本文關(guān)鍵詞： 食品安全 監(jiān)管體制 委托-代理　出處：《西南政法大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：本文論題：食品安全監(jiān)管權(quán)是政府作為社會管理者所擔(dān)負的職權(quán)之一。從信息經(jīng)濟學(xué)的視角看，我國各級食品安全監(jiān)管部門不過是全體社會公眾的食品安全監(jiān)管權(quán)利代理人，他們與作為委托人的社會公眾之間存在著委托-代理關(guān)系。在信息經(jīng)濟學(xué)文獻中，常常將博弈中擁有信息的參與人稱為“代理人”，不擁有信息的參與人稱為“委托人”。在食品安全監(jiān)管關(guān)系中，政府擔(dān)任代理人角色，相應(yīng)地，社會公眾則是委托人，這一關(guān)系是隱藏行動道德風(fēng)險模型，委托人所能觀測到的只是結(jié)果，而不能直接觀測到代理人的行動本身和自然狀態(tài)本身。這一模型中，社會公眾基于對食品安全監(jiān)管者的信任讓渡了監(jiān)管權(quán)利，但是這一讓渡只是一種法律上的擬制，現(xiàn)實中存在代理人虛位的現(xiàn)象，理論上委托人與代理人也往往存在目標函數(shù)的差異。代理人（政府的監(jiān)管部門）可能因存在自利動機而不充分且善良履行其代理義務(wù)，濫用監(jiān)管權(quán)力，而扭曲食品安全監(jiān)管效果，這一代理關(guān)系的非市場化使委托人的食品安全監(jiān)管權(quán)利被不當?shù)男惺苟鴵p害委托人利益。同時，在食品安全監(jiān)管體系中存在多重代理、代理鏈條過長的情況，各級別、各部門代理人之間目標和行為取向可能均存在差異，統(tǒng)一性的缺乏導(dǎo)致委托人的目標不能實現(xiàn)，地區(qū)與部門之間缺乏溝通與合作，存在難以逾越的信息鴻溝，信息資源也無法互通有無。 本文研究思路：本文遵循規(guī)范-實證-比較-對策的研究思路，首先介紹委托-代理理論并通過分析食品安全監(jiān)管中的委托-代理關(guān)系，尋求食品安全監(jiān)管制度的理論基礎(chǔ)；其次，分析我國現(xiàn)的行食品安全監(jiān)管法律制度體系，發(fā)現(xiàn)制度問題并分析原因；再次，簡介國外先進的食品安全監(jiān)管經(jīng)驗；最后，提出制度完善建議。具體思路如圖： 有別于往常從公共管理角度去分析食品安全監(jiān)管制度，，本文主要觀點是作為食品安全監(jiān)管者的政府是社會公眾食品安全監(jiān)管權(quán)利的代理人，在行使食品安全監(jiān)管權(quán)時可能發(fā)生委托-代理問題，出現(xiàn)問題的原因主要有委托人虛位、代理鏈條延長、信息不對稱、代理關(guān)系非市場化等，在借鑒西方發(fā)達國家監(jiān)管體制的基礎(chǔ)上，針對食品安全監(jiān)管中的委托-代理問題嘗試提出食品安全監(jiān)管制度完善的新思路。
[Abstract]:The topic of this paper: food safety supervision right is one of the powers of government as a social management responsibility. From the perspective of information economics, China's food safety supervision departments at all levels, but the public food safety supervision rights and their agents, as between the public trustee exists the principal-agent relationship in information economics. In the literature, often will have the information game participation called "agent" does not have the participation of information called "client". In the food safety supervision in relation to the government as the agent role, accordingly, the public is the principal, this relationship is a hidden action moral hazard model, only the principal people can be observed, and cannot directly observe the agent's actions and the state of nature itself. In this model, the public based on food safety regulators The transfer of trust supervision rights, but this is just a transfer of legal fiction, there are agents of virtual phenomenon in reality, differences between the theory of principal and agent are the objective function. The agent (government regulators) may be due to the presence of self moving without full machine and good performance of its obligations the abuse of regulatory power, distorted, food safety regulatory effect, the agency relationship of the non market to food safety supervision right of the principal is improper exercise and harm the principal's interests. At the same time, the existence of multiple agents in the food safety supervision system, the long chain of circumstances, each level between each Department agent the goal and behavior orientation may have differences, the lack of unity in the principal goal can not be achieved, the lack of communication and cooperation between regions and departments, there are more difficult than the information gap Information resources can not be exchanged.
The research idea of this paper: This paper follows the specification - Empirical Studies - Comparison of countermeasures, first introduces the principal-agent theory and through the analysis of food safety supervision in the principal - agent relationship, the theoretical basis for the food safety supervision system; secondly, analyze the legal system of food safety supervision system of our country, and find the system problem analysis of causes; again, introduction of foreign advanced food safety supervision experience; finally, puts forward some improvement suggestions system. Specific ideas such as map:
Different from usual from the perspective of public management to analyze the food safety supervision system, the main points of this paper are as food safety regulator of the government is the public food safety supervision rights of the agent in the exercise of food safety supervision when possible principal-agent problem, because the problem with the principal agent chain extension, virtual information the relationship between non market asymmetry, etc., on the basis of the supervision system in western developed countries, the principal food safety supervision agency problems try to put forward new ideas on improving food safety supervision system.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：D923.6

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本文編號：1453426