發(fā)布時間：2018-02-17 08:48

  本文關鍵詞： 供應鏈 努力水平 收益共享契約　出處：《合肥工業(yè)大學》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：供應鏈是一個情況復雜的動態(tài)系統(tǒng)，既有上游的供應鏈成員如供應商、制造商等，還有下游的銷售商、零售商等。由于這些供應鏈成員大多都只追求各自利益的最優(yōu)，進而使供應鏈出現(xiàn)了“雙邊際化效應”，即供應鏈各成員單方面收益最優(yōu)，而系統(tǒng)整體可能沒有達到最優(yōu)的現(xiàn)象。為了避免此現(xiàn)象的發(fā)生，企業(yè)領導者們通過正確的戰(zhàn)略決策來優(yōu)化供應鏈，，從而實現(xiàn)供應鏈上各成員的雙贏。因此，研究供應鏈協(xié)調(diào)問題已經(jīng)變得尤為重要。 首先，文章在緒論部分主要描述了供應鏈協(xié)調(diào)問題的研究背景和意義，指出了供應鏈協(xié)調(diào)中存在的諸多問題和相應地協(xié)調(diào)方式方法。而隨著競爭的激烈，制造商的廣告合作、質(zhì)量監(jiān)控、售后服務等努力付出對產(chǎn)品的市場需求產(chǎn)生了一定積極影響，本文就通過考慮制造商的努力水平進行了模型研究。 其次，文中針對需求依賴努力水平的兩制造商單零售商供應鏈模型，考慮了零售商對制造商努力成本的分擔比例情況及其對產(chǎn)品需求的影響，給出集中決策和分散決策下制造商的最優(yōu)努力水平以及銷售初期的最優(yōu)訂購量。此外，文中還分析了收益共享契約能實現(xiàn)供應鏈協(xié)調(diào)的必要條件，并得到此時制造商的最優(yōu)批發(fā)價。 最后，以風險波動的環(huán)境作為研究背景，考慮帶有努力水平的固定需求以及回饋與懲罰契約相結(jié)合的供應鏈模型，分別給出了集中和分散兩種決策下的最優(yōu)策略，還證明了回饋與懲罰契約能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)供應鏈的協(xié)調(diào)，并且探討了在風險波動條件下供應鏈各成員利潤的變化關系，通過數(shù)據(jù)模擬得到一些相關的靈敏度分析和管理啟示。
[Abstract]:Supply chain is a complex dynamic system, which has upstream supply chain members such as suppliers, manufacturers and so on, as well as downstream vendors, retailers, etc. In order to avoid this phenomenon, the supply chain has a "double marginalization effect", that is, the members of the supply chain have the best unilateral income, but the system as a whole may not reach the optimum. The leaders of enterprises optimize the supply chain through correct strategic decision, so as to realize the win-win situation of each member of the supply chain, therefore, it has become particularly important to study the coordination of supply chain. First of all, in the introduction part, the paper mainly describes the research background and significance of supply chain coordination, and points out many problems in supply chain coordination and corresponding coordination methods. However, with the fierce competition, manufacturers cooperate in advertising. Quality control, after-sales service and other efforts have a positive impact on the market demand of the product. This paper makes a model study by considering the manufacturer's level of effort. Secondly, according to the supply chain model of two manufacturers single retailer, the paper considers the ratio of retailer to manufacturer's effort cost and its influence on product demand. The optimal effort level of the manufacturer and the optimal order quantity in the initial stage of sales are given under centralized and decentralized decision. In addition, the necessary conditions for the profit sharing contract to realize the coordination of supply chain are also analyzed in this paper. The optimal wholesale price of the manufacturer is obtained. Finally, taking the environment of risk fluctuation as the research background, considering the supply chain model with the fixed demand of effort level and the combination of feedback and punishment contract, the optimal strategies under centralized and decentralized decisions are given respectively. It is also proved that the feedback and punishment contract can realize the coordination of supply chain, and the relationship between the profit of each member of the supply chain under the condition of risk fluctuation is discussed, and some sensitivity analysis and management inspiration are obtained through the data simulation.
【學位授予單位】：合肥工業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274

【參考文獻】

相關期刊論文 前10條

1 何勇;吳清烈;楊德禮;肖萍;;基于努力成本共擔的數(shù)量柔性契約模型[J];東南大學學報(自然科學版);2006年06期

2 徐賢浩;聶思s

本文編號：1517678