財(cái)政分權(quán)下環(huán)境治理的地方政府行為研究
[Abstract]:In recent years, environmental economists have gradually reached a new consensus on EKC, that is, the relationship between environmental pollution and fiscal decentralization will undergo a process of positive correlation to negative correlation, and this critical point is the level of fiscal capacity of local governments. For China, the current empirical analysis is not only nationwide, but also the provincial panel data analysis shows that China's per capita financial capacity and inverted U curve inflection point value is far from each other, so the improvement of environmental quality can not be expected to increase the wealth of the people, otherwise it will fall into " In fact, the central government, as the highest representative of the public interest, has realized that "environmental pollution" is an important issue related to human well-being, but in the process of policy delivery and implementation, local governments are driven by fiscal decentralization and political incentives. In recent years, people have gradually realized the negative effects of fiscal decentralization on the human environment. As a kind of "institutional arrangement", the utilitarianism of local government's environmental governance behavior has caused me. Based on this, this paper discusses the "intermediate link" between fiscal decentralization and environmental pollution-the behavior of local government environmental governance. It combines normative analysis with empirical analysis, empirical analysis with historical analysis. The second part, from the historical point of view, first of all, the government environmental governance extended from different financial systems. This paper makes a linear review of the behavioral patterns and environmental policy instruments in different periods, and finds that fiscal decentralization has an impact on government behavior mainly from the following three aspects: fiscal expenditure structure, central transfer payment and industrial structure. On this basis, this paper focuses on the interpretation of local governments after the tax system. The third part, the empirical study, mainly selected five representative provinces in China as the research object, analyzed the relationship between fiscal decentralization and fiscal revenue and environmental pollution control investment in these five provinces, data from 2004-2013 < China Statistical Yearbook > and the website of the National Bureau of Statistics, the use of accounting. Quantitative analysis software is Stata.12, the statistical results show that fiscal decentralization measured by expenditure decentralization has a significant inverse correlation with environmental governance; fiscal decentralization measured by provincial and local fiscal revenue has no significant impact on the environment: GDP, foreign direct investment, industrialization level and other control variables on the role of the environment The fourth part introduces the experience of the United States, Japan and other countries in fiscal decentralization and environmental pollution, aiming at discussing finance by introducing and comparing the experience of China and some developed countries in fiscal reform, especially the differences in environmental control expenditure, central transfer payment and industrial structure. The fifth part is about how to get out of the predicament mainly from the source of environmental pollution - the system level, and how to establish a sound fiscal revenue and expenditure management system, adjust the local performance evaluation method, and change the local government's administration. In order to strengthen the public participation in environmental protection supervision and other aspects of specific recommendations. This paper innovations: 1, as a policy and institutional arrangements, fiscal decentralization has positive externalities and negative externalities, and now on the domestic fiscal decentralization and positive externalities (such as health care, education, infrastructure construction, etc.) on the relationship between the discussion Although many scholars have discussed the relationship between environmental pollution and fiscal decentralization, they have also put forward some suggestions to get out of the predicament from the perspective of experience, such as innovative work. The innovation of this paper is to examine the institutional reasons behind environmental pollution, start with the fiscal decentralization system, analyze the impact of this economic system on local government environmental governance behavior, and from the system. In order to enhance the validity and reliability of the research, this paper adopts the method of combining descriptive research with exploratory research and triangular cross-examination.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:華中師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2015
【分類號】:F812.2;D630
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