發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-03-30 04:20

  本文選題：閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈　切入點(diǎn)：再制造　出處：《武漢紡織大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來(lái)，環(huán)境污染與資源短缺問(wèn)題在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的快速發(fā)展下表現(xiàn)的更為突出，如何實(shí)現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)、社會(huì)和環(huán)境的協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展成為了一個(gè)世界性的課題。閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈在循環(huán)經(jīng)濟(jì)的理論范式下，將廢舊產(chǎn)品的逆向回收納入到企業(yè)的戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)營(yíng)決策體系下，，從而在傳統(tǒng)供應(yīng)鏈管理模式的基礎(chǔ)上形成了一條“資源-生產(chǎn)-消費(fèi)-再生資源”的閉環(huán)式鏈條，具有反饋性、增值性的顯著特征。然而，由于產(chǎn)品的回收在時(shí)間、數(shù)量和質(zhì)量上的高度不確定性使得對(duì)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈相關(guān)問(wèn)題的研究要復(fù)雜許多。此外，供應(yīng)鏈鏈內(nèi)外的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和合作機(jī)制對(duì)企業(yè)的最優(yōu)決策具有直接的影響，而在考慮供應(yīng)鏈成員競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和渠道競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的環(huán)境下研究閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的相關(guān)決策問(wèn)題正逐漸成為當(dāng)前管理界的研究熱點(diǎn)。 本文從競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的視角出發(fā)，依據(jù)決策優(yōu)化理論、博弈論、協(xié)調(diào)理論和均衡理論等方法，綜合考慮消費(fèi)者偏好、再制造成本節(jié)約、供應(yīng)鏈渠道結(jié)構(gòu)、決策成員風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好行為以及博弈結(jié)構(gòu)等對(duì)企業(yè)最優(yōu)決策的影響，研究了再制造閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的定價(jià)決策、協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制和網(wǎng)絡(luò)均衡問(wèn)題。主要研究?jī)?nèi)容如下： 1.建立了包含競(jìng)爭(zhēng)型的制造商和再制造商構(gòu)成的再制造系統(tǒng)的生產(chǎn)及定價(jià)聯(lián)合決策模型。對(duì)再制造數(shù)量決策受約束與不受約束兩種情形下再制造系統(tǒng)的最優(yōu)生產(chǎn)及定價(jià)策略進(jìn)行了對(duì)比，并進(jìn)一步分析了制造商的產(chǎn)品設(shè)計(jì)策略、消費(fèi)者對(duì)再制造品的偏好及再制造品的單位成本節(jié)約等關(guān)鍵參數(shù)對(duì)均衡價(jià)格、產(chǎn)量、系統(tǒng)成員利潤(rùn)和再制造商進(jìn)入決策的影響。 2.建立了包含競(jìng)爭(zhēng)型的制造商和單一零售商構(gòu)成的再制造閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的利潤(rùn)共享協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制。運(yùn)用博弈論分別構(gòu)建了集中決策與分散決策模型并用逆向歸納法進(jìn)行求解，分析了再制造成本節(jié)約對(duì)均衡價(jià)格、產(chǎn)量、系統(tǒng)成員利潤(rùn)及系統(tǒng)總利潤(rùn)的影響。最后，通過(guò)設(shè)計(jì)了一個(gè)改進(jìn)的“通道費(fèi)”契約實(shí)現(xiàn)分散化閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)運(yùn)作。 3.建立了由傳統(tǒng)銷(xiāo)售渠道和電子銷(xiāo)售渠道共同構(gòu)成的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)型雙渠道閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的博弈分析模型，對(duì)比了集中決策與分散決策下制造商Stackelberg博弈、零售商Stackelberg博弈、Nash均衡博弈三種不同渠道權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)下的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈模型的均衡價(jià)格、產(chǎn)量、渠道成員利潤(rùn)及系統(tǒng)成員總利潤(rùn)。最后，探討了分散化決策下制造商領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的Stackelberg博弈情形的雙渠道閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制的建立問(wèn)題，通過(guò)將一種簡(jiǎn)單的批發(fā)價(jià)格契約和兩部收費(fèi)制契約相結(jié)合，實(shí)現(xiàn)了分散化閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的完美協(xié)調(diào)。 4.在隨機(jī)需求且假設(shè)零售商具有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的特征的條件下建立了多個(gè)相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的供應(yīng)商、制造商及零售商構(gòu)成的再制造閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)均衡模型，分別得到了各層級(jí)及整個(gè)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)實(shí)現(xiàn)均衡的條件并建立了相關(guān)的變分不等式模型。運(yùn)用擬牛頓算法對(duì)變分模型進(jìn)行求解，得到了不同決策層級(jí)的均衡價(jià)格、產(chǎn)量，并進(jìn)一步分析了隨機(jī)再制造率、零售商的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避程度及回收率的變動(dòng)對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈均衡的影響。
[Abstract]:In recent years , the problem of environmental pollution and resource shortage has become more prominent in the rapid development of global economy , and how to realize the coordinated development of economy , society and environment has become a worldwide topic .

From the perspective of competition , according to the methods of decision optimization theory , game theory , coordination theory and equilibrium theory , the influence of consumer preference , manufacturing cost saving , supply chain channel structure , decision - making member risk preference behavior and game structure on the optimal decision - making of enterprises are comprehensively considered , and the pricing decision - making , coordination mechanism and network equilibrium problem of re - manufacturing closed - loop supply chain are studied .

1 . A joint decision - making model for the production and pricing of remanufacturing system composed of competing manufacturers and remanufacturers is established . The optimal production and pricing strategies of the re - manufacturing system are compared with the optimal production and pricing strategies of the re - manufacturing system under the condition of constrained and unconstrained remanufacture , and the influence of the manufacturer ' s product design strategy , the consumer ' s preference on remanufacture and the unit cost saving of the remanufacturer are further analyzed .

2 . The profit sharing coordination mechanism of the closed - loop supply chain composed of competition - type manufacturers and single retailers is established . The centralized decision - making and decentralized decision - making models are respectively constructed and solved by using the game theory , and the effects of the re - manufacturing cost saving on the equilibrium price , output , system member profit and total profit of the system are analyzed . Finally , the coordinated operation of the decentralized closed - loop supply chain is realized by designing an improved " channel fee " contract .

3 . A game model of competitive double - channel closed - loop supply chain composed of traditional sales channel and electronic sale channel is established , and the equilibrium price , output , channel member profit and total profit of the closed - loop supply chain model under three different channel power structures are compared .

4 . Under the condition of random demand and assuming that the retailer has the characteristics of risk avoidance , a multi - competing supplier , manufacturer and retailer is established to build a closed - loop supply chain network equilibrium model . The equilibrium conditions of each level and the whole closed - loop supply chain network are obtained , and the related variational inequality model is established . By using the quasi - Newton algorithm to solve the variational model , the equilibrium price and output of different decision - level levels are obtained , and the influence of the stochastic remanufacture rate , the risk avoidance degree of the retailer and the variation of the recovery rate on the supply chain equilibrium is further analyzed .

【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢紡織大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F274;F224

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 李學(xué)遷;吳勤e

本文編號(hào)：1684340