本文選題：閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈　切入點：再制造　出處：《武漢紡織大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來，環(huán)境污染與資源短缺問題在全球經(jīng)濟的快速發(fā)展下表現(xiàn)的更為突出，如何實現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟、社會和環(huán)境的協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展成為了一個世界性的課題。閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈在循環(huán)經(jīng)濟的理論范式下，將廢舊產(chǎn)品的逆向回收納入到企業(yè)的戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)營決策體系下，，從而在傳統(tǒng)供應(yīng)鏈管理模式的基礎(chǔ)上形成了一條“資源-生產(chǎn)-消費-再生資源”的閉環(huán)式鏈條，具有反饋性、增值性的顯著特征。然而，由于產(chǎn)品的回收在時間、數(shù)量和質(zhì)量上的高度不確定性使得對閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈相關(guān)問題的研究要復(fù)雜許多。此外，供應(yīng)鏈鏈內(nèi)外的競爭和合作機制對企業(yè)的最優(yōu)決策具有直接的影響，而在考慮供應(yīng)鏈成員競爭和渠道競爭的環(huán)境下研究閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的相關(guān)決策問題正逐漸成為當(dāng)前管理界的研究熱點。 本文從競爭的視角出發(fā)，依據(jù)決策優(yōu)化理論、博弈論、協(xié)調(diào)理論和均衡理論等方法，綜合考慮消費者偏好、再制造成本節(jié)約、供應(yīng)鏈渠道結(jié)構(gòu)、決策成員風(fēng)險偏好行為以及博弈結(jié)構(gòu)等對企業(yè)最優(yōu)決策的影響，研究了再制造閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的定價決策、協(xié)調(diào)機制和網(wǎng)絡(luò)均衡問題。主要研究內(nèi)容如下： 1.建立了包含競爭型的制造商和再制造商構(gòu)成的再制造系統(tǒng)的生產(chǎn)及定價聯(lián)合決策模型。對再制造數(shù)量決策受約束與不受約束兩種情形下再制造系統(tǒng)的最優(yōu)生產(chǎn)及定價策略進行了對比，并進一步分析了制造商的產(chǎn)品設(shè)計策略、消費者對再制造品的偏好及再制造品的單位成本節(jié)約等關(guān)鍵參數(shù)對均衡價格、產(chǎn)量、系統(tǒng)成員利潤和再制造商進入決策的影響。 2.建立了包含競爭型的制造商和單一零售商構(gòu)成的再制造閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的利潤共享協(xié)調(diào)機制。運用博弈論分別構(gòu)建了集中決策與分散決策模型并用逆向歸納法進行求解，分析了再制造成本節(jié)約對均衡價格、產(chǎn)量、系統(tǒng)成員利潤及系統(tǒng)總利潤的影響。最后，通過設(shè)計了一個改進的“通道費”契約實現(xiàn)分散化閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)運作。 3.建立了由傳統(tǒng)銷售渠道和電子銷售渠道共同構(gòu)成的競爭型雙渠道閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的博弈分析模型，對比了集中決策與分散決策下制造商Stackelberg博弈、零售商Stackelberg博弈、Nash均衡博弈三種不同渠道權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)下的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈模型的均衡價格、產(chǎn)量、渠道成員利潤及系統(tǒng)成員總利潤。最后，探討了分散化決策下制造商領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的Stackelberg博弈情形的雙渠道閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)機制的建立問題，通過將一種簡單的批發(fā)價格契約和兩部收費制契約相結(jié)合，實現(xiàn)了分散化閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的完美協(xié)調(diào)。 4.在隨機需求且假設(shè)零售商具有風(fēng)險規(guī)避的特征的條件下建立了多個相互競爭的供應(yīng)商、制造商及零售商構(gòu)成的再制造閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)均衡模型，分別得到了各層級及整個閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)實現(xiàn)均衡的條件并建立了相關(guān)的變分不等式模型。運用擬牛頓算法對變分模型進行求解，得到了不同決策層級的均衡價格、產(chǎn)量，并進一步分析了隨機再制造率、零售商的風(fēng)險規(guī)避程度及回收率的變動對供應(yīng)鏈均衡的影響。
[Abstract]:In recent years , the problem of environmental pollution and resource shortage has become more prominent in the rapid development of global economy , and how to realize the coordinated development of economy , society and environment has become a worldwide topic .

From the perspective of competition , according to the methods of decision optimization theory , game theory , coordination theory and equilibrium theory , the influence of consumer preference , manufacturing cost saving , supply chain channel structure , decision - making member risk preference behavior and game structure on the optimal decision - making of enterprises are comprehensively considered , and the pricing decision - making , coordination mechanism and network equilibrium problem of re - manufacturing closed - loop supply chain are studied .

1 . A joint decision - making model for the production and pricing of remanufacturing system composed of competing manufacturers and remanufacturers is established . The optimal production and pricing strategies of the re - manufacturing system are compared with the optimal production and pricing strategies of the re - manufacturing system under the condition of constrained and unconstrained remanufacture , and the influence of the manufacturer ' s product design strategy , the consumer ' s preference on remanufacture and the unit cost saving of the remanufacturer are further analyzed .

2 . The profit sharing coordination mechanism of the closed - loop supply chain composed of competition - type manufacturers and single retailers is established . The centralized decision - making and decentralized decision - making models are respectively constructed and solved by using the game theory , and the effects of the re - manufacturing cost saving on the equilibrium price , output , system member profit and total profit of the system are analyzed . Finally , the coordinated operation of the decentralized closed - loop supply chain is realized by designing an improved " channel fee " contract .

3 . A game model of competitive double - channel closed - loop supply chain composed of traditional sales channel and electronic sale channel is established , and the equilibrium price , output , channel member profit and total profit of the closed - loop supply chain model under three different channel power structures are compared .

4 . Under the condition of random demand and assuming that the retailer has the characteristics of risk avoidance , a multi - competing supplier , manufacturer and retailer is established to build a closed - loop supply chain network equilibrium model . The equilibrium conditions of each level and the whole closed - loop supply chain network are obtained , and the related variational inequality model is established . By using the quasi - Newton algorithm to solve the variational model , the equilibrium price and output of different decision - level levels are obtained , and the influence of the stochastic remanufacture rate , the risk avoidance degree of the retailer and the variation of the recovery rate on the supply chain equilibrium is further analyzed .

【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢紡織大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274;F224

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 李學(xué)遷;吳勤e

本文編號：1684340