)為案例，通過對(duì)重慶萬里蓄電池企業(yè)三種場(chǎng)景下的研發(fā)決策進(jìn)行分析，基于供應(yīng)商研發(fā)的視角，分別構(gòu)造了供應(yīng)商進(jìn)行以降低部件成本為目的的自主研發(fā)和供應(yīng)商進(jìn)行以提升最終產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量為目的的自主研發(fā)兩種情形，得出供應(yīng)商在兩種場(chǎng)景中選擇共性技術(shù)和專用性技術(shù)情形下各自對(duì)應(yīng)的最優(yōu)研發(fā)決策。并針對(duì)供應(yīng)商應(yīng)制造商要求被動(dòng)參與研發(fā)的場(chǎng)景，考慮多供應(yīng)商不同分擔(dān)意愿下，研究了供應(yīng)商如何決策最優(yōu)研發(fā)成本分擔(dān)比例。 重點(diǎn)研究了供應(yīng)商在面臨選擇共性技術(shù)還是專用性技術(shù)路線的兩難選擇下如何進(jìn)行自主研發(fā)決策。 在供應(yīng)商進(jìn)行以降低部件成本為目的的研發(fā)中，針對(duì)面向多制造商的供應(yīng)商自主研發(fā)決策問題，分別構(gòu)造了供應(yīng)商在選擇共性技術(shù)和專用性技術(shù)研發(fā)決策情形下與兩個(gè)制造商組成的三階段非合作博弈模型，得到了供應(yīng)商在這兩種情形下各自的最優(yōu)研發(fā)決策，通過對(duì)這兩種不同技術(shù)路線中供應(yīng)商最優(yōu)研發(fā)程度比較，給出了這兩種情形下供應(yīng)商研發(fā)程度相等的條件和各自的占優(yōu)區(qū)間。供應(yīng)商選擇不同技術(shù)路線，會(huì)在市場(chǎng)容量不變的情況下帶來不同的部件成本降低幅度。進(jìn)一步討論了各參數(shù)變動(dòng)對(duì)這兩種情形下供應(yīng)商最優(yōu)研發(fā)決策的影響，并給出了相應(yīng)的數(shù)值解，表明采用不同技術(shù)研發(fā)決策時(shí)供應(yīng)商最優(yōu)研發(fā)程度與制造商單位成本存在顯著差異，即：采用共技術(shù)性研發(fā)決策時(shí)，與兩個(gè)制造商單位成本負(fù)相關(guān)；采用專用性技術(shù)研發(fā)決策時(shí)，與面向?qū)Ｓ眯缘闹圃焐虇挝怀杀菊嚓P(guān)，無專用性面向的制造商單位成本負(fù)相關(guān)。 研究了在供應(yīng)商進(jìn)行以提升最終產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量為目的的研發(fā)場(chǎng)景中，供應(yīng)商選擇共性技術(shù)和專用性技術(shù)下如何進(jìn)行最優(yōu)研發(fā)程度、最大化利潤、參與約束的決策。供應(yīng)商并非直接面向市場(chǎng)而是面向不同的制造商，供應(yīng)商自主研發(fā)決策目標(biāo)選擇的不同導(dǎo)致了不同的技術(shù)路線，會(huì)帶來不同的市場(chǎng)變化。通過建立兩階段非合作博弈模型得到供應(yīng)商選擇兩種技術(shù)下各自的最大化利潤、最優(yōu)研發(fā)程度和參與約束條件，并對(duì)兩種決策情形下供應(yīng)商最大化利潤進(jìn)行比較，給出了這兩種情形下供應(yīng)商最大化利潤相等的條件和各自的占優(yōu)區(qū)間。最后運(yùn)用算例對(duì)供應(yīng)商在選擇不同技術(shù)下影響其進(jìn)行研發(fā)決策的各類參數(shù)進(jìn)行敏感性分析，得出供應(yīng)部件單位成本、供應(yīng)部件價(jià)格、最終產(chǎn)品替代率、單位研發(fā)成本變動(dòng)對(duì)這兩種技術(shù)路線中供應(yīng)商最優(yōu)研發(fā)決策的影響。 在考慮供應(yīng)商不同分擔(dān)意愿條件下，通過設(shè)計(jì)參與成本分擔(dān)的供應(yīng)商會(huì)獲得供貨比例增加的激勵(lì)機(jī)制，研究了供應(yīng)商在參與制造商研發(fā)成本分擔(dān)中如何決策最優(yōu)研發(fā)成本分擔(dān)比例。針對(duì)在兩家供應(yīng)商與一家制造商組成的供應(yīng)鏈體系中，并非所有的供應(yīng)商會(huì)做出一致性的決策，考慮只有一家供應(yīng)商參與研發(fā)成本分擔(dān)的情形。制造商對(duì)參與分擔(dān)的供應(yīng)商實(shí)施增加供貨比例的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)機(jī)制，但保證未參與成本分擔(dān)的供應(yīng)商的供貨量不少于分擔(dān)前的供貨量。通過逆向歸納法得到供應(yīng)商最優(yōu)研發(fā)成本分擔(dān)比例和增加的供貨比例區(qū)間，區(qū)間大小取決于參與成本分擔(dān)的供應(yīng)商與制造商的談判能力，且參與分擔(dān)研發(fā)成本的供應(yīng)商在單位產(chǎn)品利潤大于制造商單位產(chǎn)品利潤的一定比例才有動(dòng)機(jī)進(jìn)行投資。最后運(yùn)用算例對(duì)影響供應(yīng)商最優(yōu)研發(fā)成本分擔(dān)比例的參數(shù)進(jìn)行敏感性分析。
[Abstract]:The research on supplier R & D decision includes two categories: supplier's independent research and development decision and supplier's passive participation in R & D decision. On the basis of the research conclusions of Bhaskaran and Krishnan: (1) the supplier carries out R & D for the purpose of reducing the cost; 2. Take the manufacturer's R & D cost in three forms to study the supplier's R & D decision.
Supplier's sharing of R & D cost is one of the most common ways of supplier's passive participation in R & D. Suppliers should invest resources in R & D in order to reduce cost and share risk. However, with the increasing complexity of product technology and the increasing technical ability of suppliers, suppliers begin to take more and more responsibility. Many research and development tasks are faced with greater challenges in R & D decision. Suppliers are not only involved in R & D, but also make decisions on independent R & D in the realistic scenarios facing multiple manufacturers. Their independent R & D decisions are not only constrained by their own resources but also by the external environment, especially the constraints of the manufacturers. The company faces the dilemma of choosing common technology or special technical route in independent research and development decision, that is, the common technology research and development decision on the quality of the product or the cost of reducing the component for all manufacturers; or the quality of the product or the lower part of the supplier for a particular custom maker. A special technical research and development decision on cost.
This paper takes the automobile industry as the object, takes the auto parts enterprise as the case, analyzes the R & D Decision under the three scenarios of Chongqing Wanli battery enterprise, and constructs the self main R & D and supplier to improve the final product quality based on the supplier R & D perspective. Two cases of independent research and development are taken as the target, and the supplier selects the best R & D Decision under the situation of common technology and special technology in two scenarios. And considering the supplier's request for passive participation in R & D, and considering the different sharing intention of multi supplier, the author studies the optimal R & D of the supplier. Cost sharing ratio.
This paper focuses on how to make independent R & D decisions for suppliers in the face of the dilemma of choosing generic technology or special technology route.
In the research and development of the supplier in order to reduce the cost of components, the three stage non cooperative game model, which is composed of two manufacturers in the case of choosing common technology and special technology R & D decision, is constructed to solve the decision problem of independent research and development of suppliers oriented to multi manufacturer. The two kinds of situation of the supplier are obtained. By comparing the optimal R & D degree of the suppliers in these two different technical routes, the conditions for the equal research and development of the suppliers and their respective dominant intervals are given by the comparison of the supplier's optimal R & D degree in these two different technical routes. The influence of the variation of each parameter on the optimal R & D Decision of the supplier under these two situations is further discussed, and the corresponding numerical solutions are given. It shows that there is a significant difference between the optimal R & D degree of the supplier and the unit cost of the manufacturer when using different technologies for R & D decision. The negative correlation of bit cost; the use of special technology for R & D decision is positively related to the unit cost for the special-purpose manufacturer, and there is a negative correlation between the unit cost of no specific oriented manufacturer.
In a R & D scene with the aim of improving the quality of the final product, the supplier selects the best research and development degree, maximizes the profit and participates in the decision under the purpose of improving the quality of the final product. The supplier is not directly facing the market but is facing the different manufacturers, and the supplier's decision goal of independent research and development is selected. The choice of the difference leads to different technical routes and brings different market changes. Through the establishment of the two stage non cooperative game model, the maximum profit, the optimal R & D degree and the participation constraint conditions are obtained under the two technologies of supplier selection, and the comparison of the maximum profit for the two kinds of decision making cases is given, and the two kinds of these are given. Under the circumstances, the supplier maximizes the conditions of maximizing the profits and their respective dominant intervals. Finally, a numerical example is used to analyze the sensitivity analysis of the various parameters that affect the R & D Decision of the suppliers in different technologies. The unit cost, the supply component price, the final product replacement rate, and the change of the unit R & D cost are two. The influence of supplier's optimal R & D Decision in technical route.
Under the consideration of the different willingness to share the supplier and the incentive mechanism that the supply chamber of commerce is designed to participate in the cost sharing, the author studies how the supplier makes the optimal R & D cost sharing ratio in the R & D cost sharing of the manufacturer. Not all suppliers make a consistent decision, considering only one supplier participating in R & D cost sharing. The manufacturer implements an incentive mechanism to increase the supply ratio for the participating suppliers, but the supply of suppliers who are not involved in the cost sharing is not less than the amount of supply before the share. Through reverse induction The proportion of the supplier's optimal R & D cost sharing ratio and the increasing supply ratio range depend on the bargaining power of the suppliers and manufacturers participating in the cost sharing, and the suppliers who participate in the R & D cost are motivated to invest in a certain proportion of the profit of the unit product greater than the manufacturer's product. The sensitivity analysis of parameters affecting supplier's optimal R & D cost sharing ratio is carried out by an example.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F274;F273.1

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