發(fā)電行業(yè)放松管制研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-12-13 00:19
【摘要】：目前,發(fā)電行業(yè)受到政府管制所引發(fā)的矛盾不斷凸顯,政府管制改革正向深水區(qū)邁進。但是,發(fā)電行業(yè)政府管制改革是一項涉及面廣、內(nèi)容繁多、程序復雜的系統(tǒng)工程,改革的進程顯得異常艱難,改革的結(jié)果褒貶不一。在此背景下,本文以放松管制作為切入點,試圖證明,放松管制的過程是發(fā)電行業(yè)市場活力增強、產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)優(yōu)化、產(chǎn)出績效提高的過程。本文在回顧發(fā)電行業(yè)放松管制改革歷程的基礎(chǔ)上,從公共管理的視角,以產(chǎn)權(quán)管制理論為依據(jù),從政府對發(fā)電行業(yè)放松管制的原因、過程和績效三個層面,構(gòu)建了一個“交易費用—放松管制—制度績效”的解析模型,這一理論模型說明發(fā)電行業(yè)的放松管制可以有效節(jié)約交易費用,進而提高發(fā)電行業(yè)放松管制的制度績效。圍繞這一理論模型,以廣東粵電集團為案例進行了實證分析,以此呈現(xiàn)出放松管制對政府管制失靈的糾正過程,進而提出了完善發(fā)電行業(yè)放松管制的對策建議,為我國的發(fā)電行業(yè)改革提供充實的理論依據(jù)。其基本結(jié)論如下:第一,我國對發(fā)電行業(yè)的放松管制進行了四個階段的改革,每一個階段的放松管制,都是步履蹣跚,有得有失,取得的成效并不一致。當前已經(jīng)進入新的改革時期,這一時期的改革必然是進一步放松對發(fā)電行業(yè)的管制,構(gòu)建充分的發(fā)電市場競爭格局。第二,節(jié)約交易費用是政府放松發(fā)電行業(yè)管制的初始動因。政府管制導致發(fā)電行業(yè)的公共領(lǐng)域租金耗散嚴重,增加了內(nèi)生性交易費用。放松管制過程是一個內(nèi)生性交易費用遞減從而制度績效遞增的過程。發(fā)電行業(yè)的放松管制,一方面使政府節(jié)約了管制的成本,另一方面,讓發(fā)電企業(yè)以更加靈活和多樣的方式實現(xiàn)增長。廣東粵電集團的改革歷程進一步證明,發(fā)電行業(yè)管制不斷放松是一個管制成本不斷降低而制度績效不斷增加的動態(tài)過程。第三,國外發(fā)電行業(yè)放松管制的經(jīng)驗表明:改革要以法制作保障,放松管制不等于放手不管,設(shè)計改革方案要統(tǒng)籌考慮,改革要把握好管制與競爭的尺度,將電價機制改革作為重點,應建立競爭開放的電力市場。第四,進一步完善我國發(fā)電行業(yè)的放松管制,不但要以完備的法律體系作保障,還應當要接受專業(yè)的行業(yè)監(jiān)管機構(gòu)指導;不僅要準確把握管制與放松管制的“度”,而且要建立獨立的調(diào)度機構(gòu),確保電力調(diào)度的公平和公正,并且還應實行環(huán)境保護的激勵性管制,促進發(fā)電行業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)升級和結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整。
[Abstract]:At present, the contradictions caused by the government regulation of the power generation industry have been highlighted, and the reform of government regulation is moving towards the deep water area. However, the reform of government regulation in power generation industry is a systematic project involving a wide range of areas, various contents and complicated procedures. The reform process is extremely difficult, and the results of the reform are mixed. In this context, this paper takes deregulation as the starting point, trying to prove that the process of deregulation is the process of enhancing the market vitality, optimizing the industrial structure and improving the output performance of the power generation industry. On the basis of reviewing the reform course of deregulation in power generation industry, from the perspective of public management, based on the theory of property right regulation, this paper discusses the reasons, process and performance of deregulation in power generation industry. An analytical model of "transaction cost-deregulation-system performance" is constructed. This theoretical model shows that the deregulation of power generation industry can effectively save transaction costs and improve the institutional performance of deregulation in power generation industry. Based on this theoretical model, this paper takes Guangdong Power Group as an example to analyze the process of deregulation to correct the failure of government regulation, and then puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to improve the deregulation of power generation industry. It provides a substantial theoretical basis for the reform of power generation industry in China. The basic conclusions are as follows: first, China has carried out four stages of reform on the deregulation of power generation industry, each stage of deregulation, are stumbling, gains and losses, the results are not consistent. At present, it has entered a new period of reform, the reform in this period is bound to further relax the regulation of the power generation industry, and build a sufficient competition pattern of the power generation market. Second, saving transaction costs is the initial motivation for the government to relax the regulation of power generation industry. Government regulation results in a serious consumption of public sector rents in the power generation industry, which increases endogenous transaction costs. The process of deregulation is a process of decreasing endogenous transaction costs and increasing institutional performance. The deregulation of the power generation industry, on the one hand, makes the government save the cost of regulation, on the other hand, it allows the power generation enterprises to achieve growth in a more flexible and diverse way. The reform course of Guangdong Power Group further proves that the deregulation of power generation industry is a dynamic process of decreasing regulation cost and increasing system performance. Thirdly, the experience of deregulation in foreign power generation industry shows that the reform should be guaranteed by law, and deregulation does not mean letting go. The design of the reform plan should be considered as a whole, and the reform should grasp the scale of regulation and competition. The reform of electricity price mechanism should be focused on the establishment of a competitive and open electricity market. Fourth, to further improve the deregulation of China's power generation industry, not only a complete legal system should be guaranteed, but also should be guided by professional industry regulatory agencies; It is necessary not only to accurately grasp the "degree" of regulation and deregulation, but also to establish independent dispatch agencies to ensure the fairness and fairness of electricity dispatch, and to implement incentive regulations for environmental protection. To promote industrial upgrading and restructuring of the power generation industry.
【學位授予單位】：華南農(nóng)業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F426.61
本文編號：2375505
[Abstract]:At present, the contradictions caused by the government regulation of the power generation industry have been highlighted, and the reform of government regulation is moving towards the deep water area. However, the reform of government regulation in power generation industry is a systematic project involving a wide range of areas, various contents and complicated procedures. The reform process is extremely difficult, and the results of the reform are mixed. In this context, this paper takes deregulation as the starting point, trying to prove that the process of deregulation is the process of enhancing the market vitality, optimizing the industrial structure and improving the output performance of the power generation industry. On the basis of reviewing the reform course of deregulation in power generation industry, from the perspective of public management, based on the theory of property right regulation, this paper discusses the reasons, process and performance of deregulation in power generation industry. An analytical model of "transaction cost-deregulation-system performance" is constructed. This theoretical model shows that the deregulation of power generation industry can effectively save transaction costs and improve the institutional performance of deregulation in power generation industry. Based on this theoretical model, this paper takes Guangdong Power Group as an example to analyze the process of deregulation to correct the failure of government regulation, and then puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to improve the deregulation of power generation industry. It provides a substantial theoretical basis for the reform of power generation industry in China. The basic conclusions are as follows: first, China has carried out four stages of reform on the deregulation of power generation industry, each stage of deregulation, are stumbling, gains and losses, the results are not consistent. At present, it has entered a new period of reform, the reform in this period is bound to further relax the regulation of the power generation industry, and build a sufficient competition pattern of the power generation market. Second, saving transaction costs is the initial motivation for the government to relax the regulation of power generation industry. Government regulation results in a serious consumption of public sector rents in the power generation industry, which increases endogenous transaction costs. The process of deregulation is a process of decreasing endogenous transaction costs and increasing institutional performance. The deregulation of the power generation industry, on the one hand, makes the government save the cost of regulation, on the other hand, it allows the power generation enterprises to achieve growth in a more flexible and diverse way. The reform course of Guangdong Power Group further proves that the deregulation of power generation industry is a dynamic process of decreasing regulation cost and increasing system performance. Thirdly, the experience of deregulation in foreign power generation industry shows that the reform should be guaranteed by law, and deregulation does not mean letting go. The design of the reform plan should be considered as a whole, and the reform should grasp the scale of regulation and competition. The reform of electricity price mechanism should be focused on the establishment of a competitive and open electricity market. Fourth, to further improve the deregulation of China's power generation industry, not only a complete legal system should be guaranteed, but also should be guided by professional industry regulatory agencies; It is necessary not only to accurately grasp the "degree" of regulation and deregulation, but also to establish independent dispatch agencies to ensure the fairness and fairness of electricity dispatch, and to implement incentive regulations for environmental protection. To promote industrial upgrading and restructuring of the power generation industry.
【學位授予單位】：華南農(nóng)業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F426.61
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